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QUESTION PRESENTED
Congress effected a sweeping and comprehensive
restructuring of the Nation’s health-insurance
markets in the Patient Protection and Affordable
Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010),
as amended by the Health Care and Education
Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124
Stat. 109 (collectively, the “Act” or “ACA”). In No.
11-398, this Court is reviewing whether Congress
exceeded its Article I authority when it enacted the
ACA’s mandate that virtually every individual
American obtain health insurance. 26 U.S.C.A.
§ 5000A(a). Here, the question presented is:
Whether the remainder of the Act must be
invalidated in whole or in part because it cannot be
severed from the individual mandate.

ii
PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING
AND RULE 29.6 STATEMENT
Three private individuals or organizations were
Plaintiffs-Appellees below and are Petitioners in No.
11-393 and Respondents (by rule) in No. 11-400:
National Federation of Independent Business
(“NFIB”); Kaj Ahlburg; and Mary Brown. NFIB is a
nonprofit mutual benefit corporation that promotes
and protects the rights of its members to own,
operate, and grow their businesses across the fifty
States and the District of Columbia. NFIB is not a
publicly traded corporation, issues no stock, and has
no parent corporation. There is no publicly held
corporation with more than a 10% ownership stake
in NFIB.
26 States, by and through their Attorneys
General
or
Governors,
were
PlaintiffsAppellees/Cross-Appellants
below
and
are
Petitioners in No. 11-400 and Respondents (by rule)
in No. 11-393: Alabama; Alaska; Arizona; Colorado;
Florida; Georgia; Idaho; Indiana; Iowa; Kansas;
Louisiana; Maine; Michigan; Mississippi; Nebraska;
Nevada; North Dakota; Ohio; Pennsylvania; South
Carolina; South Dakota; Texas; Utah; Washington;
Wisconsin; and Wyoming.
Six federal officers or agencies were DefendantsAppellants/Cross-Appellees
below
and
are
Respondents in Nos. 11-393 & 11-400: Kathleen
Sebelius, in her official capacity as Secretary of
Health and Human Services; Timothy F. Geithner, in
his official capacity as Secretary of the Treasury;
Hilda L. Solis, in her official capacity as Secretary of
Labor; and the United States Departments of Health
and Human Services, of the Treasury, and of Labor.
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BRIEF FOR PRIVATE PETITIONERS
Private Petitioners respectfully submit this brief
arguing that the individual mandate is not severable
from the remainder of the Act.1
OPINIONS BELOW
The opinion of the court of appeals (Pet.App. 1a273a) is reported at 648 F.3d 1235. The summaryjudgment opinion of the district court (Pet.App. 274a368a) is reported at 780 F. Supp. 2d 1256. The
district court’s motion-to-dismiss opinion (Pet.App.
394a-475a) is reported at 716 F. Supp. 2d 1120.
JURISDICTION
The Eleventh Circuit entered judgment on
August 12, 2011. The petitions for writs of certiorari
were filed on September 27 and 28, 2011. This Court
has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).
STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED
The appendix hereto
provisions from the Act.

reproduces

selected

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Act reflects an intricate deal that emerged
from one of the most hard-fought and narrowly
decided legislative battles in recent memory. It
produced a “comprehensive and complex regulatory
scheme” (Pet.App. 22a) that proponents claimed
would achieve near-universal health-insurance
coverage and reduce health-insurance costs—without
increasing the federal budget deficit.
To avoid confusion, all “Pet.App.” citations reference the
appendix to the Government’s certiorari petition in No. 11-398.
“RE” citations reference the Eleventh Circuit Record Excerpts.
1

2
A. The Act’s Passage
1. Origins Of The Act
Comprehensive change of the Nation’s system of
health insurance was a central issue in the 2008
Democratic presidential primary, with each major
candidate outlining proposals to achieve nearuniversal coverage while lowering costs. See, e.g.,
Michael Cooper, It Was Clinton vs. Obama on Health
Care, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16, 2007, at A30. ThenSenator Hillary Clinton was the first to propose a
mandate that every individual purchase health
insurance—a proposal that then-Senator Barack
Obama sharply criticized. Id. Clinton responded
that universal coverage would be impossible absent
an individual mandate. Id.
After taking office, President Obama’s position
on an insurance mandate changed. The shift began
after the insurance industry’s two main trade
associations offered to support comprehensive
regulation on the condition that any bill contain “an
enforceable mandate for individual coverage.”
Robert Pear, Health Insurers Offer to Accept All
Applicants, On Condition, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 20, 2008,
at A30. This offer led to planning sessions between
congressional leaders and major healthcare
stakeholders, at which the centrality of the mandate
became clear. See, e.g., Robert Pear, Health Care
Industry in Talks to Shape Policy, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
20, 2009, at A16. In the face of this pressure, the
President signaled a willingness to depart from his
campaign pronouncements. Robert Pear, Obama
Open to Mandate That People Own Coverage, N.Y.
TIMES, June 3, 2009, at A17. Likewise, the chairs of
critical congressional committees agreed “to plow

3
ahead on the assumptions that individuals would be
required to carry insurance” and “that most
employers would be required to help pay for it.”
Robert Pear, Team Effort In the House To Overhaul
Health Care, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 18, 2009, at A12.
2. Goals Of The Legislative Effort
For proponents of change, any legislation had to
serve two fundamental goals: (1) ensuring nearly
universal coverage, in particular by prohibiting what
were described as discriminatory and abusive
practices by insurance companies, such as the
refusal to insure sick individuals and the pricing of
insurance based on individual actuarial risk; and
(2) reducing the overall cost of health insurance.
The President made clear throughout the process
that his core goal was to expand coverage, especially
by eliminating the putative insurer abuses. As he
explained in his 2010 State of the Union address:
I took on health care because of the stories
I’ve heard from Americans with preexisting
conditions whose lives depend on getting
coverage; patients who’ve been denied
coverage;
families—even
those
with
insurance—who are just one illness away
from financial ruin. …
The approach we’ve taken would protect
every American from the worst practices of
the insurance industry. It would give small
businesses and uninsured Americans a
chance to choose an affordable health care
plan in a competitive market.2
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-presidentstate-union-address.

2

4
Legislators echoed the sentiment. E.g., 155 Cong.
Rec. S13295, 13306 (daily ed. Dec. 16, 2009) (Sen.
Johnson) (“This legislation … puts an end to
insurance industry abuses that have denied coverage
to hard-working Americans ….”).
Equally “driving” the legislative effort, though,
was the fact that costs were “exploding.” Robert
Pear, Obama’s Health Plan, Ambitious in Any
Economy, Is Tougher In This One, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
2, 2009, at A14 (quoting Melody C. Barnes, director
of the President’s Domestic Policy Council). Once
again, President Obama was emphatic:
Then there’s the problem of rising cost. …
[This is why] so many employers–especially
small
businesses—are
forcing
their
employees to pay more for insurance, or are
dropping their coverage entirely ….
The plan I’m announcing tonight …will slow
the growth of health care costs for our
families,
our
businesses,
and
our
government. It’s a plan that asks everyone
to take responsibility for meeting this
challenge—not just government, not just
insurance
companies,
but
everybody
including employers and individuals.

Remarks by the President to a Joint Session of
Congress on Health Care, Sept. 9, 2009 (“Remarks to
Congress”).3
Then-Speaker Pelosi, and
legislators, echoed this refrain:

countless

other

http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-by-thePresident-to-a-Joint-Session-of-Congress-on-Health-Care/
3

5
We all know that the present … health insurance
system in our country is unsustainable. We
simply cannot afford it. … The best action that
we can take on behalf of America’s family
budgets and on behalf of the Federal budget is to
pass health care reform.
156 Cong. Rec. H1891, 1896 (daily ed. Mar. 21, 2010);
see also, e.g., 156 Cong. Rec. S1923, 1931 (daily ed.
Mar. 24, 2010) (Sen. Levin) (“At its heart, this bill …
aim[s] to tackle the central problems of our health
care system—rising costs and the insecurity many
Americans rightly feel about the lack of
dependability of their insurance.”).
3. Critical Constraints
Despite the urgency with which the President
and congressional leaders pushed forward, they faced
many obstacles to obtaining the necessary votes.
Significant
disagreements,
even
among
proponents of comprehensive legislation, left little
room for workable compromise. For example, many
supported a strong “public option,” i.e., a
government-run insurer, which was said to “remove
the profit motive as an obstacle to medical care”; 4
others argued that the “public option” would produce
inefficient and unfair competition with the private
sector; and still others offered compromise solutions
involving more limited public plans. See Robert
Pear, Schumer Points to a Middle Ground on
Government-Run Health Insurance, N.Y. TIMES, May
David M. Herszenhorn, Public Option Keeps Toehold in
Senate Deal on Health Bill, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 9, 2009,
4

http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/10/health/policy/10health.html
?scp=32&sq=health+care+public+option&st=nyt.

6
5, 2009, at A20. Many legislators were concerned
about imposing the onerous taxes that would be
necessary to fund an expansion in health-insurance
coverage. See David M. Herszenhorn, Democrats
Are at Odds on Financing Health Care, N.Y. TIMES,
July 10, 2009, at A14.
Moreover, the Act had no hope of passing if it
was scored by the Congressional Budget Office
(“CBO”) as increasing the federal deficit. President
Obama was emphatic that “[h]ealth care reform
must not add to our deficits over the next 10 years—
it must be at least deficit neutral.” Letter from
President Obama to Senators Kennedy and Baucus
(June 3, 2009).5 The President bluntly warned: “I
will not sign a plan that adds one dime to our
deficits—either now or in the future.” Remarks to
Congress, supra. The Senate Majority Leader agreed
that any bill had to not only “lower the cost of
staying healthy” but also “reduce the national debt.”6
And key, centrist Senators likewise insisted on this
constraint. See, e.g., Robert Pear & David M.
Herszenhorn, Democrats Are Considering Additional
Tax on Insurers, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9, 2009, at A19
(“[W]e all set goals and we really, really, really
worked hard to stay within those goals of making
sure that it was deficit-neutral.” (quoting Sen.
Lincoln)); Nelson: Bill Must Be Deficit Neutral,
ORLANDO SENTINEL, Oct. 2, 2009, at A18.
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Letter-fromPresident-Obama-to-Chairmen-Edward-M-Kennedy-and-MaxBaucus.
5

Press Conference of Sen. Harry Reid at 0:29-0:34, Dec. 19,
2009, available at http://reid.senate.gov/newsroom/121909
_finalbill.cfm.

6
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4. Early Versions Of The Act
The Act’s first precursor was released by the
House Ways and Means Committee. The draft bill:
x

Required that insurance companies provide
insurance on a “guaranteed-issue” basis, i.e.,
that they provide coverage for all consumers,
regardless of any pre-existing health
conditions. H.R.__ [Discussion Draft], §§ 111112 (June 19, 2009).7

x

Required “community-rated” premiums—i.e.,
premiums reflecting average costs in a
particular
region,
but
(with
limited
exceptions) not individual characteristics
reflecting actuarial risk. Id. § 113.

x

Provided that “[i]n the case of any individual
who does not [maintain insurance] at any
time during the taxable year, there is hereby
imposed a tax.” Id. § 401.

This draft was subject to intense negotiations,
and sharp disagreements led to three different
committee versions.8 Ultimately, the House passed,
by a vote of 220 to 215, a version that retained the
guaranteed-issue and community-rating provisions,
and imposed a tax on individuals without insurance
(but not a direct mandate to buy it). H.R. 3962,
111th Cong. §§ 211-213, 501 (Nov. 7, 2009). The bill
also included a severability clause, providing that if
any provision were held to be unconstitutional, the
rest of the bill would remain in effect. Id. § 255.
7

http://waysandmeans.house.gov/media/pdf/111/hrdraft.pdf.

David M. Herszenhorn & Robert Pear, House Health Care Bill
Criticized as Panel Votes for Public Plan, N.Y. TIMES, July 31,
8

2009, at A11.

8
The initial bill reported from committee in the
Senate, like the House bill, imposed guaranteedissue and community-rating rules on insurers.
Affordable Health Choices Act § 101, S. 1679, 111th
Cong. (as reported by Sen. Comm. on Health, Educ.,
Labor, and Pensions Sept. 17, 2009). In contrast to
the House bill, however, the Senate bill did not apply
a tax if an individual was uninsured. Rather, to
comport with the President’s campaign pledge not to
raise taxes on families earning under $250,000 per
year, it instead imposed a direct legal requirement
that “[e]very individual shall ensure that such
individual … is covered under qualifying coverage at
all times during the taxable year.” Id. § 161; see also
Adam Nagourney & David M. Herszenhorn,
Republicans Call Health Legislation a Tax Increase,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 2, 2009, at A22.
Following intense negotiation among the
congressional leadership, a final Senate bill was
introduced. S. Amend. No. 2786 to H.R. 3590, 111th
Cong. (introduced Nov. 19, 2009). This version
included guaranteed-issue and community-rating
rules, like each of its predecessors, and it also
imposed an individual insurance mandate, with
compliance enforced by “payment of [a] penalty.” Id.
§§ 1201, 1501.
Notably, however, the Senate
amendment deleted the severability clause that had
been included in the House bill. Following further
amendments, exactly sixty Senators—just enough
under Senate rules, Sen. R. XXII—ended debate on
the bill on December 23, 2009; and with the same
sixty votes, the Senate passed the bill the next day.9
Bill Summary and Status, H.R. 3590, available at http://
thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d111:HR03590:@@@X.
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5. Final Passage And Reconciliation
Just a few weeks later, Scott Brown won a
special election to fill a Senate seat previously
occupied by Paul Kirk, who had voted for the Senate
bill. A central plank in Brown’s campaign was that
he had “vowed to oppose” the bill. Michael Cooper,
G.O.P. Senate Victory Stuns Democrats, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 19, 2010, at A1. Thus, when he was sworn in,
there were no longer sixty supportive Senators, so a
filibuster could not be avoided on any future votes.
This was critical, because no single bill had yet
been enacted by both houses of Congress, as required
by the Constitution. Ordinarily, different House and
Senate versions of a bill are reconciled by a
conference committee into a final bill, which each
house then must pass. But, in this case, any bill
remotely resembling the one passed by the Senate in
December 2009 was sure to be filibustered in the
reconstituted Senate. Accordingly, the House had no
choice, if it wanted such a bill, but to pass it in the
exact form in which it had passed the Senate.
The only way for Congress then to make any
changes was to amend the bill through a procedure
known as budget reconciliation. By statute, budget
reconciliation bills may be debated in the Senate for
only twenty hours, 2 U.S.C. § 641(e)(2), which makes
filibusters impossible. However, such bills may
include only provisions that have direct budgetary
impacts. Id. § 644(b)(1)(A). Congress was thus
precluded
from
making
any
non-budgetary
amendments to the Senate bill.
With no other option, the House adopted a rule
providing for all-or-nothing consideration of the
Senate bill without amendments, see H.R. Res. 1203,
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111th Cong. (2010), and passed the Senate bill (the
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act) by a
final vote of 219 to 212. The House and Senate then
passed, by simple majority vote, the Health Care and
Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, a reconciliation
bill that adopted certain budgetary amendments.
David M. Herszenhorn & Robert Pear, Final Votes in
Congress Cap Battle over Health, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
26, 2010, at A17.
B. Operation Of The Act
The Act operates through nine titles (as amended
by a tenth). Its heart, contained in Title I, expands
insurance coverage by simultaneously requiring
insurers to provide broad coverage to all comers and
imposing on individuals and employers a “shared
responsibility” to buy it.
Title I also assists
individuals in satisfying the mandate by subsidizing
their purchase of insurance through newly created
“Health Benefit Exchanges.” Title II fills remaining
gaps in coverage, by expanding Medicaid and other
public insurance programs. Titles III through VIII
aim to increase the availability of various services
and the efficiency of health-insurance coverage—e.g.,
by increasing preventative-care coverage, reducing
fraud and abuse in public insurance, and expanding
prescription-drug coverage. Finally, Title IX imposes
various revenue-raising measures to “offset” the
spending measures in the Act.
1. Insurance Regulations
The Act comprehensively regulates various
aspects of health insurance. Specifically, Congress
banned “discrimination based on health status,” by
requiring
insurance
companies
to
provide
“guaranteed-issue” coverage and charge “community-
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rated” premiums. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 300gg, 300gg-1(a),
300gg-3(a), 300gg-4. Relatedly, Congress limited
insurers’ ability to restrict the scope and duration of
covered services. Insurers thus may not: refuse to
pay for certain services, such as “preventative health
services,” id. §§ 300gg-6(a), 300gg-13; impose annual
or lifetime limits on coverage, id. § 300gg-11; rescind
coverage absent fraud, id. § 300gg-12; impose
“unreasonable” premium increases, id. § 300gg4(a)(1); or require more than a maximum level of
“cost sharing” (e.g., deductibles) from insured
individuals, id. § 18022(c)(3)(A). See Pet.App. 26a31a (describing the Act’s restrictions on insurance).
The Act thus effectively requires insurers to offer
health insurance to any individual, no matter how
sick, and to cover limitless amounts of healthcare for
the life of the insured, at average rates that ignore
actuarial risk. These measures serve the Act’s goal
of expanding health-insurance coverage and curbing
“discriminatory” insurance practices; but by
themselves, they severely undermine the Act’s other
principal goal of reducing health-insurance costs.
See 42 U.S.C.A. § 18091(a)(2)(I). As the Eleventh
Circuit noted, according to the CBO, by “requir[ing]
private insurers … to cover the unhealthy,” but
forbidding them from “pric[ing] that coverage [based]
on actuarial risks,” the Act’s insurance regulations
will raise insurance costs in the individual market by
27 to 30%. Pet.App. 126a n.107, 129a n.114.10

Citing CBO, An Analysis of Health Insurance Premiums
Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, at 6
(Nov. 30, 2009) (“CBO, Premiums”), http://www.cbo.gov/
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ftpdocs/107xx/doc10781/11-30-Premiums.pdf.).
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2. Individual Mandate
To counteract the cost-increasing effect of the
Act’s insurance regulations, Congress heeded the
insurance industry’s lobbying to impose a mandate
for individuals to purchase insurance coverage.11
The mandate provides:
An applicable individual shall for each
month beginning after 2013 ensure that the
individual, and any dependent of the
individual who is an applicable individual, is
covered under minimum essential coverage
for such month.
26 U.S.C.A. § 5000A(a). This legal “requirement” to
obtain health insurance is enforced by a monetary
“penalty” for each month of non-compliance. Id.
§ 5000A(b).
The mandate was intended to counteract the
inflationary effects of the Act’s insurance regulations
in two distinct ways. First, and most significantly,
the mandate directly subsidizes insurance companies
by forcing healthy individuals to buy extensive
coverage on economically disadvantageous terms,
namely, at the same price as unhealthy persons.
Second, Congress believed the mandate, along with
other provisions of the Act, would reduce the costs
imposed on doctors, patients, and insurers as a result
of uncompensated care.
See, e.g., Addressing Insurance Market Reform: Hearing
Before the S. Comm. on Health, Education, Labor & Pensions,
111th Cong. (2009) (submission of Ronald A. Williams,
Chairman & CEO, Aetna, Inc.) (“Since 2005, we at Aetna have
been speaking out in support of an individual coverage
requirement ….”).

11
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a. The most significant effect of the mandate is
to subsidize insurers, which will in turn hold down
the premiums paid by individuals and families. By
forcing “millions of new customers [in]to the health
insurance market,” the mandate increases the
number of customers for insurers. 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 18091(a)(2)(C). As Senator Franken explained in
justifying the insurance regulations, “we are giving
these companies a huge influx of new business.” 156
Cong. Rec. S1821, 1862 (daily ed. Mar. 23, 2010).
Moreover, this “huge influx” is highly profitable,
because it consists of primarily healthy individuals,
who have sensibly decided that comprehensive
insurance is not financially worthwhile.
The
statutory findings expressly state that the mandate’s
“broaden[ing of] the health insurance risk pool to
include healthy individuals … will lower health
insurance premiums” and is therefore “essential to
creating effective health insurance markets.” 42
U.S.C.A. § 18091(a)(2)(I).
The mandate does not target, and was not
needed to capture, the sick or the poor. Regardless of
the mandate, unhealthy individuals will voluntarily
purchase insurance at favorable rates, under the
guaranteed-issue and community-rating provisions.12
And impoverished individuals will generally be
covered either by the Act’s subsidies for participation
in health-insurance exchanges or by the expanded
Medicaid program. See infra at 19-22. Accordingly,
the mandate targets healthy individuals who could
CBO, Premiums, 19 (“[I]n the absence of [the mandate],
people who are older and more likely to use medical care would
be more likely to enroll in nongroup plans” than “people who
are younger and expect to use less medical care.”).
12
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afford insurance but believe, given their infrequent
healthcare needs, that its cost is not warranted,
particularly given the 30% increase in premiums
caused by the Act’s insurance regulations.13
Conscripting these individuals into the insurance
market will greatly reduce the average payouts
required from insurance companies. That is why the
mandate lowers prices for voluntary insurance
customers, inverting the normal economic axiom that
increased demand increases prices. Specifically, the
mandate is supposed to lower premiums in the nongroup market by 15-20%, offsetting roughly twothirds of the increase caused by the Act’s insurance
regulations.14 Based on CBO estimates, this subsidy
is worth between $28 and $39 billion in 2016 alone.15
As the Eleventh Circuit noted, Congress used this
subsidy “to mitigate [the Act’s] regulatory costs on
private insurers.” Pet.App. 129a.16
CBO, Effects of Eliminating the Individual Mandate to
Obtain Health Insurance, at 2 (June 16, 2010) (“CBO, Effects”),

13

http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/113xx/doc11379/Eliminate_Individu
al_Mandate_06_16.pdf (“[T]he elimination of the mandate
would reduce insurance coverage among healthier people to a
greater degree than it would reduce coverage among less
healthy people.”).
14

CBO, Effects, 2.

15 The

average premium in the non-group market in 2016 will
be $5,800 after the reduction, which would mean the mandate
lowered premiums by $1,024 to $1,450 for each of the 27 million
voluntary participants. CBO, Premiums, 6; CBO, Effects, 2.
Indeed, as the Government explained below, Congress
believed that “the absence of a minimum coverage requirement
[to
offset]
guaranteed-issue
and
community-rating
requirements had undermined health care reform efforts in
several states.” Govt. Br. at 31 (11th Cir. Apr. 1, 2011).
16
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In addition to reducing the average payouts by
insurance companies, Congress also believed that the
mandate protected insurers’ incoming revenue
stream, by preventing a type of “adverse selection”
thought to be enabled by the Act’s guaranteed-issue
and community-rating rules. Namely, people now
“would wait to purchase health insurance until they
need[] care.” 42 U.S.C.A. § 18091(a)(2)(I). Indeed,
some proponents of the mandate claimed that this
“adverse selection” phenomenon “tends to lead to a
death spiral of individual insurance.” 17 Rightly or
wrongly, Congress thought the mandate “essential”
to prevent such adverse selection. Id.18
b. In addition to directly subsidizing insurance
companies by conscripting healthy individuals,

Statement of Uwe Reinhardt, Making Health Care Work for
American Families, Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Energy &
Commerce, Subcomm. on Health, 111th Cong. 11 (Mar. 17,
2009).
17

18 As the Eleventh Circuit explained, Congress’ concerns about
this kind of “adverse selection” are both highly implausible and
completely speculative.
One “cannot literally purchase
insurance on the way to the hospital,” because “the Act permits
insurers to restrict enrollment to a specific open or special
enrollment period,” and it additionally allows waiting periods
for general coverage eligibility. Pet.App. 178a n.139 (citing 42
U.S.C.A. §§ 300gg-1(b), 300gg-7). Thus, an individual hoping to
game the Act’s insurance regulations would have to gamble
that, if he contracted some catastrophic illness, he would be
able to wait until an open enrollment period (generally one
month out of each year) and then wait an additional period for
coverage to kick in. In this regard, neither Congress nor the
CBO offered even a rough estimate, based on the States’
experience or otherwise, of the extent to which people might
delay purchasing insurance because of the availability of
guaranteed-issue and community-rating rules.
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Congress also thought the mandate would “lower
health insurance premiums” by reducing the alleged
premium increase of “over $1,000 a year”
attributable to uncompensated care provided to the
uninsured. 42 U.S.C.A. § 18091(a)(2)(F). Congress
found that the uninsured “fail to pay the full cost of
the services they consume” and instead “shift the
costs of their uncompensated care—totaling $43
billion in 2008—to health care providers.” Govt.
Cert. Pet. 6 (citing 42 U.S.C.A. § 18091(a)(2)(A)).
Congress believed that providers in turn “pass on the
cost to private insurers,” which “increases family
premiums by on average over $1,000 a year.” 42
U.S.C.A. § 18091(a)(2)(F). Congress thus thought
that, “[b]y significantly reducing the number of the
uninsured, the [mandate] … will lower …
premiums.” Id.
In fact, the mandate will have virtually no
impact on uncompensated care. As the Eleventh
Circuit explained, the data on which Congress relied
for its $43 billion estimate of uncompensated care
show that the vast majority of this sum is
attributable to people not affected by the mandate.
First, $15 billion is attributable to people who will
become eligible for Medicaid under the Act, and are
therefore likely to obtain insurance without the
mandate. Pet.App. 127a. Another $8.7 billion is
provided to individuals with pre-existing conditions,
who will buy coverage voluntarily under the new
guaranteed-issue and community-rating regulations.
Id. 127a-28a.
An additional $8.1 billion is
attributable to aliens not subject to the mandate. Id.
127a. And another $3.3 billion is caused by the
failure of individuals with insurance to pay out-ofpocket expenses such as deductibles. Id. 128a. Thus,
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the amount of uncompensated care even potentially
attributable to individuals affected by the mandate is
less than $8 billion, 0.33% of the $2.4 trillion
healthcare market. Id.
Moreover, other data show that even this $8
billion figure is substantially overstated.
As a
threshold matter, many uninsured individuals obtain
no healthcare in a given year, and most others
actually pay in full. The uninsured on average
obtain no uncompensated care from non-emergency
providers and actually pay more for those services
than the insured do.19 As for emergency care, less
than 20% of the full-year uninsured visit emergency
rooms, which is the only place where federal law
requires that the indigent receive limited
“stabilizing” care.20
Thus, as detailed by amicus curiae in the court
below, the voluntarily uninsured obtain, on average,
only $854 in healthcare services per year. 21 And
when it comes to emergency-room care, “the data
show that the targets of the mandate consume only
$56 per year on average in total emergency-room
care, which includes both the mandated emergency
stabilization care (which may still be billed to
patients) and the more routine care administered
there.”22 Given CBO estimates that the individual
Jonathan Gruber & David Rodriquez, How Much
Uncompensated Care Do Doctors Provide?, 26 J. HEALTH ECON.

19

1151, 1159-61 (2007).
20

CDC, Health, 337; 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd.

See Amicus Curiae Economists Br. at 13-16 (11th Cir. May 11,
2011).
21

22

Id.
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mandate will cause 16 million people to buy
insurance, 23 it will only affect people consuming
about $900 million (16 million x $56) in emergencyroom care, and an even smaller amount of
uncompensated care. The full $900 million equals
approximately 2% of Congress’ inflated estimate of
$43 billion in uncompensated care, and .038% of the
$2.4 trillion healthcare market.
In short, the
mandate targets individuals who are unlikely to
obtain healthcare at all and who mostly pay when
they do.
In truth, Congress’s professed concern with costshifting attributable to uncompensated care is
somewhat ironic, given the extent to which the Act
affirmatively requires cost-shifting in other respects.
By any measure, uncompensated care attributable to
those affected by the individual mandate is a small
fraction of the $28 to $39 billion in costs that will be
shifted from the new, healthier customers affected by
the individual mandate to insurance companies and
their voluntary, less-healthy customers.
In addition, even after 2014, the Act does not
allow insurers to subject those who refuse to buy
insurance to pre-existing condition bans or higher
premiums. Moreover, the Act exempts millions of
individuals from the penalty for violating the
mandate, see 26 U.S.C.A. § 5000A(e), and the
relatively modest penalties are not used to offset the
costs of insuring those who purchase insurance only
once ill. For all of these reasons, private insurance
customers will continue to bear the cost of millions of
people failing to buy insurance after 2014.
23

CBO, Effects 2.
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Moreover, Medicaid pays substantially lower
rates than private insurers. 24 On Congress’ view
that hospitals shift unrecovered costs to private
insurers, such rates would likely shift costs to
private insurance. Indeed, the Act exacerbates that
cost-shifting by expanding Medicaid while cutting
Medicaid reimbursements. Likewise, “[t]he current
tax exclusion for the premiums of employment-based
health plans provides a subsidy of about 30 percent”
to those receiving employer-based insurance, another
amount far greater than any subsidy for
uncompensated care provided to the voluntarily
uninsured.25
3. Exchanges And Federal Subsidies
Title I of the Act also requires the creation of
state “Health Benefit Exchanges” by January 1,
2014. 42 U.S.C.A. § 18031. These are marketplaces
through which individuals (or small businesses) can
purchase the mandated insurance.
To sell insurance on an exchange, an insurer
must be certified as offering “qualified health plans,”
id. § 18031(d)(2)(B)(I), which must pay for certain
“essential health benefits,” id. § 18021(a)(1)(B).
These include a wide range of services including
substance-abuse treatment, behavioral health
treatment,
prescription
drugs,
rehabilitative
services, and preventive services. Id. § 18022(b)(1).
Insurers must limit “cost sharing” by insureds—i.e.,
out-of-pocket costs like deductibles. Id. § 18022(c).
CBO, Key Issues in Analyzing Major Health Insurance
Proposals, at 114-15 (Dec. 2008), http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/
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99xx/doc9924/12-18-KeyIssues.pdf
25

Id. at XVII.
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Insurers also must calibrate their plans to pay for a
specific percentage of the healthcare costs for all
enrollees: A “bronze” plan must pay for 60% of the
healthcare costs obtained by enrollees, a “silver” plan
must pay 70%, a “gold” plan 80%, and a “platinum”
plan 90%. Id. § 18022(d)(1). Insurers may offer the
option of a “catastrophic plan,” which provides no
benefits until a certain level of out-of-pocket costs is
met, but only to individuals who are under 30 or
exempt based on economic hardship from the penalty
for violating the mandate. Id. § 18022(e).
The Act provides extensive subsidies for lowincome individuals to participate in exchanges. 26
U.S.C.A. § 36B; 42 U.S.C.A. § 18071. Specifically,
tax credits are available for individuals who
purchase health insurance through an exchange and
have income between 100% and 400% of poverty
levels. 26 U.S.C.A. § 36B(a), (b), (c)(1). The credits
are tied to the lesser of (i) the actual premiums paid
by the individual on a plan purchased on an
exchange, or (ii) the community-rated premiums for
the second-cheapest “silver” plan offered through an
exchange for the geographic “rating area” where the
individual resides. Id. §§ 36B(b)(2), (b)(3)(C).
The CBO has predicted that, by 2019, 24 million
people will be insured through exchanges, and 20
million of them will receive federal subsidies of, on
average, $6,460 per person. 26 That amounts to an
annual federal subsidy of almost $13 billion.

CBO, Analysis of the Major Health Care Legislation Enacted
in March 2010, at 19 (Mar. 30, 2011) (“CBO, Analysis”),
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http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/121xx/doc12119/03-30-HealthCare
Legislation.pdf.
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4. Employer “Responsibility” Assessment
Subtitle F of Title I imposes “Shared
Responsibility for Health Care,” not just on
individuals subject to the mandate, but on employers
as well. Immediately after creating the mandate
requiring “Individual Responsibility” for insurance in
Part I, Subtitle F creates “Employer Responsibilities”
in Part II. In contrast to the individual mandate,
employers’ “responsibility” does not include a direct
legal requirement to offer insurance to their
employees. Instead, it consists of an exaction that is
triggered if at least one employee of an employer
with at least 50 full-time employees obtains a federal
subsidy to purchase health insurance on an
exchange, whether because (a) the employer fails to
offer “minimum essential coverage” in an employersponsored plan, 26 U.S.C.A. § 4980H(a), or (b) the
employer offers “minimum essential coverage,” but it
is unaffordable or does not cover the same level of
benefits as a “bronze” plan on an exchange, id.
§ 4980H(b). See also Pet.App. 45a-47a.
5. Expansion Of Medicaid
In keeping with the Act’s theme of “shared
responsibility,” Title II compels the States to expand
Medicaid coverage for many individuals who would
likely not be able to obtain other insurance. Starting
in 2014, states must offer Medicaid to adults under
age 65 with incomes up to 133% of federal poverty
levels. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396a(a)(10)(A)(i)(VIII). States
must likewise offer Medicaid to all children whose
families earn up to 133% of federal poverty levels.
Id. §§ 1396a(a)(10)(A)(i)(VII), 1396a(l)(1)(D), 2(C). As
the Eleventh Circuit explained, “[t]his is a significant
change, because previously the Medicaid Act did not
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set a baseline income level [and] many states
currently do not provide Medicaid to childless adults
and cover parents only at much lower income levels.”
Pet.App. 49a.
6. Revenue-Raising And Deficit-Neutrality
“Offset” Measures
To ensure a CBO score of deficit-neutrality, the
Act includes various tax increases and spending cuts
necessary to fund the subsidies, Medicaid expansion,
and other expenditures in the Act. As the Federal
Government itself explained below, “[w]hen Congress
passed the ACA, it was careful to ensure that any
increased spending … was offset by other revenueraising and cost-saving provisions.” RE 1024.
Title IX adopts a series of new healthcare-related
taxes and fees expressly described as “Revenue
Offset Provisions,” which fall, inter alia, on
individuals,
employers,
insurance
companies,
pharmaceutical companies, and manufacturers of
medical devices. E.g., 26 U.S.C.A. §§ 1401(b)(2),
1411, 3101(b)(2) (imposing additional Medicare taxes
on high-income taxpayers); id. § 4980I (taxing socalled “Cadillac” plans); id. §§ 106(f), 125(i),
220(d)(2)(A), 223(d)(2)(A) (restricting ability to pay
for healthcare with pre-tax dollars); id. § 213(a)
(limiting itemized deduction for medical expenses);
id. § 139A (eliminating deduction for employers who
provide prescription-drug coverage for retirees); ACA
§§ 9008-9010 (various fees).
The Act also cuts various payments under public
programs such as Medicare. For example, it reduces
“disproportionate share hospital payments,” which
are special payments to hospitals that provide a
disproportionate share of uncompensated care. 42
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U.S.C.A. §§ 1396r–4(f)(7), 1395ww(r). According to
the President, this was a “common-sense change[]”
because “if more Americans are insured, we can cut
payments that help hospitals treat patients without
health insurance.” Sheryl Gay Stolberg & Robert
Pear, Health Plan May Mean Payment Cuts, N.Y.
TIMES, June 14, 2009, at A20.
7. Miscellaneous Additions
The Act also includes hundreds of measures
ostensibly aimed at improving the quality, efficiency,
and availability of healthcare. Many of these operate
through public programs like Medicare. E.g., ACA
§§ 2501, 2503 (adjusting reimbursement formulas for
prescription drugs); id. § 3401 (adjusting payments
for inpatient hospital, home health, skilled nursing
facility, hospice and other Medicare providers
according to productivity); 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395ww(q)
(reducing Medicare payments to hospitals with
specified percentages of preventable readmissions);
id. § 1395ww(p) (reducing Medicare payments for
hospital-acquired conditions).
Other measures involve direct federal spending.
E.g., 42 U.S.C.A. § 1315a (creating Center for
Medicare and Medicaid Innovation to study more
efficient payment methods for public programs); id.
§ 300hh–31 (establishing grants for epidemiology
laboratories); id. § 1320e (establishing “PatientCentered Outcomes Research Institute” to research
effectiveness of various medical treatments).
And yet other provisions impose direct
requirements on employers or individuals. E.g., 29
U.S.C.A. § 207(r)(1) (requiring employers to provide
reasonable break times for nursing mothers); 21
U.S.C.A. § 343(q)(5)(H) (requiring chain restaurants
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to “disclose in a clear and conspicuous manner” the
nutritional content of standard menu items).
Many provisions of the Act, though not directly
related to the individual mandate or the insurance
regulations, were added as quid pro quo measures
needed to secure the votes of specific legislators. For
example, legislators such as Congressman Bart
Stupak and Senator Ben Nelson insisted that the bill
clearly prohibit the use of federal funds to pay for
abortions. See ACA § 1303; David D. Kirkpatrick,
Abortion Fight Adds to Debate on Health Care, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 29, 2009, at A1. Other provisions in the
Act were, even more explicitly, included to benefit
individual legislators. For example, § 10323 of the
Act extends Medicare coverage to “individuals
exposed to environmental health hazards” in an area
“subject to an emergency declaration made as of
June 17, 2009.” In fact, this “cryptic, mysterious”
provision, demanded by Montana Senator Max
Baucus, refers specifically to “people exposed to
asbestos from a vermiculite mine in Libby,
Montana.” Robert Pear, Buried in Health Bill, Very
Specific Beneficiaries, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 21, 2009, at
A1. Likewise, § 2006 increases Medicaid payments
to certain “states recovering from a major disaster.”
In fact, this would give hundreds of millions of
dollars to a single state, Louisiana, and was inserted
at the behest of wavering Louisiana Senator Mary
Landrieu. Brian Montopoli, Tallying the Health
Care Bill’s Giveaways, CBS NEWS, Dec. 21, 2009.27

http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-503544_162-6006838-503544.
html.
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Still other provisions were not identified as part
of specific quid pro quos, but provide suspiciously
targeted benefits. For example, § 10502 of the Act
grants $100 million to an unnamed “health care
facility” affiliated with a health center at a public
university in a state where there is only one public
medical and dental school. Buried in Health Bill,
Very Specific Beneficiaries, supra (“Senators and
their aides … were not sure who would qualify for
this money … [but] a new school in Scranton, Pa.,
was a likely candidate.”); see also Tallying the
Health Care Bill’s Giveaways, supra (“Also in the bill
… is an item that increases Medicare payments to
hospitals and doctors in states where half the
counties are ‘frontier counties’ …. Montana, North
Dakota, South Dakota, Utah and Wyoming.”).
The Senate Majority Leader, one of the chief
architects of the legislative deal, candidly admitted
doubting “if there’s a senator that doesn’t have
something in this bill that was important to them.”28
C. Private Petitioners’ Challenge
Private Petitioners NFIB, Ahlburg, and Brown,
along with 26 States, brought this action challenging
the ACA’s facial validity. Pet.App. 2a. As relevant
here, they argued that the individual mandate
exceeds Congress’ Article I authority and cannot be
severed from the remainder of the Act. Id. 3a.
The district court granted summary judgment to
the challengers.
Holding the mandate to be
unconstitutional and non-severable, the court
David Welna, On Health Bill, Reid Proves The Ultimate Deal
Maker, NATIONAL PUBLIC RADIO, Dec. 23, 2009, http://www.
28

npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=121791736.

26
invalidated the Act in its entirety. Id. 362a-364a
The Eleventh Circuit affirmed in part and reversed
in part. In an opinion jointly authored by Chief
Judge Dubina and Judge Hull, that court held the
mandate unconstitutional, but concluded that it was
severable from the remainder of the Act, including
even the insurance regulations that the Government
had conceded were non-severable. Id. 186a & n.144.
After the parties filed their certiorari petitions,
Petitioner Brown, whose standing had been conceded
by the Government in the Eleventh Circuit (id. 8a),
filed a voluntary petition for bankruptcy. See Letter
from G. Katsas to D. McNerney (Dec. 7, 2011).
Private Petitioners do not believe that Brown’s
pending bankruptcy undermines her standing; to the
contrary, her worsened financial state exacerbates
the degree to which future costs from the mandate
are “immediately and directly affect[ing]” her
“financial strength[] and fiscal planning.” Clinton v.
City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 431 (1998).
Moreover, Brown’s standing obviously does not affect
the standing of Petitioners Ahlburg or NFIB, both of
whom the courts below held had standing: Ahlburg
is an unrelated individual, and NFIB has additional
members
who
filed
declarations
materially
indistinguishable from Brown’s in support of NFIB’s
associational standing. See Pet.App. 8a-10a, 290a293a, 439a; JA 151-56.
Nevertheless, in an
abundance of caution, on January 4, 2011, Private
Petitioners, with the support of the Government and
the State Petitioners, moved to add two of these
additional NFIB members as formal parties, thereby
eliminating any possible concerns. That motion is
pending as of this filing.
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Severability of an unconstitutional statute turns
on congressional intent. By any fair measure, the
text, structure, and operation of the ACA—not to
mention its tortured path through the legislative
process—make it evident that, without the
individual mandate at its heart, no statute remotely
resembling the Act would or could have been
enacted. Once the mandate is invalidated, the entire
Act must fall with it.
In constructing the ACA, Congress sought to
restructure the health-insurance market to obtain
near-universal coverage, bring down costs, and keep
the federal deficit from growing. Ambitious goals,
but Congress believed it had a magic bullet to
achieve them—the individual mandate. By forcing
healthy individuals to buy full-scale insurance at
artificially inflated prices, the mandate handed an
annual $30 billion subsidy to insurance companies.
That subsidy allowed Congress to force the insurers,
in turn, to sell coverage to the old and the sick at
artificially low prices. The Federal Government
could then provide limited assistance to those who
could not afford even the premiums as reduced by
the mandate’s subsidy. Miscellaneous taxes and
spending cuts could balance out this new spending
and thus maintain deficit-neutrality. And, with
individuals and insurance companies bearing such a
substantial amount of the Act’s costs, employers and
States could be co-opted into filling some residual
gaps—by,
respectively,
sponsoring
affordable
insurance for employees and expanding publicinsurance programs like Medicaid.
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Without the mandate, the remainder of the Act
cannot operate as Congress intended. Absent the
mandate’s
mammoth
subsidy
to
insurance
companies, the Act’s insurance regulations would
dramatically
drive
up
premiums—reversing
Congress’ goal of reducing health-insurance costs.
That is why Congress found the mandate “essential”
to these provisions, and why the Government
concedes that at least some of them cannot survive
alone. But without the mandate and the new
regulations prohibiting the insurance practices that
Congress condemned as abusive and discriminatory,
none of the Act’s primary goals would be satisfied.
These provisions are the heart of the Act, its central
raison d’etre.
To remove them would be to
fundamentally alter the legislation; this Court has
never used severability to effect such a major change
to such a major part of such a major bill.
Moreover, without the mandate and insurance
regulations, none of the Act’s major planks would
operate as intended by Congress. Federal subsidies
would no longer be linked to community-rated
premiums; instead, they would pay private insurance
companies for the very “abusive” practices Congress
intended to forbid. Other actors, like healthcare
providers and the States, would bear burdens well
beyond those intended, as elimination of the
mandate and insurance regulations would destroy
the bill’s careful allocation of shared responsibility.
And new taxes would reap revenue no longer being
used to further the Act’s primary goals. At best, the
parts of the Act unaffected in operation by the
foregoing measures would amount to a hodge-podge
of minor, miscellaneous measures, many added only
to secure passage of provisions no longer intact.
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That is nothing like what Congress enacted, and
it is not an Act that Congress would have enacted.
The ACA was the fragile product of extensive
legislative deal-making; to strip out its centerpiece
would fundamentally alter the original legislative
bargain. Particularly in light of the deletion of a
severability clause from an earlier version of the bill,
and the House’s determination to consider the Act on
an all-or-nothing basis, it is clear that Congress
intended this unique legislative deal to rise or fall as
a whole. Invalidation of the mandate therefore
requires that the entire Act be stricken; this Court
should leave to Congress the complex and political
task of revisiting comprehensive health-insurance
reform.
ARGUMENT
I.

UNCONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS MAY BE
SEVERED ONLY WHERE CONSISTENT WITH
CONGRESSIONAL INTENT

When a court invalidates part of a statute, it
faces the question of what happens to the rest. Can
the stricken provision be severed, so that the
remainder of the statute survives?
Or would
severance—the slicing of legislation into a new,
judicial creation—be an inappropriate intrusion into
the lawmaking process? The answer, as this Court
has explained, depends on legislative intent: whether
Congress would have enacted the bill absent the
stricken provision, or whether omission of that
provision would have scuttled legislative bargains or
undermined statutory objectives. If the latter is
true, judicial revision through severance is improper,
particularly where it entails complex line-drawing
that is best left to the legislature.
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Severability questions invariably raise serious
separation-of-powers issues. By severing invalid
provisions, courts may save Congress from having to
go back to the drawing board. On the other hand,
severance creates a law that Congress never enacted,
and risks having it operate differently than
intended—e.g., by preserving a quid enacted only
because of the now-invalidated quo. Such partial
invalidation of integrated statutes thus may produce
a serious invasion of the legislative domain. To
respect the distinct legislative and judicial roles,
severability analysis must recognize the separationof-powers concerns on both sides of the calculus.
A. An Unconstitutional Provision Cannot Be
Severed If The Remainder Of The Act Would
Not Operate As Congress Intended, And So
Would Not Have Been Enacted On Its Own
“The inquiry into whether a statute is severable
is essentially an inquiry into legislative intent.”
Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians,
526 U.S. 172, 191 (1999); see also Ayotte v. Planned
Parenthood of N. New England, 546 U.S. 320, 330
(2006) (“[T]he touchstone for any decision about
remedy is legislative intent.”). The ultimate question
is whether Congress “would have been satisfied with
what remained” after the unconstitutional provisions
were removed. Champlin Rfg. Co. v. Corp. Comm’n
of Okla., 286 U.S. 210, 235 (1932). Courts should
avoid “nullify[ing] more of a legislature’s work than
is necessary,” Ayotte, 546 U.S. at 330, but it would
likewise be improper for judges to “substitute, for the
law intended by the legislature, one they may never
have been willing by itself to enact,” Pollock v.
Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co., 158 U.S. 601, 636 (1895).
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If “the balance of the legislation is incapable of
functioning independently,” then certainly “Congress
could not have intended a constitutionally flawed
provision to be severed from the remainder of the
statute.” Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Brock, 480 U.S.
678, 684 (1987). But even if the remainder of the act
could stand alone from an operational perspective,
the question remains whether “it is evident that the
Legislature would not have enacted those provisions
independently of that which is invalid.” Free Enter.
Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S.
Ct. 3138, 3161 (2010) (“FEF”). Thus, “[t]he more
relevant inquiry in evaluating severability is
whether the statute will function in a manner
consistent with the intent of Congress.” Alaska
Airlines, 480 U.S. at 685.
To determine whether the rest of the legislation
would operate in the “manner” intended by Congress,
courts look to various objective factors, including:
“the nature” of the stricken provision, Alaska
Airlines, 480 U.S. at 685; its role “in the original
legislative bargain,” id.; the “historical context” of the
legislation, FEF, 130 S. Ct. at 3162; the economic
connection between the invalidated provision and the
remainder of the statute, Carter v. Carter Coal Co.,
298 U.S. 238, 314-15 (1936); and the impact of that
provision on the “dominant aim of the whole statute,”
R.R. Ret. Bd. v. Alton R.R. Co., 295 U.S. 330, 362
(1935). If these considerations show that Congress
“would not have been satisfied with what remains”
after invalidation of the unconstitutional provision,
then severance is improper. Williams v. Standard
Oil Co., 278 U.S. 235, 242 (1929).
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In undertaking the analysis, courts consider
clauses that expressly address severability—text
that apprises the judiciary whether Congress intends
the statute’s provisions to survive, and to operate
independently of, any one that may be invalid. Thus,
inclusion of a severability clause “gives rise to a
presumption that Congress did not intend the
validity of the Act as a whole, or of any part of the
Act, to depend upon whether” a particular provision
“was invalid.” INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 932
(1983). But the absence of a severability clause is
treated simply as silence, creating no presumption at
all, neither “against severability,” Alaska Airlines,
480 U.S. at 686, nor for it, see Br. of Amici Curiae
Family Research Council et al. at 4-14 (Nos. 11-393
& 11-400). If, however, a severability clause was
specifically removed from a law during the legislative
process, that “does suggest that Congress intended to
have the various components of the [legislative]
package operate together or not at all.” GubiensioOrtiz v. Kanahele, 857 F.2d 1245, 1267 (9th Cir.
1988) (Kozinski, J.); accord United States v.
Croxford, 324 F. Supp. 2d 1230, 1245 (D. Utah 2004)
(Cassell, J.); see also Russello v. United States, 464
U.S. 16, 23-24 (1983) (drawing inference of
congressional intent from fact that Congress
included text “in an earlier version of a bill but
delete[d] it prior to enactment”).
B. Severability Analysis Must Account For The
Separation-Of-Powers Dangers Inherent In
Both Potential Courses of Action
This Court has observed that the refusal to sever
unconstitutional provisions “frustrat[es] the intent of
the elected representatives of the people.” Regan v.
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Time, Inc., 468 U.S. 641, 652 (1984) (plurality
opinion). Accordingly, courts should “act cautiously”
and “refrain from invalidating more of the statute
than is necessary.” Id. Conversely, however, if the
Court does sever part of a statute, the necessary
result is a new law that was never enacted by the
political branches through the required means of
bicameral passage and presentment to the President,
Chadha, 462 U.S. at 951-59. Judicial creation of
such new laws poses obvious dangers of intrusion
into legislative function:
“This would, to some
extent, substitute the judicial for the legislative
department of the [G]overnment,” and in substance
“make a new law, not … enforce an old one.” United
States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214, 221 (1876). Indeed such
partial invalidation “may call for a ‘far more serious
invasion of the legislative domain’ than [the Court]
ought to undertake,” especially “where linedrawing
[would be] inherently complex.” Ayotte, 546 U.S. at
330 (quoting United States v. Nat’l Treasury
Employees Union, 513 U.S. 454, 479, n.26 (1996)).
The Court has therefore repeatedly held it
improper to rewrite a statute to solve constitutional
flaws. To “dissect an unconstitutional measure and
reframe a valid one,” by “inserting limitations it does
not contain,” would be “legislative work beyond the
power and function of the court.” Hill v. Wallace,
259 U.S. 44, 70 (1922); see also FEF, 130 S. Ct. at
3162 (courts lack “editorial discretion” to “bluepencil” statute). Given the “many different possible
ways the legislature might respond” to the law’s
defects, courts should let Congress “rewrite those
provisions.” Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230, 262
(2006).
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Partial judicial deletion of an enacted statute can
pose similar problems of judicial usurpation. As this
Court noted in holding that Congress cannot
authorize the President to delete parts of an enacted
statute, selective deletion impermissibly amends an
enacted law: “In both legal and practical effect, the
President has amended two Acts of Congress by
repealing a portion of each.” Clinton, 524 U.S. at
438; cf. Hill, 259 U.S. at 71 (reiterating that
severability “does not give the court power to amend
the act”). Moreover, partial judicial “repeal” leaves
in its wake a never-enacted law based on judicial
speculation about counter-factual congressional
desires. Particularly when Congress has omitted a
severability clause—the traditional method of
informing courts how it wants the judiciary to
respond if part of a law is held unconstitutional—
there is a grave danger that excising only part of the
integrated whole will be based on mere guesswork,
which may result in judicial creation of a law that
Congress would not have enacted.
Indeed, such selective judicial deletion is
virtually indistinguishable from improper judicial
revision where the “line-drawing is inherently
complex,” Ayotte, 546 U.S. at 330. This is especially
true here because, as discussed below and as even
the Government concedes, some constitutional parts
of the Act must be excised once the mandate is
invalidated. When some constitutional parts of a law
must be severed, judicial selection of which parts of
Congress’ permissible handiwork will remain is akin
to judicial rewriting.
Selectively deleting the
remaining parts of the statute entails the same “blue
pencil[ing]” as judicial rewriting. In both cases, the
Court is not performing the straightforward judicial
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function of striking unconstitutional statutory
provisions, but also the quasi-legislative function of
deciding which lawful provisions will survive, based
on guesswork about which subset of the
constitutional residue best serves Congress’ policy
goals.
Finally, these worries of judicial intrusion on
legislative prerogative are particularly acute when
the invalidated provision is part of a comprehensive,
heavily negotiated package. Where legislation is
born of compromise, severing an invalid provision
threatens improperly to strip one side of the deal of
its benefits in the “original legislative bargain.”
Alaska Airlines, 480 U.S. at 685. See, e.g., Carter,
298 U.S. at 316 (refusing to sever provisions that are
“conditions, considerations, or compensations” for
one another); Allen v. Louisiana, 103 U.S. 80, 84
(1881) (same); see also Legal Servs. Corp. v.
Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 561-62 (2001) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (courts have “no authority” to “eliminate
a significant quid pro quo of the legislative
compromise”). It is no answer to say that Congress
can simply repeal the remainder, given the inertial
forces that check the legislative process. Imagine,
for example, a law including some provisions
demanded by each house of Congress, together
reflecting a quid pro quo. If a court were to
invalidate only one set of these, the result would be a
law that never would have been enacted yet is
unlikely to be repealed. Further, in a comprehensive
legislative package, removal of any provision could
impact the severability of every other provision,
making the task all the more difficult and all the less
appropriate for the judiciary.
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The lesson is that this Court, “mindful that [its]
constitutional mandate and institutional competence
are limited,” Ayotte, 546 U.S. at 329, must be equally
skeptical of severing either too much or too little of a
law. At least absent a severability clause, severing a
key provision from a hard-fought legislative deal
should be viewed with special skepticism.
II. THE ACT’S INSURANCE REGULATIONS
OPERATE IN TANDEM WITH, AND SO MUST
FALL WITH, THE INDIVIDUAL MANDATE
The Act expressly states that the mandate is
“essential to creating effective health insurance
markets” because it was necessary to “lower health
insurance premiums” that would be increased by the
guaranteed-issue and community-rating provisions.
42 U.S.C.A. § 18091(a)(2)(I).
That statutory
finding—expressly linking the intended operation of
the
guaranteed-issue
and
community-rating
provisions to the mandate—should be dispositive for
severability purposes. But, in any event, further
examination of the interrelationship of these
provisions eliminates any conceivable doubt.
Even the Government agrees that the individual
mandate is inextricably linked to the guaranteedissue and community-rating requirements.
The
mandate was intended to be a direct subsidy to
insurance companies, as compensation for requiring
them (in the guaranteed-issue provision) to insure
against “risks” that have already come to pass and
forbidding them (in the community-rating provision)
from using actuarially sound insurance premiums.
The mandate thus works to counteract the powerful
inflationary impacts of these other provisions, which
would otherwise make premiums in the individual
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insurance market prohibitively expensive, thereby
frustrating Congress’ goal of affordable health
insurance.
And Congress further viewed the
mandate as necessary to prevent “adverse selection”
to “game” the new insurance rules, which proponents
warned would spark a “death spiral” in insurance.
The guaranteed-issue and community-rating
requirements thus cannot operate without the
mandate in the manner intended by Congress.
Rather, “their associated force—not one or the other
but both combined—was deemed by Congress to be
necessary to achieve the end sought.” Carter, 298
U.S. at 314. To strike the mandate alone would
impermissibly eliminate a central quid pro quo of the
Act. If the mandate falls, the guaranteed-issue and
community-rating regulations must therefore fall
with it, as the Government itself has conceded.
A. Congress Intended The Individual Mandate
To Offset The New Burdens Imposed On
Insurers By The Act’s Insurance Regulations
The Act’s guaranteed-issue and communityrating rules, both found in Subtitle C of Title I,
prohibit the related “discriminatory” practices of
denying coverage for a pre-existing condition or
charging higher premiums to people who will require
greater health-care expenditures because of risky
conditions or habits. Supra at 10-11.
As Congress recognized, the unavoidable result
of these measures would be a dramatic rise in
premiums. The CBO estimated that they would
cause a 30% increase in individual premiums. Supra
at 11.
Congress also believed that, because
insurance companies would now be prohibited from
“discriminating” against sick people, “many
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individuals would wait to purchase health insurance
until they needed care.” If the prediction of this type
of “adverse selection” were accurate, it would reduce
insurers’ revenues, and thus force them to increase
the premiums charged to their diminishing number
of customers. Supra at 15.
Congress was equally explicit that the individual
mandate was its solution to these dual problems
created by the guaranteed-issue and communityrating provisions.
As the statutory findings
expressly state, Congress believed the mandate was
“essential” to mitigating increased premiums from
these effects, and thus to “creating effective health
insurance markets.” 42 U.S.C.A. § 18091(a)(2)(I).
This was so for two reasons.

First, the individual mandate’s principal purpose
and effect was to greatly offset the estimated 30%
increase in premiums attributable to guaranteedissue and community-rating.
Specifically, the
mandate was supposed to lower insurance premiums
by 15-20%, or $28 to $39 billion annually, thus
reducing nearly two-thirds of the premium increases
caused by these insurance regulations. Supra at 14.
It would do so by, in Congress’ words, “add[ing]
millions of new consumers to the health insurance
market,” 42 U.S.C.A. § 18091(a)(2), primarily
healthy individuals whose premium payments far
outweigh any reasonably foreseeable healthcare
expenditures. This is why Congress emphasized that
the individual mandate’s “broaden[ing] [of] the
health insurance risk pool to include healthy
individuals” would “lower health insurance
premiums.” Id. (emphasis added).
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A statute expected to increase premiums by some
30% would not have been acceptable to Congress, as
it would have materially undermined the Act’s stated
goal of reducing costs to achieve “affordable care.”
The guaranteed-issue and community-rating rules
would still dramatically drive up premiums, but
without any countervailing effect.
Absent the
mandate, then, these insurance regulations plainly
would not “function in a manner consistent with the
intent of Congress.” Alaska Airlines, 480 U.S. at
685. They are legislation that Congress “never
[would] have been willing by itself to enact.” Pollock,
158 U.S. at 636. Nor could Congress have, without
the vital support of the insurance industry, which
found the insurance requirements palatable only as
tempered by the mandate. See supra at 2, 12.
In short, the mandate is so closely tied to these
provisions that its invalidation spells their demise.
In concluding otherwise, the Eleventh Circuit simply
failed to consider the adverse effect on premiums—
and thus on the Act’s express purposes—that the
insurance regulations would have, if unmitigated by
the mandate. See Pet.App. 180a-85a.

Second, Congress expressly stated its belief that
the individual mandate was “essential” to eliminate
the “adverse selection” enabled by guaranteed-issue
and community-rating. 42 U.S.C.A. § 18091(a)(2)(I).
To be sure, as the Eleventh Circuit explained,
Congress greatly exaggerated this problem. See
supra at 15, n18. Nevertheless, second-guessing
Congress’ judgments about how the individual
mandate will actually operate should play no role in
severability analysis. For severability, the question
is whether Congress “would … have been satisfied
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with what remains” after the unconstitutional
provision is invalidated, Williams, 278 U.S. at 242,
not whether Congress should have been satisfied had
it better understood the effect of its law.
In sum, because Congress thought the individual
mandate was “essential” to cure dramatic premium
increases and market distortions caused by the
guaranteed-issue and community-ratings provisions,
those provisions cannot, without the mandate,
“function in the manner” Congress intended.
B. The
Act’s
Guaranteed-Issue
And
Community-Rating
Provisions
Are
Indistinguishable From Its Other, Related
Insurance Regulations
The Government has acknowledged that the
mandate cannot be severed from the guaranteedissue and community-rating provisions. Govt. Cert.
Resp. 31-33 & n.13. But these provisions cannot be
singled out from the Act’s restrictions on healthinsurance products. All of these regulations, which
appear together in Sections 1001 and 1201 of Title I
of the Act, also must fall with the mandate—and for
the same reasons.
In addition to precluding insurers from setting
premiums based on individualized factors, and from
refusing to cover pre-existing conditions, the Act
imposes closely related restrictions on insurance
products. Many are designed to combat the same
assertedly abusive or unfair insurance practices
addressed by the guaranteed-issue and communityrating rules. For example, the Act forbids insurers to
set limits on coverage, to exceed certain levels of
cost-sharing, to refuse to cover various services, or to
freely rescind or decline to renew coverage. Supra at
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10-11. Like the guaranteed-issue and communityrating provisions, all of these are designed to protect
health-insurance consumers—particularly unhealthy
consumers most in need of open-ended, permanent
coverage—from insurance practices that make
coverage inadequate, expensive, or unavailable. By
forcing insurers to offer policies on economically
unfavorable terms, all of these provisions would
drive up premiums. The individual mandate would
offset many of those increased costs. The insurance
regulations, together, thus comprise a package of
restrictions that work in unison and are offset by the
mandate. Absent the mandate, the entire set of
insurance regulations must be invalidated.
The Government’s position, that this Court can
strike the guaranteed-issue and community-rating
provisions, but nonetheless retain the other
insurance regulations, seems to rest on a policy
determination
that
eliminating
the
former
provisions, but no others, would sufficiently relax the
burdens on insurance companies to make up for
invalidation of the mandate’s subsidy. But that is
precisely the type of responsive policy choice
reserved to Congress. See, e.g., Randall, 548 U.S. at
262. For example, Congress could just as easily have
decided to remedy the problem by retaining
guaranteed-issue and community-rating but doing
without the prohibition on coverage limits. For this
Court to choose which of the Act’s insurance
regulations to strike, in an effort to offset the effects
of invalidating the mandate, would amount to
nothing less than unauthorized “blue pencil[ing]” of
the Act, FEF, 130 S. Ct. at 3162.
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III. WITHOUT THE MANDATE AND INSURANCE
REGULATIONS AT ITS HEART, THE ACT
WOULD NOT OPERATE AS CONGRESS
INTENDED
It is one thing to strike, from a major law, a
minor or ancillary provision only tangentially related
to its overarching purposes. But it is another thing
entirely to displace a primary pillar of the legislative
structure. When legislation is constructed around
certain foundational provisions, striking them will
almost inevitably topple the edifice as a whole.
The Act’s pillars are the insurance regulations
and the individual mandate. Indeed, the Act’s full
name is the Patient Protection and Affordable Care
Act. By forcing insurance companies to forever
extend equally priced coverage to all comers, the Act
“protects patients” from market practices thought to
be discriminatory. By forcing unwilling Americans
to purchase insurance, the law subsidizes everyone
else’s premiums, ensuring “affordable care.” These
provisions are the heart of the legislation, and the
foundation of the statute. None of the Act’s other
provisions can survive their excision; Congress would
hardly have reached the same destination had it
proceeded from an entirely different starting point.
Moreover, without the mandate and insurance
regulations, the Act’s other principal features would
operate in dramatically different ways, shifting costs
in unforeseen directions and allocating benefits and
burdens inconsistent with the congressional scheme.
Some of these provisions could perhaps continue to
“function” without the mandate and insurance
regulations, but not “in a manner consistent with the
intent of Congress.” Alaska Airlines, 480 U.S. at 685.
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A. The Mandate And Insurance Regulations Are
So Central To The Act’s Principal Objectives
That The Entire Act Must Be Invalidated
1. In determining whether partial invalidation
would produce “legislation that Congress would not
have enacted,” Alaska Airlines, 480 U.S. at 685,
courts consider “the nature” of the stricken provision;
its role “in the original legislative bargain,” id.; and
the “historical context” of the legislation, FEF, 130 S.
Ct. at 3162. These considerations establish a basic
divide between run-of-the-mill provisions and
legislative centerpieces. A statutory provision will
likely be severable if it played only a minor role in
the legislative debate; or if its effects are relatively
small in the grand scheme; or if it simply added an
additional frill to an otherwise-coherent regime.
Conversely, if a provision was especially contentious;
or if it constituted a core element of the legislation;
or if it was a principal means of securing the law’s
objects, severing it would likely be improper.
The caselaw bears out this distinction. For
example, in Alaska Airlines, the record showed that
Congress had “paid scant attention” to the
unconstitutional provision of the statute at issue,
while it had regarded another provision as “an
important feature.” 480 U.S. at 691. During floor
debate, “neither supporters nor opponents of the bill
ever mentioned” the unconstitutional provision; it
was, in fact, mentioned but once “during the entire
deliberation on the Act”—and even then, only in
general terms. Id. at 691-96. Faced with this
history, the Court could not conclude that Congress
“would have failed to enact” the law “if the [invalid
provision] had not been included.” Id. at 697.
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Similarly, in Reagan v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust
Co., 154 U.S. 362 (1894), the invalidation of a
provision giving conclusive effect to railroad rates set
by an agency did not require striking the entire
statute, which created the agency and gave it
regulatory authority.
Rather, “creation of a
commission, with power to establish rules for the
operation of railroads and to regulate rates, was the
prime object of the legislation,” and that object could
be “fully accomplished” regardless of “whether the
rates shall be conclusive or simply prima facie
evidence.” Id. at 395-96 (emphases added); see also
United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 586-91
(1968) (invalidating death-penalty provision but
severing it from criminal prohibition, as “elimination
[of death penalty] in no way alters the substantive
reach of the statute and leaves completely
unchanged its basic operation”).
By contrast, in Mille Lacs Band, the Court
considered an executive order that (i) directed
certain Indians to remove from territories they had
ceded to the United States; and (ii) stripped those
Indians of their treaty rights to hunt and fish on
those lands. 526 U.S. at 179. After invalidating the
former aspect of the order, the Court held it was not
severable from the latter. Applying the “severability
standard for statutes,” the Court concluded that the
order had “to stand or fall as a whole,” because it
“embodied a single, coherent policy,” and removal of
the Indians from the lands was its “predominant
purpose.” Id. at 191. Although the other portion of
the order admittedly “perform[ed] an integral
function in this policy,” it could not survive on its
own after the primary function of the executive order
had been so undermined. Id. at 192.
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The severability principles applied in Mille Lacs
Band have been settled for decades. For example, in
Alton, the invalidation of central features of a
compulsory pension scheme required the entire
statute to be scrapped, because the unconstitutional
provisions “so affect[ed] the dominant aim of the
whole statute as to carry it down with them.” 295
U.S. at 361-62. Likewise, in Williams, this Court
invalidated the substantive provisions of price-fixing
legislation, 278 U.S. at 239-41, and then held that
the law’s other provisions could not stand alone
because they were “mere appendants in aid of the
[statute’s] main purpose” or “mere aids to their
effective execution.” Id. at 243-44. Although the new
agency designated to fix prices could, in theory, still
collect data, issue permits, and collect fees, it would
have been “unreasonable to suppose” that the
legislature would have wanted these mechanisms to
keep operating once the most basic function of the
law had been disabled. Id. at 244.
These cases make clear that severance is
improper when the stricken provision is the heart of
the legislative scheme—the principal effort toward
its predominant purpose. In that context, it cannot
fairly be surmised that Congress would have pushed
ahead unperturbed, making no changes to the bill
once its hallmark was stripped out. In such cases,
the residue simply could not function in the manner
that Congress intended. And it is not enough that
Congress might have enacted “some form” of
legislation without the invalid provision; severance is
permissible only if Congress would have enacted “the
same [provisions] currently found in the Act.”
Alaska Airlines, 480 U.S. at 685 n.7.
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2. The individual mandate, together with the
insurance reforms, are the heart of the ACA, as
demonstrated by their crucial significance in
achieving its objectives and their central role in the
legislative debate. The ACA cannot survive the
elimination of these critically important provisions.
The overriding goals of the Act were to reduce
premiums and the number of uninsured, without
raising the deficit.
Supra at 2-6; 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 18091(a)(2)(F). It is no surprise, then, that both
the mandate and the insurance regulations appear in
the Act’s first title.
These were considered
indispensable to meeting the Act’s core objectives.
To expand coverage, the insurance regulations force
insurers to provide coverage to the unhealthy on
terms economically unfavorable to insurers. To keep
premiums down, the mandate forces healthy people
to buy insurance on terms economically favorable to
insurers. And Congress thereby avoided the need to
use direct spending to subsidize insurance companies
(as well as the concomitant need to adopt a
politically unpopular tax). The insurance regulations
fundamentally transform the way health insurance
may be sold in this country, and the mandate is
expected to force some 16 million new consumers into
the insurance market. By any fair measure, these
provisions are the Act’s centerpiece, and embody its
“predominant purposes” or “dominant aims.”
Accordingly, once they are invalidated, the rest of the
Act must fall. This is true even if its other parts can
operate independently: Hunting and fishing rights
in Mille Lacs Band, for example, could have been
stripped independent of tribal removal, but because
the latter was the “predominant purpose” of the
executive order, its invalidity doomed the whole.
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Further confirming this point, the mandate and
insurance regulations were the clear focus of the
debate surrounding the Act’s negotiation and
enactment. The President’s 2010 State of the Union
address, delivered while the Act was being debated
in Congress, highlighted his desire to “protect every
American from the worst practices of the insurance
industry”—through the insurance regulations—and
to give “uninsured Americans a chance to choose an
affordable health care plan in a competitive
market”—through the mandate.
Supra at 3.
Legislators emphasized that the insurance reforms
would rein in practices condemned as odious and
discriminatory. Supra at 4. Indeed, a major voting
bloc was committed to going still further—through a
public option designed to entirely eliminate the
“profit motive” in insurance—but settled for the
insurance regulations as a necessary compromise.
See supra at 5-6.
And numerous legislators
highlighted how the mandate, together with
guaranteed-issue and community-rating, would
decrease the number of uninsured individuals in the
country. Supra at 4-5; 42 U.S.C.A. § 18091(a)(2)(C)
(finding that mandate “will increase the number and
share of Americans who are insured”).
What
matters is not the accuracy of these claims, but that
the Act is largely premised on them.
The contrast to Alaska Airlines—where the
invalid provision had been referenced only a single
time during extensive debate, 480 U.S. at 691—could
not be starker. Congress’ sustained attention to the
mandate and insurance reforms reflects their
singular importance to the overall legislative
bargain.
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B. Invalidating Only The Mandate And
Insurance Regulations Would Disturb The
Allocation
Of
“Shared
Responsibility”
Intended By Congress
Analysis of the Act’s other notable provisions
reinforces that the mandate and insurance
regulations were its foundational premises. Without
them, the operation of the Act’s other features would
be significantly undermined.
And, if an
unconstitutional provision “is of such import that the
other sections without it would cause results not
contemplated or desired by the legislature, then the
entire statute must be held inoperative.” Connolly v.
Union Sewer Pipe Co., 184 U.S. 540, 565 (1902).
Most obviously, elimination of the mandate and
insurance regulations would displace Congress’ effort
to allocate the costs of the Nation’s health insurance.
President Obama argued that “[i]mproving our
health care system only works if everybody does
their part.” Remarks to Congress, supra. “Shared
Responsibility for Health Care” (ACA Title I, Subtitle
F) is thus the Act’s theme; Congress sought to
distribute the costs of near-universal coverage across
individuals, employers, insurers, participants in the
healthcare industry, States, and the Federal
Government itself. As explained below, without the
mandate and insurance regulations, individuals and
insurers will be freed of the major burdens that the
Act imposed on them—and other stakeholders will,
to a degree not intended, be left to pick up the slack.

Pollock is instructive as to the implications of
those redistributive impacts. In that case, this Court
invalidated a general income tax as applied to
income from real or personal property. 158 U.S. at
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637. Then, it held that the tax could not survive
subject to those exclusions, because revenues from
property “formed a vital part of the scheme,” and
striking it “would leave the burden of the tax to be
borne by professions, trades, employments, or
vocations.” Id. at 636-37. Eliminating the invalid
provisions thus would shift tax burdens “in a
direction which could not have been contemplated.”
Id. at 637. “[W]hat was intended as a tax on capital
would remain in substance a tax on occupations and
labor,” and the scheme, “considered as a whole,” was
not intended to function as such. Id.
Here, striking only the mandate and insurance
regulations would similarly disturb the allocation of
costs and shared responsibility under the Act.
1. Title I of the Act includes not only the
mandate and insurance regulations, but also
subsidies to help individuals with lower incomes to
buy insurance. The subsidies grant refundable tax
credits tied to the lesser of (i) the premiums paid by
those individuals, or (ii) the community-rated cost of
the second-cheapest “silver” plan for the individual’s
geographic “rating area.” Supra at 19-20.
If, per the Eleventh Circuit, this Court were to
sever only the mandate, the anticipated cost to the
Government would skyrocket. As explained above,
in that circumstance, premiums in the individual
market would rise by some 30%. Supra at 11. And,
because the subsidies are calculated based on actual
premium costs, the Government would be on the
hook for these costs. Congress intended for the
Government to subsidize premiums, but on the
assumption that they would be relatively low, given
the mandate’s subsidy.
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Even if the insurance regulations are properly
invalidated along with the mandate, the subsidies
would not operate as intended. The subsidy amounts
are effectively capped by the community-rated
premiums for the applicable geographic “rating
area,” see 26 U.S.C.A. § 36B(b)(3)(C); 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 300gg(a)(2), which of course exist only by virtue of
the insurance regulations.
And if that nowinoperative cap were simply set aside, and the
subsidies calculated by reference only to actual
premiums paid, the effects would be unacceptable:
Absent the insurance regulations, insurers would
return to the individualized pricing that Congress
found discriminatory, with higher premiums for the
elderly and those with pre-existing conditions. Yet
the Government, paying subsidies tied to actual
premiums, would simply be footing the bill for
private insurers to charge these unrestricted prices.
Rather than ban the insurer practices that Congress
condemned, the Act would actually pay for them with
federal money. The Congress that enacted the ACA
could not possibly have intended that result.
Nor would Congress have been willing to pay the
whole bill for universal coverage. Congress required
healthy people, through the mandate, to provide an
annual $30 billion subsidy to defray premiums for
the sick—Congress simply could not afford, and
never intended, for the Government to pay the entire
amount. Moreover, if the Federal Government really
wanted to shoulder the entire cost of healthcare for
Americans who cannot afford it, it would likely have
done so through a public program like Medicaid—not
by simply accepting, and paying, “discriminatory”
prices charged by private insurance companies.
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2. A cousin to the individual mandate, the
employer “responsibility” assessment, encourages
certain employers to sponsor health plans for their
employees. Specifically, it imposes an exaction on
covered employers if one of their employees obtains a
federal subsidy to help pay for insurance purchased
elsewhere. Supra at 21.
This assessment—labeled “shared responsibility
for employers regarding health coverage,” 26
U.S.C.A. § 4980H—was one plank of a multi-part
effort to spread health-care costs across multiple
actors. For that reason alone, it cannot stand once
individuals, insurers, and the Federal Government
are all let off the hook. Pollock, 158 U.S. at 636-37.
Further, the exaction is inextricably intertwined
with the subsidies described above. Indeed, if those
subsidies are invalidated, no employee will ever
receive one—and so the employer exaction will never
be triggered. The employer exaction is thus simply
“incapable of functioning independently” of the
subsidies. Alaska Airlines, 480 U.S. at 684.
3. The Act also creates new health-insurance
“exchanges,” marketplaces where individuals and
small businesses can buy the Act’s new insurance
products. The Federal Government only subsidizes
coverage purchased within an exchange, thus giving
insurance companies a reason to sell there despite
the distinct regulatory burdens imposed on plans
offered through the exchanges. Supra at 19-20.
The exchanges cannot be severed from the
provisions already addressed. Without the subsidies
driving demand within the exchanges, insurance
companies would have absolutely no reason to offer
their products through exchanges, where they are
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subject to far greater restrictions. Premised on the
mandate, the insurance regulations, and the
subsidies, the insurance exchanges cannot operate as
intended by Congress absent those provisions.
4. Another part of the Act requires that States
substantially relax the eligibility criteria for
Medicaid. Supra at 21-22. But, as the Government
explained below, Congress intended for the
additional Medicaid spending required of the States
to be “offset” by other “cost-saving provisions.” RE
1024. For example, Congress believed the insurance
regulations would prevent individuals with preexisting conditions from being driven onto Medicaid
rolls, or into state-funded high-risk pools, by the
uninsurable cost of their care. See RE 1023; 42
U.S.C.A. § 18091(a)(2)(G) (finding that “62 percent of
all personal bankruptcies are caused in part by
medical expenses”). Congress further believed the
States would also, in light of the mandate and
premium subsidies, save money on uncompensated
care. See RE 1023. If the States need no longer
worry about picking up the tab for uninsurable sick
people (because private insurers will now be forced
to), or for cost-shifting by the uninsured (because the
mandate will force them to buy insurance), then they
can devote more resources to the poor. Absent the
mandate, insurance regulations, and subsidies, this
premise would no longer be true, and the States
would be forced to bear additional costs far greater
than those intended by Congress.29

Of course, if the Medicaid expansion is independently
unconstitutional, as the State Petitioners contend, then the
severability analysis must take their invalidity as a given.
29
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5. Another major component of the Act is a set
of new taxes, most of which are found in Subtitle A of
Title IX (“Revenue Offset Provisions”), and a set of
spending cuts to public programs like Medicare.
Many of these affect insurance companies and
healthcare providers but, like the insurance
regulations, were offset by the substantial benefits
conferred by the mandate. Supra at 22. Without the
mandate’s subsidy, these taxes and cuts would
saddle insurance companies and providers with far
greater net burdens than did the original legislative
bargain. See Pollock, 158 U.S. at 636-37.
Moreover, these provisions satisfied (as the
heading of the revenue Subtitle indicates) the Act’s
overriding political constraint—that it not add to the
federal deficit. Supra at 6. Given the new liabilities
adopted by the Government—notably, the subsidies
for low-income Americans—Congress had to include
new revenues to “offset” them. The Act’s revenueraising and spending cuts were thus premised on the
funds being used to expand coverage and hold down
the cost of health insurance.
But, as shown, the subsidies cannot survive
without the mandate and insurance regulations.
And there is no reason to think that Congress would
have imposed this hodge-podge of taxes and cuts for
its own sake, without furthering the twin goals of the
Act. Accordingly, these “offset” provisions, too, must
fall. Williams, 278 U.S. at 244 (holding “taxes” that
were enacted to “defra[y] the expenses” of an invalid
provision to be non-severable). Nor could this Court
restore budget neutrality by “blue pencil[ing]” the
Act, FEF, 130 S. Ct. at 3162, in determining which of
the new taxes to strike. Randall, 548 U.S. at 262.
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In sum, Congress designed the Act to spread the
costs of expanded insurance coverage among
individuals (the mandate), insurers (the insurance
regulations),
employers
(the
“responsibility”
assessment), the Federal Government (the premium
subsidies), the States (the Medicaid expansion), and
other actors (the “offset” taxes and spending cuts).
Eliminating the mandate and insurance reforms
would have major ripple effects, twisting Congress’
reticulated scheme of “shared responsibility” beyond
repair. Accordingly, the Act must be invalidated in
toto.
C. Retaining Only The Act’s Miscellaneous TagAlong Provisions Would Fundamentally
Change The Statute That Congress Enacted
To be sure, the discussion above does not address
every provision of the 2700-page Act.
As the
Eleventh Circuit observed, within the law’s countless
provisions can be identified various obscure
measures that appear independent of its major
planks. The Act, for example, requires employers to
provide “reasonable break time for nursing mothers”
and restores “funding for abstinence education.”
Pet.App. 174a-175a. For three reasons, however, the
existence of these peripheral provisions does not
affect the conclusion of wholesale non-severability.

First, the mandate cannot be severed from the
Act’s major components. As explained above, a law’s
central pillars cannot be removed without toppling
the statute as a whole, and the mandate and
insurance regulations together plainly qualify as
such pillars. Supra Part III.A. A fortiori, so too does
the combination of the mandate, insurance
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regulations, subsidies, health exchanges, employer
assessment, Medicaid expansion, and taxes. Once all
of these are stricken, what is left would bear no
resemblance to the statute Congress enacted.
Whereas severability analysis normally removes
a small discrete part to preserve a larger coherent
whole, the issue here is removing a large coherent
whole to preserve small discrete parts. We are
aware of no precedent that has allowed severance in
remotely similar circumstances.
And for good
reason: It is inconceivable that Congress, trying to
adopt a comprehensive solution to a perceived crisis,
would “have been satisfied” with the menagerie of
tag-along provisions that remain after a statute’s
pillars are removed. Williams, 278 U.S. at 242.

Second, if the severability analysis really must
proceed provision-by-provision, courts would be faced
with the impractical, unrealistic task of proceeding
through the Act’s “hundreds of new laws about
hundreds of different areas of health insurance and
health care,” Pet.App. 21a, and evaluating each
provision’s relationship to the others and to the
whole. There are simply too many provisions to
engage in such granular inquiries, particularly
because the severance of each provision could alter
the calculus and call into question earlier decisions
about other provisions. Once numerous, substantial
pieces of the legislation cannot operate as intended,
this Court should invalidate the whole statute.

Third, even if it were somehow practical to
consider every provision on its own, the difficulty of
analysis required would be far beyond the judicial
ken. In an act this complex and interrelated, courts
cannot confidently deem individual provisions to be
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operationally independent. Once a number of major
provisions are stricken, the only responsible course
for a court—“mindful that [its] constitutional
mandate and institutional competence are limited,”
Ayotte, 546 U.S. at 329—is to declare the entire Act
non-severable, and let Congress handle rebuilding.
IV. THE ACT WOULD NOT, AND COULD NOT,
HAVE BEEN ENACTED WITHOUT THE
MANDATE AND INSURANCE REGULATIONS
Another way of framing the severability inquiry
is to ask whether the valid portions would have been
enacted independently of the invalid ones. FEF, 130
S. Ct. at 3161. Here, even apart from the centrality
of the mandate and insurance regulations to the
functioning of the whole, the unusual legislative
proceedings further confirm that, absent those
provisions, the Act would not have been enacted in
anything even resembling its current form. The Act
emerged only after extended, hard-fought, legislative
negotiation. Every vote was crucial to its passage,
and the vote-trading and log-rolling that developed
as a result make this “sweeping and comprehensive
Act” (Pet.App. 4a) an unusually unstable grand
bargain. Moreover, the shift in the composition of
the Senate that preceded the Act’s final passage
made it certain that the bill could not have passed
without the mandate.
A. The Act Was A Grand Bargain, With Nearly
Every Provision Crucial To Its Success
In an oft-cited analysis, Chief Justice Shaw of
the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
reasoned that, while “the same act of legislation may
be unconstitutional in some of its provisions, and yet
constitutional in others,” the proposition “must be
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taken with this limitation”: If the parts “are so
mutually connected with and dependent on each
other, as conditions, considerations or compensations
for each other,” then the statute must fall as a whole.
Warren v. Charlestown, 68 Mass. 84, 98-99 (1854)
(emphasis added). This Court long ago adopted that
test, directing courts to inquire whether, if “while the
bill was pending in Congress a motion to strike out
the [invalid] provisions had prevailed,” Congress
would still have enacted the bill. Carter, 298 U.S. at
313, 316; see also Alaska Airlines, 480 U.S. at 685
(considering role of invalid provision in “original
legislative bargain”). Here, the nature of the debate
that produced the bill, and the indications from its
drafting history, confirm that the answer is “no.”
1. The Act ultimately passed, in both the House
and the Senate, by the closest of margins. In the
Senate, every affirmative vote was necessary for
passage, making every Senator in the majority a
swing vote. And the uncertain outcome of the votes
shaped negotiations over the bill throughout the
legislative process.
Dispositive blocs of votes
demanded a wide-ranging set of provisions—from the
Act’s treatment of abortion to its exclusion of the socalled “public” option. Yet other votes were extended
in exchange for particular, parochial benefits, such
as a Medicaid subsidy for Louisiana; a pilot program
for a group of people exposed to asbestos in Montana;
and grants to particular, but unnamed, hospitals and
universities in other states. See supra at 23-25.
This historical context provides strong additional
evidence that, if “while the bill was pending in
Congress a motion to strike out the [mandate and
insurance reforms] had prevailed,” Carter, 298 U.S.
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at 313, the delicate compromises embodied in the Act
would have blown up, and there is little chance that
Congress would nonetheless have proceeded,
unfazed, to enact the remainder of the law.
Separation-of-powers concerns about the judicial
displacement of legislative bargains are especially
grave in this context.
Granted, every statute
represents some compromise, but this Act’s inherent
“conditions, considerations [and] compensations,”
Warren, 68 Mass. at 98-99, are unusually complex
and were unusually important to its passage. As the
Senate Majority Leader acknowledged, there are
more quid pro quos in this Act than anyone even
knows. See supra at 25. For this Court to slice up
the legislation in unforeseen, uncontemplated
ways—invalidating quids and retaining quos, likely
without even realizing it—would raise profound
separation-of-powers concerns regarding the judicial
creation of a statute so substantially different,
politically as well as operationally, from the one that
Congress enacted.
2. Textual confirmation that Congress intended
the Act to operate as a package deal can be found in
its drafting history—namely, removal of an express
severability clause. If a law simply omits such a
clause, its silence “does not raise a presumption
against severability.” Alaska Airlines, 480 U.S. at
686. But here, Congress removed a severability
clause that had been included in an earlier iteration
of the bill. H.R. 3962, § 255 (Oct. 29, 2009). While
not dispositive, this fact “does suggest that Congress
intended to have the various components of the
[legislative] package operate together or not at all.”
Gubiensio-Ortiz, 857 F.2d at 1267.

59
The Eleventh Circuit entirely discounted this
drafting history, pointing out that “both the Senate
and House legislative drafting manuals state that …
severability clauses are unnecessary.”
Pet.App.
175a. That may have explained a failure to include a
severability clause at all, but it hardly explains why
Congress went to the effort of deleting a clause it had
earlier found important enough to include. And,
despite the drafting manuals, the very same
Congress included—in its other showcase piece of
complex legislation, enacted just weeks after the
Act—an apparently “unnecessary” severability
clause. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act, § 3, Pub. L. No. 111-203
(2010). That fundamental difference between these
two landmark statutes is highly probative of
congressional intent.
B. Under Congress’ Procedural Rules, The Act
Could Not Have Been Enacted Without the
Individual Mandate
In many cases, determining whether Congress
would have enacted the legislation absent its invalid
provision may be an “elusive” inquiry. Chadha, 462
U.S. at 932. Not so here. The unique procedures by
which the Act was passed, following an unexpected
change in the political composition of the Senate,
provides the plainest evidence imaginable that this
bill not only would not, but could not have been
enacted without the mandate.
On December 24, 2009, the Senate passed a
health-insurance reform bill with exactly the sixty
votes needed to overcome a filibuster the day prior.
Supra at 8. But when Senator Scott Brown, a
staunch opponent of the legislative efforts, was
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elected soon thereafter, the balance of power shifted,
and the Act’s proponents could no longer retain its
fundamental structure and yet avoid a filibuster.
Supra at 9.
Accordingly, the House of
Representatives had no choice but to pass the bill in
the exact form in which it had already passed the
Senate, since a different bill emerging from a
bicameral conference committee, reconciling the two
houses’ versions, could not then pass in the Senate.
To satisfy the Constitution’s requirement that a bill
pass both houses in the same form, the House was
bound (if it wanted any bill remotely resembling the
pending one) to pass the Senate’s version—which
included the mandate and insurance regulations. Id.
Thus, the only way for Congress to make changes
to the bill as passed by the Senate was through the
budget reconciliation process, but that process
allowed only for budgetary provisions. Id. Congress
therefore was precluded from making any nonbudgetary amendments to the version of the Act
passed by the Senate. In other words, the large
parts of the Act that did not affect the budget—i.e.,
everything aside from the Act’s taxes, subsidies, and
changes to public programs like Medicare—were
unalterable, and thus essential to the Act’s
successful enactment. The point is further confirmed
by the rule that the House adopted to govern its
consideration of the Senate bill: It allowed for no
amendments, requiring instead an all-or-nothing
vote on the entire package. See supra at 9-10.
This history confirms that the Act, without the
mandate or insurance regulations, could not have
been enacted. The latter have no direct budgetary
impact, and so any attempt to amend them out of the
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Act through reconciliation would have failed. The
whole statute is thus procedurally—not just
operationally—intertwined with the mandate and
insurance regulations. It therefore would be doubly
inappropriate for this Court to substitute for the Act
a law that Congress would not, and could not, have
enacted.
CONCLUSION
This Court should hold that the ACA is entirely
non-severable from the individual mandate and
reverse in relevant part the judgment below.
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TITLE I—QUALITY, AFFORDABLE HEALTH
CARE FOR ALL AMERICANS
Subtitle A—Immediate Improvements in Health
Care Coverage for All Americans
SEC. 1001. AMENDMENTS

TO THE PUBLIC HEALTH

SERVICE ACT.

Part A of title XXVII of the Public Health Service
Act (42 U.S.C. 300gg et seq.) is amended—
(1) by striking the part heading and inserting
the following:
‘‘PART A—INDIVIDUAL AND GROUP
MARKET REFORMS’’;
(2) by redesignating sections 2704 through 2707
as sections 2725 through 2728, respectively;
(3) by redesignating sections 2711 through 2713
as sections 2731 through 2733, respectively;
(4) by redesignating sections 2721 through 2723
as sections 2735 through 2737, respectively; and
(5) by inserting after section 2702, the following:
‘‘Subpart II—Improving Coverage
‘‘SEC. 2711. NO LIFETIME OR ANNUAL LIMITS.
‘‘(a) PROHIBITION.—
“(1) IN GENERAL.—A group health plan and a
health insurance issuer offering group or
individual health insurance coverage may not
establish—
‘‘(A) lifetime limits on the dollar value of
benefits for any participant or beneficiary; or
‘‘(B) unreasonable annual limits (within the
meaning of section 223 of the Internal Revenue
Code of 1986) on the dollar value of benefits for
any participant or beneficiary.
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‘‘(2) ANNUAL LIMITS PRIOR TO 2014.—With respect
to plan years beginning prior to January 1, 2014, a
group health plan and a health insurance issuer
offering group or individual health insurance
coverage may only establish a restricted annual
limit on the dollar value of benefits for any
participant or beneficiary with respect to the scope
of benefits that are essential health benefits under
section 1302(b) of the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act, as determined by the
Secretary. In defining the term ‘restricted annual
limit’ for purposes of the preceding sentence, the
Secretary shall ensure that access to needed
services is made available with a minimal impact
on premiums.
‘‘(b) PER BENEFICIARY LIMITS.—Subsection (a) shall
not be construed to prevent a group health plan or
health insurance coverage that is not required to
provide essential health benefits under section
1302(b) of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care
Act from placing annual or lifetime per beneficiary
limits on specific covered benefits to the extent that
such limits are otherwise permitted under Federal or
State law.
‘‘SEC. 2712. PROHIBITION ON RESCISSIONS.
‘‘A group health plan and a health insurance issuer
offering group or individual health insurance
coverage shall not rescind such plan or coverage with
respect to an enrollee once the enrollee is covered
under such plan or coverage involved, except that
this section shall not apply to a covered individual
who has performed an act or practice that constitutes
fraud or makes an intentional misrepresentation of
material fact as prohibited by the terms of the plan or
coverage.
Such plan or coverage may not be
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cancelled except with prior notice to the enrollee, and
only as permitted under section 2702(c) or 2742(b).
‘‘SEC. 2713. COVERAGE OF PREVENTIVE HEALTH
SERVICES.
‘‘(a) IN GENERAL.—A group health plan and a
health insurance issuer offering group or individual
health insurance coverage shall, at a minimum
provide coverage for and shall not impose any cost
sharing requirements for—
‘‘(1) evidence-based items or services that have
in effect a rating of ‘A’ or ‘B’ in the current
recommendations of the United States Preventive
Services Task Force;
‘‘(2) immunizations that have in effect a
recommendation from the Advisory Committee on
Immunization Practices of the Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention with respect to the
individual involved; and
‘‘(3) with respect to infants, children, and
adolescents, evidence-informed preventive care and
screenings provided for in the comprehensive
guidelines supported by the Health Resources and
Services Administration.
‘‘(4) with respect to women, such additional
preventive care and screenings not described in
paragraph (1) as provided for in comprehensive
guidelines supported by the Health Resources and
Services Administration for purposes of this
paragraph.
‘‘(5) for the purposes of this Act, and for the
purposes of any other provision of law, the current
recommendations of the United States Preventive
Service Task Force regarding breast cancer
screening, mammography, and prevention shall be
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considered the most current other than those
issued in or around November 2009.
Nothing in this subsection shall be construed to
prohibit a plan or issuer from providing coverage for
services in addition to those recommended by United
States Preventive Services Task Force or to deny
coverage for services that are not recommended by
such Task Force.
‘‘(b) Interval.—
‘‘(1) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary shall establish
a minimum interval between the date on which a
recommendation described in subsection (a)(1) or
(a)(2) or a guideline under subsection (a)(3) is
issued and the plan year with respect to which the
requirement described in subsection (a) is effective
with respect to the service described in such
recommendation or guideline.
‘‘(2) MINIMUM.—The interval described in
paragraph (1) shall not be less than 1 year.
‘‘(c)
Value-BASED
INSURANCE
DESIGN.—The
Secretary may develop guidelines to permit a group
health plan and a health insurance issuer offering
group or individual health insurance coverage to
utilize value-based insurance designs.
‘‘SEC. 2714. EXTENSION OF DEPENDENT COVERAGE.
‘‘(a) IN GENERAL.—A group health plan and a
health insurance issuer offering group or individual
health insurance coverage that provides dependent
coverage of children shall continue to make such
coverage available for an adult child until the child
turns 26 years of age. Nothing in this section shall
require a health plan or a health insurance issuer
described in the preceding sentence to make coverage
available for a child of a child receiving dependent
coverage.
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‘‘(b)
REGULATIONS.—The
Secretary
shall
promulgate regulations to define the dependents to
which coverage shall be made available under
subsection (a).
‘‘(c) RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.—Nothing in this
section shall be construed to modify the definition of
‘dependent’ as used in the Internal Revenue Code of
1986 with respect to the tax treatment of the cost of
coverage.
‘‘SEC. 2715. DEVELOPMENT AND UTILIZATION OF
UNIFORM EXPLANATION OF COVERAGE DOCUMENTS AND
STANDARDIZED DEFINITIONS.

‘‘(a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 12 months after
the date of enactment of the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act, the Secretary shall develop
standards for use by a group health plan and a health
insurance issuer offering group or individual health
insurance coverage, in compiling and providing to
applicants, enrollees, and policyholder or certificate
holders a summary of benefits and coverage
explanation that accurately describes the benefits
and coverage under the applicable plan or coverage.
In developing such standards, the Secretary shall
consult with the National Association of Insurance
Commissioners (referred to in this section as the
‘NAIC’), a working group composed of representatives
of health insurance-related consumer advocacy
organizations, health insurance issuers, health care
professionals, patient advocates including those
representing individuals with limited English
proficiency, and other qualified individuals.
‘‘(b) REQUIREMENTS.—The standards for the
summary of benefits and coverage developed under
subsection (a) shall provide for the following:
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‘‘(1) APPEARANCE.—The standards shall ensure
that the summary of benefits and coverage is
presented in a uniform format that does not exceed
4 pages in length and does not include print
smaller than 12-point font.
‘‘(2) LANGUAGE.—The standards shall ensure
that the summary is presented in a culturally and
linguistically appropriate manner and utilizes
terminology understandable by the average plan
enrollee.
‘‘(3) CONTENTS.—The standards shall ensure
that the summary of benefits and coverage
includes—
‘‘(A) uniform definitions of standard insurance
terms and medical terms (consistent with
subsection (g)) so that consumers may compare
health insurance coverage and understand the
terms of coverage (or exception to such
coverage);
‘‘(B) a description of the coverage, including
cost sharing for—
‘‘(i) each of the categories of the essential
health benefits described in subparagraphs (A)
through (J) of section 1302(b)(1) of the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act; and
‘‘(ii) other benefits, as identified by the
Secretary;
‘‘(C)
the
exceptions,
reductions,
and
limitations on coverage;
‘‘(D) the cost-sharing provisions, including
deductible,
coinsurance,
and
co-payment
obligations;
‘‘(E) the renewability and continuation of
coverage provisions;
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‘‘(F) a coverage facts label that includes
examples to illustrate common benefits
scenarios, including pregnancy and serious or
chronic medical conditions and related cost
sharing, such scenarios to be based on
recognized clinical practice guidelines;
‘‘(G) a statement of whether the plan or
coverage—
‘‘(i) provides minimum essential coverage (as
defined under section 5000A(f) of the Internal
Revenue Code 1986); and
‘‘(ii) ensures that the plan or coverage share
of the total allowed costs of benefits provided
under the plan or coverage is not less than 60
percent of such costs;
‘‘(H) a statement that the outline is a
summary of the policy or certificate and that the
coverage document itself should be consulted to
determine the governing contractual provisions;
and
‘‘(I) a contact number for the consumer to
call with additional questions and an Internet
web address where a copy of the actual
individual coverage policy or group certificate
of coverage can be reviewed and obtained.
‘‘(c) PERIODIC REVIEW AND UPDATING.—The
Secretary shall periodically review and update, as
appropriate, the standards developed under this
section.
‘‘(d) REQUIREMENT TO PROVIDE.—
‘‘(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 24 months
after the date of enactment of the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act, each entity
described in paragraph (3) shall provide, prior to
any enrollment restriction, a summary of benefits
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and coverage explanation pursuant to the
standards developed by the Secretary under
subsection (a) to—
‘‘(A) an applicant at the time of application;
‘‘(B) an enrollee prior to the time of enrollment
or reenrollment, as applicable; and
‘‘(C) a policyholder or certificate holder at the
time of issuance of the policy or delivery of the
certificate.
‘‘(2) COMPLIANCE.—An entity described in
paragraph (3) is deemed to be in compliance with
this section if the summary of benefits and
coverage described in subsection (a) is provided in
paper or electronic form.
‘‘(3) ENTITIES IN GENERAL.—An entity described
in this paragraph is—
‘‘(A) a health insurance issuer (including a
group health plan that is not a self-insured plan)
offering health insurance coverage within the
United States; or
‘‘(B) in the case of a self-insured group health
plan, the plan sponsor or designated
administrator of the plan (as such terms are
defined in section 3(16) of the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974).
‘‘(4) NOTICE OF MODIFICATIONS.—If a group
health plan or health insurance issuer makes any
material modification in any of the terms of the
plan or coverage involved (as defined for purposes
of section 102 of the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974) that is not reflected in the
most recently provided summary of benefits and
coverage, the plan or issuer shall provide notice of
such modification to enrollees not later than 60
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days prior to the date on which such modification
will become effective.
‘‘(e) PREEMPTION.—The standards developed under
subsection (a) shall preempt any related State
standards that require a summary of benefits and
coverage that provides less information to consumers
than that required to be provided under this section,
as determined by the Secretary.
‘‘(f) FAILURE TO PROVIDE.—An entity described in
subsection (d)(3) that willfully fails to provide the
information required under this section shall be
subject to a fine of not more than $1,000 for each
such failure. Such failure with respect to each
enrollee shall constitute a separate offense for
purposes of this subsection.
‘‘(g) DEVELOPMENT OF STANDARD DEFINITIONS.—
‘‘(1) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary shall, by
regulation, provide for the development of
standards for the definitions of terms used in
health
insurance
coverage,
including
the
insurance- related terms described in paragraph
(2) and the medical terms described in paragraph
(3).
‘‘(2) INSURANCE-RELATED TERMS.—The insurancerelated terms described in this paragraph are
premium, deductible, co-insurance, co-payment,
out-of-pocket limit, preferred provider, nonpreferred provider, out-of-network co-payments,
UCR (usual, customary and reasonable) fees,
excluded services, grievance and appeals, and such
other terms as the Secretary determines are
important to define so that consumers may
compare
health
insurance
coverage
and
understand the terms of their coverage.
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‘‘(3) MEDICAL TERMS.—The medical terms
described in this paragraph are hospitalization,
hospital outpatient care, emergency room care,
physician services, prescription drug coverage,
durable medical equipment, home health care,
skilled nursing care, rehabilitation services,
hospice
services,
emergency
medical
transportation, and such other terms as the
Secretary determines are important to define so
that consumers may compare the medical benefits
offered by health insurance and understand the
extent of those medical benefits (or exceptions to
those benefits).
‘‘SEC. 2716. PROHIBITION OF DISCRIMINATION BASED ON
SALARY.
‘‘(a) IN GENERAL.— A group health plan (other than
a self-insured plan) shall satisfy the requirements of
section 105(h)(2) of the Internal Revenue Code of
1986 (relating to prohibition on discrimination in
favor of highly compensated individuals).
‘‘(b) RULES AND DEFINITIONS.—For purposes of this
section—
‘‘(1) CERTAIN RULES TO APPLY.—Rules similar to
the rules contained in paragraphs (3), (4), and (8)
of section 105(h) of such Code shall apply.
‘‘(2) HIGHLY COMPENSATED INDIVIDUAL.—The
term ‘highly compensated individual’ has the
meaning given such term by section 105(h)(5) of
such Code.
‘‘SEC. 2717. ENSURING THE QUALITY OF CARE.
‘‘(a) QUALITY REPORTING.—
‘‘(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 2 years after
the date of enactment of the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act, the Secretary, in consultation
with experts in health care quality and
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stakeholders, shall develop reporting requirements
for use by a group health plan, and a health
insurance issuer offering group or individual
health insurance coverage, with respect to plan or
coverage benefits and health care provider
reimbursement structures that—
‘‘(A) improve health outcomes through the
implementation of activities such as quality
reporting, effective case management, care
coordination, chronic disease management, and
medication and care compliance initiatives,
including through the use of the medical homes
model as defined for purposes of section 3602 of
the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act,
for treatment or services under the plan or
coverage;
‘‘(B) implement activities to prevent hospital
readmissions through a comprehensive program
for hospital discharge that includes patientcentered
education
and
counseling,
comprehensive discharge planning, and post
discharge reinforcement by an appropriate
health care professional;
‘‘(C) implement activities to improve patient
safety and reduce medical errors through the
appropriate use of best clinical practices,
evidence based medicine, and health information
technology under the plan or coverage; and
‘‘(D) implement wellness and health promotion
activities.
‘‘(2) REPORTING REQUIREMENTS.—
‘‘(A) IN GENERAL.—A group health plan and a
health insurance issuer offering group or
individual health insurance coverage shall
annually submit to the Secretary, and to
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enrollees under the plan or coverage, a report on
whether the benefits under the plan or coverage
satisfy the elements described in subparagraphs
(A) through (D) of paragraph (1).
‘‘(B) TIMING OF REPORTS.—A report under
subparagraph (A) shall be made available to an
enrollee under the plan or coverage during each
open enrollment period.
‘‘(C) AVAILABILITY OF REPORTS.—The Secretary
shall
make
reports
submitted
under
subparagraph (A) available to the public through
an Internet website.
‘‘(D) PENALTIES.—In developing the reporting
requirements under paragraph (1), the Secretary
may develop and impose appropriate penalties
for non-compliance with such requirements.
‘‘(E) EXCEPTIONS.—In developing the reporting
requirements under paragraph (1), the Secretary
may provide for exceptions to such requirements
for group health plans and health insurance
issuers that substantially meet the goals of this
section.
‘‘(b) WELLNESS AND PREVENTION PROGRAMS.—For
purposes of subsection (a)(1)(D), wellness and health
promotion activities may include personalized
wellness and prevention services, which are
coordinated, maintained or delivered by a health care
provider, a wellness and prevention plan manager, or
a health, wellness or prevention services organization
that conducts health risk assessments or offers
ongoing face-to-face, telephonic or web-based
intervention efforts for each of the program’s
participants, and which may include the following
wellness and prevention efforts:
‘‘(1) Smoking cessation.
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‘‘(2) Weight management.
‘‘(3) Stress management.
‘‘(4) Physical fitness.
‘‘(5) Nutrition.
‘‘(6) Heart disease prevention.
‘‘(7) Healthy lifestyle support.
‘‘(8) Diabetes prevention.
‘‘(c) PROTECTION OF SECOND AMENDMENT GUN
RIGHTS.—
“(1) WELLNESS AND PREVENTION PROGRAMS.— A
wellness
and
health
promotion
activity
implemented under subsection (a)(1)(D) may not
require the disclosure or collection of any
information relating to—
“(A) the presence or storage of a lawfullypossessed firearm or ammunition in the
residence or on the property of an individual; or
‘‘(B) the lawful use, possession, or storage of a
firearm or ammunition by an individual.
“(2) LIMITATION ON DATA COLLECTION.—None of
the authorities provided to the Secretary under the
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act or an
amendment made by that Act shall be construed to
authorize or may be used for the collection of any
information relating to—
‘‘(A) the lawful ownership or possession of a
firearm or ammunition;
‘‘(B) the lawful use of a firearm or
ammunition; or
‘‘(C) the lawful storage of a firearm or
ammunition.
“(3) LIMITATION ON DATABASES OR DATA BANKS.—
None of the authorities provided to the Secretary
under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care
Act or an amendment made by that Act shall be
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construed to authorize or may be used to maintain
records of individual ownership or possession of a
firearm or ammunition.
(4) LIMITATION ON DETERMINATION OF PREMIUM
RATES OR ELIGIBILITY FOR HEALTH INSURANCE.—A
premium rate may not be increased, health
insurance coverage may not be denied, and a
discount, rebate, or reward offered for participation
in a wellness program may not be reduced or
withheld under any health benefit plan issued
pursuant to or in accordance with the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act or an
amendment made by that Act on the basis of, or on
reliance upon—
‘‘(A) the lawful ownership or possession of a
firearm or ammunition; or
‘‘(B) the lawful use or storage of a firearm or
ammunition.
ON
DATA
COLLECTION
(5)
LIMITATION
REQUIREMENT FOR INDIVIDUALS.—No individual
shall be required to disclose any information under
any data collection activity authorized under the
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act or an
amendment made by that Act relating to—
‘‘(A) the lawful ownership or possession of a
firearm or ammunition; or
‘‘(B) the lawful use, possession, or storage of a
firearm or ammunition.
‘‘(d) REGULATIONS.—Not later than 2 years after
the date of enactment of the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act, the Secretary shall promulgate
regulations that provide criteria for determining
whether a reimbursement structure is described in
subsection (a).
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“(e) STUDY AND REPORT.—Not later than 180 days
after the date on which regulations are promulgated
under subsection (c), the Government Accountability
Office shall review such regulations and conduct a
study and submit to the Committee on Health,
Education, Labor, and Pensions of the Senate and the
Committee on Energy and Commerce of the House of
Representatives a report regarding the impact the
activities under this section have had on the quality
and cost of health care.
‘‘SEC. 2718. BRINGING DOWN THE COST OF HEALTH
CARE COVERAGE.
‘‘(a) CLEAR ACCOUNTING FOR COSTS.—A health
insurance issuer offering group or individual health
insurance coverage (including a grandfathered health
plan) shall, with respect to each plan year, submit to
the Secretary a report concerning the ratio of the
incurred loss (or incurred claims) plus the loss
adjustment expense (or change in contract reserves)
to earned premiums. Such report shall include the
percentage of total premium revenue, after
accounting for collections or receipts for risk
adjustment and risk corridors and payments of
reinsurance, that such coverage expends—
‘‘(1) on reimbursement for clinical services
provided to enrollees under such coverage;
‘‘(2) for activities that improve health care
quality; and
‘‘(3) on all other non-claims costs, including an
explanation of the nature of such costs, and
excluding Federal and State taxes and licensing or
regulatory fees.
The Secretary shall make reports received under this
section available to the public on the Internet website
of the Department of Health and Human Services.
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‘‘(b) ENSURING THAT CONSUMERS RECEIVE VALUE
FOR THEIR PREMIUM PAYMENTS.—

‘‘(1)

REQUIREMENT

TO

PROVIDE

VALUE

FOR

PREMIUM PAYMENTS.—

“(A) REQUIREMENT.—Beginning not later than
January 1, 2011, a health insurance issuer
offering group or individual health insurance
coverage (including a grandfathered health plan)
shall, with respect to each plan year, provide an
annual rebate to each enrollee under such
coverage, on a pro rata basis, if that ratio of the
amount that is equal to the amount by which
premium revenue expended by the issuer on
costs described in paragraphs (1) and (2) of
subsection (a) to the total amount of premium
revenue (excluding Federal and State taxes and
licensing or regulatory fees and after accounting
for payments or receipts for risk adjustment,
risk corridors, and reinsurance under sections
1341, 1342, and 1343 of the Patient Protection
and Affordable Care Act) for the plan year
(except as provided in subparagraph (B)(ii)), is
less than—
‘‘(i) with respect to a health insurance issuer
offering coverage in the large group market,
85 percent, or such higher percentage as a
State may by regulation determine; or
‘‘(ii) with respect to a health insurance
issuer offering coverage in the small group
market or in the individual market, 80
percent, or such higher percentage as a State
may by regulation determine, except that the
Secretary may adjust such percentage with
respect to a State if the Secretary determines
that the application of 80 percent may
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destabilize the individual market in such
State.
‘‘(B) REBATE AMOUNT.—
‘‘(i) CALCULATION OF AMOUNT.—The total
amount of an annual rebate required under
this paragraph shall be in an amount equal to
the product of—
‘‘(I) the amount by which the percentage
described in clause (i) or (ii) of subparagraph
(A) exceeds the ratio described in such
subparagraph; and
‘‘(II) the total amount of premium revenue
(excluding Federal and State taxes and
licensing or regulatory fees and after
accounting for payments or receipts for risk
adjustment, risk corridors, and reinsurance
under sections 1341, 1342, and 1343 of the
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act)
for such plan year.
‘‘(ii) CALCULATION BASED ON AVERAGE
RATIO.—Beginning on January 1, 2014, the
determination made under subparagraph (A)
for the year involved shall be based on the
averages of the premiums expended on the
costs described in such subparagraph and total
premium revenue for each of the previous 3
years for the plan.
‘‘(2) CONSIDERATION IN SETTING PERCENTAGES.—
In determining the percentages under paragraph
(1), a State shall seek to ensure adequate
participation by health insurance issuers,
competition in the health insurance market in the
State, and value for consumers so that premiums
are used for clinical services and quality
improvements.
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‘‘(3) ENFORCEMENT.—The provisions Secretary
shall promulgate regulations for enforcing the
provisions of this section and may provide for
appropriate penalties.
‘‘(c) DEFINITIONS.— Not later than December 31,
2010, and subject to the certification of the Secretary,
the National Association of Insurance Commissioners
shall establish uniform definitions of the activities
reported under subsection (a) and standardized
methodologies for calculating measures of such
activities, including definitions of which activities,
and in what regard such activities, constitute
activities described in subsection (a)(2).
Such
methodologies shall be designed to take into account
the special circumstances of smaller plans, different
types of plans, and newer plans.
“(d) ADJUSTMENTS.—The Secretary may adjust the
rates described in subsection (b) if the Secretary
determines appropriate on account of the volatility of
the individual market due to the establishment of
State Exchanges.
“(e) STANDARD HOSPITAL CHARGES.—Each hospital
operating within the United States shall for each
year establish (and update) and make public (in
accordance with guidelines developed by the
Secretary) a list of the hospital’s standard charges for
items and services provided by the hospital, including
for diagnosis-related groups established under
section 1886(d)(4) of the Social Security Act.
‘‘SEC. 2719. APPEALS PROCESS.
“(a) INTERNAL CLAIMS APPEALS.—
“(1) IN GENERAL.—A group health plan and a
health insurance issuer offering group or
individual health insurance coverage shall
implement an effective appeals process for appeals
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of coverage determinations and claims, under
which the plan or issuer shall, at a minimum—
‘‘(A) have in effect an internal claims appeal
process;
‘‘(B) provide notice to enrollees, in a culturally
and linguistically appropriate manner, of
available internal and external appeals
processes, and the availability of any applicable
office of health insurance consumer assistance or
ombudsman established under section 2793 to
assist such enrollees with the appeals processes;
and
‘‘(C) allow an enrollee to review their file, to
present evidence and testimony as part of the
appeals process, and to receive continued
coverage pending the outcome of the appeals
process.
“(2) ESTABLISHED PROCESSES.—To comply with
paragraph (1)—
“(A) a group health plan and a health
insurance issuer offering group health coverage
shall provide an internal claims and appeals
process that initially incorporates the claims and
appeals procedures (including urgent claims) set
forth at section 2560.503–1 of title 29, Code of
Federal Regulations, as published on November
21, 2000 (65 Fed. Reg. 70256), and shall update
such process in accordance with any standards
established by the Secretary of Labor for such
plans and issuers; and
“(B) a health insurance issuer offering
individual health coverage, and any other issuer
not subject to subparagraph (A), shall provide an
internal claims and appeals process that initially
incorporates the claims and appeals procedures

20a
set forth under applicable law (as in existence on
the date of enactment of this section), and shall
update such process in accordance with any
standards established by the Secretary of Health
and Human Services for such issuers.
“(b) EXTERNAL REVIEW.—A group health plan and a
health insurance issuer offering group or individual
health insurance coverage—
“(1) shall comply with the applicable State
external review process for such plans and issuers
that, at a minimum, includes the consumer
protections set forth in the Uniform External
Review Model Act promulgated by the National
Association of Insurance Commissioners and is
binding on such plans; or
“(2) shall implement an effective external review
process
that
meets
minimum
standards
established by the Secretary through guidance and
that is similar to the process described under
paragraph (1)—
“(A) if the applicable State has not established
an external review process that meets the
requirements of paragraph (1); or
‘‘(B) if the plan is a self-insured plan that is
not subject to State insurance regulation
(including a State law that establishes an
external review process described in paragraph
(1)).
“(c) SECRETARY AUTHORITY.—The Secretary may
deem the external review process of a group health
plan or health insurance issuer, in operation as of the
date of enactment of this section, to be in compliance
with the applicable process established under
subsection (b), as determined appropriate by the
Secretary.
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“SEC. 2719A PATIENT PROTECTIONS.
“(a) CHOICE OF HEALTH CARE PROFESSIONAL.—If a
group health plan, or a health insurance issuer
offering group or individual health insurance
coverage, requires or provides for designation by a
participant, beneficiary, or enrollee of a participating
primary care provider, then the plan or issuer shall
permit each participant, beneficiary, and enrollee to
designate any participating primary care provider
who is available to accept such individual.
“(b) COVERAGE OF EMERGENCY SERVICES.—
“(1) IN GENERAL.— If a group health plan, or a
health insurance issuer offering group or
individual health insurance issuer, provides or
covers any benefits with respect to services in an
emergency department of a hospital, the plan or
issuer shall cover emergency services (as defined in
paragraph (2)(B))—
‘‘(A) without the need for any prior
authorization determination;
‘‘(B) whether the health care provider
furnishing such services is a participating
provider with respect to such services;
‘‘(C) in a manner so that, if such services are
provided to a participant, beneficiary, or
enrollee—
‘‘(i) by a nonparticipating health care
provider with or without prior authorization;
or
‘‘(ii)(I) such services will be provided
without imposing any requirement under the
plan for prior authorization of services or any
limitation on coverage where the provider of
services does not have a contractual
relationship with the plan for the providing of
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services that is more restrictive than the
requirements or limitations that apply to
emergency department services received from
providers who do have such a contractual
relationship with the plan; and
‘‘(II) if such services are provided out-ofnetwork,
the
cost-sharing
requirement
(expressed as a copayment amount or
coinsurance rate) is the same requirement
that would apply if such services were
provided in-network;
‘‘(D) without regard to any other term or
condition of such coverage (other than exclusion
or coordination of benefits, or an affiliation or
waiting period, permitted under section 2701 of
this Act, section 701 of the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act of 1974, or section 9801 of
the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, and other
than applicable cost-sharing).
“(2) DEFINITIONS.—In this subsection:
“(A) EMERGENCY MEDICAL CONDITION.—The
term ‘emergency medical condition’ means a
medical condition manifesting itself by acute
symptoms of sufficient severity (including severe
pain) such that a prudent layperson, who
possesses an average knowledge of health and
medicine, could reasonably expect the absence of
immediate medical attention to result in a
condition described in clause (i), (ii), or (iii) of
section 1867(e)(1)(A) of the Social Security Act.
“(B)
EMERGENCY
SERVICES.—The
term
‘emergency services’ means, with respect to an
emergency medical condition—
‘‘(i) a medical screening examination (as
required under section 1867 of the Social
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Security Act) that is within the capability of
the emergency department of a hospital,
including ancillary services routinely available
to the emergency department to evaluate such
emergency medical condition, and
‘‘(ii) within the capabilities of the staff and
facilities available at the hospital, such
further medical examination and treatment as
are required under section 1867 of such Act to
stabilize the patient.
“(C) STABILIZE.—The term ‘to stabilize’, with
respect to an emergency medical condition (as
defined in subparagraph (A)), has the meaning
give in section 1867(e)(3) of the Social Security
Act (42 U.S.C. 1395dd(e)(3)).
“(c) ACCESS TO PEDIATRIC CARE.—
‘‘(1) PEDIATRIC CARE.—In the case of a person
who has a child who is a participant, beneficiary,
or enrollee under a group health plan, or health
insurance coverage offered by a health insurance
issuer in the group or individual market, if the
plan or issuer requires or provides for the
designation of a participating primary care
provider for the child, the plan or issuer shall
permit such person to designate a physician
(allopathic or osteopathic) who specializes in
pediatrics as the child’s primary care provider if
such provider participates in the network of the
plan or issuer.
‘‘(2) CONSTRUCTION.—Nothing in paragraph (1)
shall be construed to waive any exclusions of
coverage under the terms and conditions of the
plan or health insurance coverage with respect to
coverage of pediatric care.
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“(d) PATIENT ACCESS TO OBSTETRICAL AND
GYNECOLOGICAL CARE.—
“(1) GENERAL RIGHTS.—
“(A) DIRECT ACCESS.—A group health plan, or
health insurance issuer offering group or
individual health insurance coverage, described
in paragraph (2) may not require authorization
or referral by the plan, issuer, or any person
(including a primary care provider described in
paragraph (2)(B)) in the case of a female
participant, beneficiary, or enrollee who seeks
coverage for obstetrical or gynecological care
provided by a participating health care
professional who specializes in obstetrics or
gynecology. Such professional shall agree to
otherwise adhere to such plan’s or issuer’s
policies and procedures, including procedures
regarding referrals and obtaining prior
authorization and providing services pursuant to
a treatment plan (if any) approved by the plan or
issuer.
“(B)
OBSTETRICAL AND GYNECOLOGICAL
CARE.—A group health plan or health insurance
issuer described in paragraph (2) shall treat the
provision of obstetrical and gynecological care,
and the ordering of related obstetrical and
gynecological items and services, pursuant to the
direct access described under subparagraph (A),
by a participating health care professional who
specializes in obstetrics or gynecology as the
authorization of the primary care provider.
“(2) APPLICATION OF PARAGRAPH.—A group
health plan, or health insurance issuer offering
group or individual health insurance coverage,
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described in this paragraph is a group health plan
or coverage that—
‘‘(A) provides coverage for obstetric or
gynecologic care; and
‘‘(B) requires the designation by a participant,
beneficiary, or enrollee of a participating
primary care provider.
“(3) CONSTRUCTION.—Nothing in paragraph (1)
shall be construed to—
‘‘(A) waive any exclusions of coverage under
the terms and conditions of the plan or health
insurance coverage with respect to coverage of
obstetrical or gynecological care; or
‘‘(B) preclude the group health plan or health
insurance issuer involved from requiring that
the obstetrical or gynecological provider notify
the primary care health care professional or the
plan or issuer of treatment decisions.’’.
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SEC. 1003 ENSURING THAT CONSUMERS GET VALUE
FOR THEIR DOLLARS.
Part C of title XXVII of the Public Health Service
Act (42 U.S.C. 300gg–91 et seq.), as amended by
section 1002, is further amended by adding at the
end the following:
‘‘SEC. 2794. ENSURING THAT CONSUMERS GET VALUE
FOR THEIR DOLLARS.
‘‘(a) INITIAL PREMIUM REVIEW PROCESS.—
‘‘(1) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary, in conjunction
with States, shall establish a process for the
annual review, beginning with the 2010 plan year
and subject to subsection (b)(2)(A), of unreasonable
increases in premiums for health insurance
coverage.
‘‘(2) JUSTIFICATION AND DISCLOSURE.—The
process established under paragraph (1) shall
require health insurance issuers to submit to the
Secretary and the relevant State a justification for
an unreasonable premium increase prior to the
implementation of the increase. Such issuers shall
prominently post such information on their
Internet websites. The Secretary shall ensure the
public disclosure of information on such increases
and justifications for all health insurance issuers.
‘‘(b) CONTINUING PREMIUM REVIEW PROCESS.—
‘‘(1) INFORMING SECRETARY OF PREMIUM INCREASE
PATTERNS.—As a condition of receiving a grant
under subsection (c)(1), a State, through its
Commissioner of Insurance, shall—
‘‘(A) provide the Secretary with information
about trends in premium increases in health
insurance coverage in premium rating areas in
the State; and
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‘‘(B) make recommendations, as appropriate,
to the State Exchange about whether particular
health insurance issuers should be excluded
from participation in the Exchange based on a
pattern or practice of excessive or unjustified
premium increases.
‘‘(2) MONITORING BY SECRETARY OF PREMIUM
INCREASES.—
‘‘(A) IN GENERAL.—Beginning with plan years
beginning in 2014, the Secretary, in conjunction
with the States and consistent with the
provisions of subsection (a)(2), shall monitor
premium increases of health insurance coverage
offered through an Exchange and outside of an
Exchange.
‘‘(B) CONSIDERATION IN OPENING EXCHANGE.—
In determining under section 1312(f)(2)(B) of the
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act
whether to offer qualified health plans in the
large group market through an Exchange, the
State shall take into account any excess of
premium growth outside of the Exchange as
compared to the rate of such growth inside the
Exchange.
‘‘(c) GRANTS IN SUPPORT OF PROCESS.—
‘‘(1) PREMIUM REVIEW GRANTS DURING 2010
THROUGH 2014.—
The Secretary shall carry out a program to award
grants to States during the 5-year period beginning
with fiscal year 2010 to assist such States in carrying
out subsection (a), including—
‘‘(A) in reviewing and, if appropriate under
State law, approving premium increases for
health insurance coverage;
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‘‘(B)
in
providing
information
and
recommendations to the Secretary under
subsection (b)(1); and
“(C) in establishing centers (consistent with
subsection (d)) at academic or other nonprofit
institutions to collect medical reimbursement
information from health insurance issuers, to
analyze and organize such information, and to
make such information available to such issuers,
health care providers, health researchers, health
care policy makers, and the general public.
‘‘(2) FUNDING.—
‘‘(A) IN GENERAL.—Out of all funds in the
Treasury not otherwise appropriated, there are
appropriated to the Secretary $250,000,000, to
be available for expenditure for grants under
paragraph (1) and subparagraph (B).
‘‘(B) FURTHER AVAILABILITY FOR INSURANCE
REFORM AND CONSUMER PROTECTION.—If the
amounts appropriated under subparagraph (A)
are not fully obligated under grants under
paragraph (1) by the end of fiscal year 2014, any
remaining funds shall remain available to the
Secretary for grants to States for planning and
implementing the insurance reforms and
consumer protections under part A.
‘‘(C) ALLOCATION.—The Secretary shall
establish a formula for determining the amount
of any grant to a State under this subsection.
Under such formula—
‘‘(i) the Secretary shall consider the number
of plans of health insurance coverage offered
in each State and the population of the State;
and
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‘‘(ii) no State qualifying for a grant under
paragraph (1) shall receive less than
$1,000,000, or more than $5,000,000 for a
grant year.’’
“(d) MEDICAL REIMBURSEMENT DATA CENTERS.—
“(1) FUNCTIONS.—A center established under
subsection (c)(1)(C) shall—
“(A) develop fee schedules and other database
tools that fairly and accurately reflect market
rates for medical services and the geographic
differences in those rates;
“(B) use the best available statistical methods
and data processing technology to develop such
fee schedules and other database tools;
‘‘(C) regularly update such fee schedules and
other database tools to reflect changes in charges
for medical services;
‘‘(D) make health care cost information readily
available to the public through an Internet
website that allows consumers to understand the
amounts that health care providers in their area
charge for particular medical services; and
‘‘(E) regularly publish information concerning
the statistical methodologies used by the center
to analyze health charge data and make such
data available to researchers and policy makers.
“(2) CONFLICTS OF INTEREST.—A
center
established under subsection (c)(1)(C) shall adopt
by-laws that ensures that the center (and all
members of the governing board of the center) is
independent and free from all conflicts of interest.
Such bylaws shall ensure that the center is not
controlled or influenced by, and does not have any
corporate relation to, any individual or entity that
may make or receive payments for health care
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services based on the center’s analysis of health
care costs.
“(3) RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.—Nothing in this
subsection shall be construed to permit a center
established under subsection (c)(1)(C) to compel
health insurance issuers to provide data to the
center.’’.

31a
Subtitle C—Quality Health Insurance Coverage for
All Americans
PART 1—HEALTH INSURANCE MARKET
REFORMS
SEC. 1201. AMENDMENT TO THE PUBLIC HEALTH
SERVICE ACT.
Part A of title XXVII of the Public Health Service
Act (42 U.S.C. 300gg et seq.), as amended by section
1001, is further amended—
(1) by striking the heading for subpart 1 and
inserting the following:
‘‘Subpart I—General Reform’’;
(2)(A) in section 2701 (42 U.S.C. 300gg), by
striking the section heading and subsection (a) and
inserting the following:
‘‘SEC. 2704. PROHIBITION OF PREEXISTING CONDITION
EXCLUSIONS OR OTHER DISCRIMINATION BASED ON
HEALTH STATUS.
‘‘(a) IN GENERAL.—A group health plan and a
health insurance issuer offering group or individual
health insurance coverage may not impose any
preexisting condition exclusion with respect to such
plan or coverage.’’; and
(B) by transferring such section (as amended by
subparagraph (A)) so as to appear after the section
2703 added by paragraph (4);
(3)(A) in section 2702 (42 U.S.C. 300gg–1)—
(i) by striking the section heading and all that
follows through subsection (a);
(ii) in subsection (b)—
(I) by striking ‘‘health insurance issuer
offering health insurance coverage in
connection with a group health plan’’ each
place that such appears and inserting ‘‘health
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insurance issuer offering group or individual
health insurance coverage’’; and
(II) in paragraph (2)(A)—
(aa) by inserting ‘‘or individual’’ after
‘‘employer’’; and
(bb) by inserting ‘‘or individual health
coverage, as the case may be’’ before the
semicolon; and
(iii) in subsection (e)—
(I) by striking ‘‘(a)(1)(F)’’ and inserting
‘‘(a)(6)’’;
(II) by striking ‘‘2701’’ and inserting ‘‘2704’’;
and
(III) by striking ‘‘2721(a)’’ and inserting
‘‘2735(a)’’; and
(B) by transferring such section (as amended
by subparagraph (A)) to appear after section
2705(a) as added by paragraph (4); and
(4) by inserting after the subpart heading (as
added by paragraph (1)) the following:
‘‘SEC. 2701. FAIR HEALTH INSURANCE PREMIUMS.
‘‘(a)
PROHIBITING DISCRIMINATORY PREMIUM
RATES.—
‘‘(1) IN GENERAL.—With respect to the premium
rate charged by a health insurance issuer for
health insurance coverage offered in the individual
or small group market—
‘‘(A) such rate shall vary with respect to the
particular plan or coverage involved only by—
‘‘(i) whether such plan or coverage covers an
individual or family;
‘‘(ii) rating area, as established in
accordance with paragraph (2);
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‘‘(iii) age, except that such rate shall not
vary by more than 3 to 1 for adults (consistent
with section 2707(c)); and
‘‘(iv) tobacco use, except that such rate shall
not vary by more than 1.5 to 1; and
‘‘(B) such rate shall not vary with respect to
the particular plan or coverage involved by any
other factor not described in subparagraph (A).
‘‘(2) RATING AREA.—
‘‘(A) IN GENERAL.—Each State shall establish 1
or more rating areas within that State for
purposes of applying the requirements of this
title.
‘‘(B) SECRETARIAL REVIEW.—The Secretary
shall review the rating areas established by each
State under subparagraph (A) to ensure the
adequacy of such areas for purposes of carrying
out the requirements of this title.
If the
Secretary determines a State’s rating areas are
not adequate, or that a State does not establish
such areas, the Secretary may establish rating
areas for that State.
‘‘(3) PERMISSIBLE AGE BANDS.—The Secretary, in
consultation with the National Association of
Insurance Commissioners, shall define the
permissible age bands for rating purposes under
paragraph (1)(A)(iii).
‘‘(4) APPLICATION OF VARIATIONS BASED ON AGE OR
TOBACCO USE.—With respect to family coverage
under a group health plan or health insurance
coverage, the rating variations permitted under
clauses (iii) and (iv) of paragraph (1)(A) shall be
applied based on the portion of the premium that is
attributable to each family member covered under
the plan or coverage.
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‘‘(5) SPECIAL RULE FOR LARGE GROUP MARKET.—If
a State permits health insurance issuers that offer
coverage in the large group market in the State to
offer such coverage through the State Exchange (as
provided for under section 1312(f)(2)(B) of the
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act), the
provisions of this subsection shall apply to all
coverage offered in such market (other than selfinsured group health plans offered in such market)
in the State.
‘‘SEC. 2702. GUARANTEED AVAILABILITY OF COVERAGE.
‘‘(a) GUARANTEED ISSUANCE OF COVERAGE IN THE
INDIVIDUAL AND GROUP MARKET.—Subject to
subsections (b) through (e), each health insurance
issuer that offers health insurance coverage in the
individual or group market in a State must accept
every employer and individual in the State that
applies for such coverage.
‘‘(b) ENROLLMENT.—
‘‘(1) RESTRICTION.—A health insurance issuer
described in subsection (a) may restrict enrollment
in coverage described in such subsection to open or
special enrollment periods.
‘‘(2) ESTABLISHMENT.—A health insurance issuer
described in subsection (a) shall, in accordance
with the regulations promulgated under paragraph
(3), establish special enrollment periods for
qualifying events (under section 603 of the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of
1974).
‘‘(3)
REGULATIONS.—The
Secretary
shall
promulgate regulations with respect to enrollment
periods under paragraphs (1) and (2).
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‘‘SEC.
2703.
GUARANTEED
RENEWABILITY
OF
COVERAGE.
‘‘(a) IN GENERAL.—Except as provided in this
section, if a health insurance issuer offers health
insurance coverage in the individual or group
market, the issuer must renew or continue in force
such coverage at the option of the plan sponsor or the
individual, as applicable.
‘‘SEC. 2705. PROHIBITING DISCRIMINATION AGAINST
INDIVIDUAL PARTICIPANTS AND BENEFICIARIES BASED
ON HEALTH STATUS.
“(a) IN GENERAL.—A group health plan and a
health insurance issuer offering group or individual
health insurance coverage may not establish rules for
eligibility (including continued eligibility) of any
individual to enroll under the terms of the plan or
coverage based on any of the following health statusrelated factors in relation to the individual or a
dependent of the individual:
‘‘(1) Health status.
‘‘(2) Medical condition (including both physical
and mental illnesses).
‘‘(3) Claims experience.
‘‘(4) Receipt of health care.
‘‘(5) Medical history.
‘‘(6) Genetic information.
‘‘(7) Evidence of insurability (including
conditions arising out of acts of domestic violence).
‘‘(8) Disability.
‘‘(9) Any other health status-related factor
determined appropriate by the Secretary.
‘‘(j) PROGRAMS OF HEALTH PROMOTION OR DISEASE
PREVENTION.—
‘‘(1) GENERAL PROVISIONS.—
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‘‘(A) GENERAL RULE.—For purposes of
subsection (b)(2)(B), a program of health
promotion or disease prevention (referred to in
this subsection as a ‘wellness program’) shall be
a program offered by an employer that is
designed to promote health or prevent disease
that meets the applicable requirements of this
subsection.
‘‘(B) NO CONDITIONS BASED ON HEALTH STATUS
FACTOR.—If none of the conditions for obtaining
a premium discount or rebate or other reward
for participation in a wellness program is based
on an individual satisfying a standard that is
related to a health status factor, such wellness
program shall not violate this section if
participation in the program is made available to
all similarly situated individuals and the
requirements of paragraph (2) are complied
with.
‘‘(C) CONDITIONS BASED ON HEALTH STATUS
FACTOR.—If any of the conditions for obtaining a
premium discount or rebate or other reward for
participation in a wellness program is based on
an individual satisfying a standard that is
related to a health status factor, such wellness
program shall not violate this section if the
requirements of paragraph (3) are complied
with.
‘‘(2) WELLNESS PROGRAMS NOT SUBJECT TO
REQUIREMENTS.—If none of the conditions for
obtaining a premium discount or rebate or other
reward under a wellness program as described in
paragraph (1)(B) are based on an individual
satisfying a standard that is related to a health
status factor (or if such a wellness program does
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not provide such a reward), the wellness program
shall not violate this section if participation in the
program is made available to all similarly situated
individuals. The following programs shall not have
to comply with the requirements of paragraph (3) if
participation in the program is made available to
all similarly situated individuals:
‘‘(A) A program that reimburses all or part of
the cost for memberships in a fitness center.
‘‘(B) A diagnostic testing program that
provides a reward for participation and does not
base any part of the reward on outcomes.
‘‘(C) A program that encourages preventive
care related to a health condition through the
waiver of the copayment or deductible
requirement under group health plan for the
costs of certain items or services related to a
health condition (such as prenatal care or wellbaby visits).
‘‘(D) A program that reimburses individuals
for the costs of smoking cessation programs
without regard to whether the individual quits
smoking.
‘‘(E) A program that provides a reward to
individuals for attending a periodic health
education seminar.
‘‘(3)
WELLNESS
PROGRAMS
SUBJECT
TO
REQUIREMENTS.—If any of the conditions for
obtaining a premium discount, rebate, or reward
under a wellness program as described in
paragraph (1)(C) is based on an individual
satisfying a standard that is related to a health
status factor, the wellness program shall not
violate this section if the following requirements
are complied with:
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‘‘(A) The reward for the wellness program,
together with the reward for other wellness
programs with respect to the plan that requires
satisfaction of a standard related to a health
status factor, shall not exceed 30 percent of the
cost of employee-only coverage under the plan.
If, in addition to employees or individuals, any
class of dependents (such as spouses or spouses
and dependent children) may participate fully in
the wellness program, such reward shall not
exceed 30 percent of the cost of the coverage in
which an employee or individual and any
dependents are enrolled. For purposes of this
paragraph, the cost of coverage shall be
determined based on the total amount of
employer and employee contributions for the
benefit package under which the employee is (or
the employee and any dependents are) receiving
coverage. A reward may be in the form of a
discount or rebate of a premium or contribution,
a waiver of all or part of a cost-sharing
mechanism (such as deductibles, copayments, or
coinsurance), the absence of a surcharge, or the
value of a benefit that would otherwise not be
provided under the plan. The Secretaries of
Labor, Health and Human Services, and the
Treasury may increase the reward available
under this subparagraph to up to 50 percent of
the cost of coverage if the Secretaries determine
that such an increase is appropriate.
‘‘(B) The wellness program shall be reasonably
designed to promote health or prevent disease.
A program complies with the preceding sentence
if the program has a reasonable chance of
improving the health of, or preventing disease
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in, participating individuals and it is not overly
burdensome,
is
not
a
subterfuge
for
discriminating based on a health status factor,
and is not highly suspect in the method chosen
to promote health or prevent disease.
‘‘(C) The plan shall give individuals eligible for
the program the opportunity to qualify for the
reward under the program at least once each
year.
‘‘(D) The full reward under the wellness
program shall be made available to all similarly
situated
individuals.
For such purpose, among other things:
‘‘(i) The reward is not available to all
similarly situated individuals for a period
unless the wellness program allows—
‘‘(I) for a reasonable alternative standard
(or waiver of the otherwise applicable
standard) for obtaining the reward for any
individual for whom, for that period, it is
unreasonably difficult due to a medical
condition to satisfy the otherwise applicable
standard; and
‘‘(II) for a reasonable alternative standard
(or waiver of the otherwise applicable
standard) for obtaining the reward for any
individual for whom, for that period, it is
medically inadvisable to attempt to satisfy
the otherwise applicable standard.
‘‘(ii) If reasonable under the circumstances,
the plan or issuer may seek verification, such
as a statement from an individual’s physician,
that a health status factor makes it
unreasonably difficult or medically inadvisable
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for the individual to satisfy or attempt to
satisfy the otherwise applicable standard.
‘‘(E) The plan or issuer involved shall disclose
in all plan materials describing the terms of the
wellness program the availability of a reasonable
alternative standard (or the possibility of waiver
of the otherwise applicable standard) required
under subparagraph (D).
If plan materials
disclose that such a program is available,
without describing its terms, the disclosure
under this subparagraph shall not be required.
‘‘(k) EXISTING PROGRAMS.—Nothing in this section
shall prohibit a program of health promotion or
disease prevention that was established prior to the
date of enactment of this section and applied with all
applicable regulations, and that is operating on such
date, from continuing to be carried out for as long as
such regulations remain in effect.
PROGRAM
DEMONSTRATION
‘‘(l)
WELLNESS
PROJECT.—
‘‘(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than July 1, 2014,
the Secretary, in consultation with the Secretary of
the Treasury and the Secretary of Labor, shall
establish a 10-State demonstration project under
which participating States shall apply the
provisions of subsection (j) to programs of health
promotion offered by a health insurance issuer that
offers health insurance coverage in the individual
market in such State.
‘‘(2) EXPANSION OF DEMONSTRATION PROJECT.—If
the Secretary, in consultation with the Secretary of
the Treasury and the Secretary of Labor,
determines that the demonstration project
described in paragraph (1) is effective, such
Secretaries may, beginning on July 1, 2017 expand
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such demonstration project to include additional
participating States.
‘‘(3) REQUIREMENTS.—
‘‘(A)
MAINTENANCE OF COVERAGE.—The
Secretary, in consultation with the Secretary of
the Treasury and the Secretary of Labor, shall
not approve the participation of a State in the
demonstration project under this section unless
the Secretaries determine that the State’s
project is designed in a manner that—
‘‘(i) will not result in any decrease in
coverage; and
‘‘(ii) will not increase the cost to the Federal
Government in providing credits under section
36B of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 or
cost-sharing assistance under section 1402 of
the Patient Protection and Affordable Care
Act.
‘‘(B) OTHER REQUIREMENTS.—States that
participate in the demonstration project under
this subsection—
‘‘(i) may permit premium discounts or
rebates or the modification of otherwise
applicable copayments or deductibles for
adherence to, or participation in, a reasonably
designed program of health promotion and
disease prevention;
‘‘(ii) shall ensure that requirements of
consumer protection are met in programs of
health promotion in the individual market;
‘‘(iii) shall require verification from health
insurance issuers that offer health insurance
coverage in the individual market of such
State that premium discounts—
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‘‘(I) do not create undue burdens for
individuals insured in the individual
market;
‘‘(II) do not lead to cost shifting; and
‘‘(III)
are
not
a
subterfuge
for
discrimination;
‘‘(iv) shall ensure that consumer data is
protected in accordance with the requirements
of section 264(c) of the Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (42
U.S.C. 1320d–2 note); and
‘‘(v) shall ensure and demonstrate to the
satisfaction of the Secretary that the discounts
or other rewards provided under the project
reflect the expected level of participation in the
wellness program involved and the anticipated
effect the program will have on utilization or
medical claim costs.
‘‘(m) REPORT.—
‘‘(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 3 years after
the date of enactment of the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act, the Secretary, in consultation
with the Secretary of the Treasury and the
Secretary of Labor, shall submit a report to the
appropriate committees of Congress concerning—
‘‘(A) the effectiveness of wellness programs (as
defined in subsection (j)) in promoting health
and preventing disease;
‘‘(B) the impact of such wellness programs on
the access to care and affordability of coverage
for participants and non-participants of such
programs;
‘‘(C) the impact of premium-based and costsharing incentives on participant behavior and
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the role of such programs in changing behavior;
and
‘‘(D) the effectiveness of different types of
rewards.
‘‘(2) DATA COLLECTION.—In preparing the report
described in paragraph (1), the Secretaries shall
gather relevant information from employers who
provide employees with access to wellness
programs, including State and Federal agencies.
‘‘(n) REGULATIONS.—Nothing in this section shall
be construed as prohibiting the Secretaries of Labor,
Health and Human Services, or the Treasury from
promulgating regulations in connection with this
section.
‘‘SEC. 2706. NON-DISCRIMINATION IN HEALTH CARE.
‘‘(a) PROVIDERS.—A group health plan and a health
insurance issuer offering group or individual health
insurance coverage shall not discriminate with
respect to participation under the plan or coverage
against any health care provider who is acting within
the scope of that provider’s license or certification
under applicable State law. This section shall not
require that a group health plan or health insurance
issuer contract with any health care provider willing
to abide by the terms and conditions for participation
established by the plan or issuer. Nothing in this
section shall be construed as preventing a group
health plan, a health insurance issuer, or the
Secretary from establishing varying reimbursement
rates based on quality or performance measures.
‘‘(b) INDIVIDUALS.—The provisions of section 1558
of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act
(relating to non-discrimination) shall apply with
respect to a group health plan or health insurance
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issuer offering group or individual health insurance
coverage.
‘‘SEC. 2707. COMPREHENSIVE HEALTH INSURANCE
COVERAGE.
‘‘(a) COVERAGE FOR ESSENTIAL HEALTH BENEFITS
PACKAGE.—A health insurance issuer that offers
health insurance coverage in the individual or small
group market shall ensure that such coverage
includes the essential health benefits package
required under section 1302(a) of the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act.
‘‘(b) COST-SHARING UNDER GROUP HEALTH PLANS.—
A group health plan shall ensure that any annual
cost-sharing imposed under the plan does not exceed
the limitations provided for under paragraphs (1) and
(2) of section 1302(c).
‘‘(c) CHILD-ONLY PLANS.—If a health insurance
issuer offers health insurance coverage in any level of
coverage specified under section 1302(d) of the
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, the
issuer shall also offer such coverage in that level as a
plan in which the only enrollees are individuals who,
as of the beginning of a plan year, have not attained
the age of 21.
‘‘(d) DENTAL ONLY.—This section shall not apply to
a plan described in section 1302(d)(2)(B)(ii)(I).
‘‘SEC. 2708. PROHIBITION ON EXCESSIVE WAITING
PERIODS.
‘‘A group health plan and a health insurance issuer
offering group health insurance coverage shall not
apply any waiting period (as defined in section
2704(b)(4)) that exceeds 90 days.’
‘‘SEC. 2709 COVERAGE FOR INDIVIDUALS PARTICIPATING
IN APPROVED CLINICAL TRIALS.
‘‘(a) COVERAGE.—
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‘‘(1) IN GENERAL.—If a group health plan or a
health insurance issuer offering group or
individual health insurance coverage provides
coverage to a qualified individual, then such plan
or issuer—
‘‘(A) may not deny the individual participation
in the clinical trial referred to in subsection
(b)(2);
‘‘(B) subject to subsection (c), may not deny (or
limit or impose additional conditions on) the
coverage of routine patient costs for items and
services
furnished
in
connection
with
participation in the trial; and
‘‘(C) may not discriminate against the
individual on the basis of the individual’s
participation in such trial.
‘‘(2) ROUTINE PATIENT COSTS.—
‘‘(A) INCLUSION.—For purposes of paragraph
(1)(B), subject to subparagraph (B), routine
patient costs include all items and services
consistent with the coverage provided in the plan
(or coverage) that is typically covered for a
qualified individual who is not enrolled in a
clinical trial.
‘‘(B) EXCLUSION.—For purposes of paragraph
(1)(B), routine patient costs does not include—
‘‘(i) the investigational item, device, or
service,
itself;
‘‘(ii) items and services that are provided
solely to satisfy data collection and analysis
needs and that are not used in the direct
clinical management of the patient; or
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‘‘(iii) a service that is clearly inconsistent
with widely accepted and established
standards of care for a particular diagnosis.
‘‘(3) USE OF IN-NETWORK PROVIDERS.—If one or
more participating providers is participating in a
clinical trial, nothing in paragraph (1) shall be
construed as preventing a plan or issuer from
requiring that a qualified individual participate in
the trial through such a participating provider if
the provider will accept the individual as a
participant in the trial.
‘‘(4) USE OF OUT-OF-NETWORK.—Notwithstanding
paragraph (3), paragraph (1) shall apply to a
qualified individual participating in an approved
clinical trial that is conducted outside the State in
which the qualified individual resides.
‘‘(b) QUALIFIED INDIVIDUAL DEFINED.—For
purposes of subsection (a), the term ‘qualified
individual’ means an individual who is a participant
or beneficiary in a health plan or with coverage
described in subsection (a)(1) and who meets the
following conditions:
‘‘(1) The individual is eligible to participate in an
approved clinical trial according to the trial
protocol with respect to treatment of cancer or
other life-threatening disease or condition.
‘‘(2) Either—
‘‘(A) the referring health care professional is a
participating health care provider and has
concluded that the individual’s participation in
such trial would be appropriate based upon the
individual meeting the conditions described in
paragraph (1); or
‘‘(B) the participant or beneficiary provides
medical and scientific information establishing
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that the individual’s participation in such trial
would be appropriate based upon the individual
meeting the conditions described in paragraph
(1).
‘‘(c) LIMITATIONS ON COVERAGE.—This section shall
not be construed to require a group health plan, or a
health insurance issuer offering group or individual
health insurance coverage, to provide benefits for
routine patient care services provided outside of the
plan’s (or coverage’s) health care provider network
unless out-of-network benefits are otherwise provided
under the plan (or coverage).
‘‘(d) APPROVED CLINICAL TRIAL DEFINED.—
‘‘(1) IN GENERAL.—In this section, the term
‘approved clinical trial’ means a phase I, phase II,
phase III, or phase IV clinical trial that is
conducted in relation to the prevention, detection,
or treatment of cancer or other life-threatening
disease or condition and is described in any of the
following subparagraphs:
‘‘(A) FEDERALLY FUNDED TRIALS.—The
study or investigation is approved or funded
(which may include funding through in-kind
contributions) by one or more of the following:
‘‘(i) The National Institutes of Health.
‘‘(ii) The Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention.
‘‘(iii) The Agency for Health Care Research
and
Quality.
‘‘(iv) The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid
Services.
‘‘(v) cooperative group or center of any of the
entities described in clauses (i) through (iv) or
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the Department of Defense or the Department
of Veterans Affairs.
‘‘(vi) A qualified non-governmental research
entity
identified in the guidelines issued by the
National Institutes of Health for center
support grants.
‘‘(vii) Any of the following if the conditions
described in paragraph (2) are met:
‘‘(I) The Department of Veterans Affairs.
‘‘(II) The Department of Defense.
‘‘(III) The Department of Energy.
‘‘(B) The study or investigation is conducted
under an investigational new drug application
reviewed by the Food and Drug Administration.
‘‘(C) The study or investigation is a drug trial
that is exempt from having such an
investigational new drug application.
‘‘(2)
CONDITIONS FOR DEPARTMENTS.—The
conditions described in this paragraph, for a study
or investigation conducted by a Department, are
that the study or investigation has been reviewed
and approved through a system of peer review that
the Secretary determines—
‘‘(A) to be comparable to the system of peer
review of studies and investigations used by the
National Institutes of Health, and
‘‘(B) assures unbiased review of the highest
scientific standards by qualified individuals who
have no interest in the outcome of the review.
‘‘(e) LIFE-THREATENING CONDITION DEFINED.—In
this section, the term ‘life-threatening condition’
means any disease or condition from which the
likelihood of death is probable unless the course of
the disease or condition is interrupted.
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‘‘(f) CONSTRUCTION.—Nothing in this section shall
be construed to limit a plan’s or issuer’s coverage
with respect to clinical trials.
‘‘(g) APPLICATION TO FEHBP.—Notwithstanding
any provision of chapter 89 of title 5, United States
Code, this section shall apply to health plans offered
under the program under such chapter.
‘‘(h) PREEMPTION.—Notwithstanding any other
provision of this Act, nothing in this section shall
preempt State laws that require a clinical trials
policy for State regulated health insurance plans that
is in addition to the policy required under this
section.’’.
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Subtitle D—Available Coverage Choices for All
Americans
PART 1—ESTABLISHMENT OF QUALIFIED
HEALTH PLANS
SEC. 1301. QUALIFIED HEALTH PLAN DEFINED.
(a) QUALIFIED HEALTH PLAN.—In this title:
(1) IN GENERAL.—The term ‘‘qualified health
plan’’ means a health plan that—
(A) has in effect a certification (which may
include a seal or other indication of approval)
that such plan meets the criteria for certification
described in section 1311(c) issued or recognized
by each Exchange through which such plan is
offered;
(B) provides the essential health benefits
package described in section 1302(a); and
(C) is offered by a health insurance issuer
that—
(i) is licensed and in good standing to offer
health insurance coverage in each State in
which such issuer offers health insurance
coverage under this title;
(ii) agrees to offer at least one qualified
health plan in the silver level and at least one
plan in the gold level in each such Exchange;
(iii) agrees to charge the same premium rate
for each qualified health plan of the issuer
without regard to whether the plan is offered
through an Exchange or whether the plan is
offered directly from the issuer or through an
agent; and
(iv) complies with the regulations developed
by the Secretary under section 1311(d) and
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such other requirements as an applicable
Exchange may establish.
(2) INCLUSION OF CO-OP PLANS AND COMMUNITY
HEALTH INSURANCE OPTION.—Any reference in this
title to a qualified health plan shall be deemed to
include a qualified health plan offered through the
CO-OP program under section 1322, and a multiState plan under section 1334, unless specifically
provided for otherwise.
(3) TREATMENT OF QUALIFIED DIRECT PRIMARY
CARE MEDICAL HOME PLANS.—The Secretary of
Health and Human Services shall permit a
qualified health plan to provide coverage through a
qualified direct primary care medical home plan
that meets criteria established by the Secretary, so
long as the qualified health plan meets all
requirements that are otherwise applicable and the
services covered by the medical home plan are
coordinated with the entity offering the qualified
health plan.
(4) VARIATION BASED ON RATING AREA.—A
qualified health plan, including a multi-State
qualified health plan, may as appropriate vary
premiums by rating area (as defined in section
2701(a)(2) of the Public Health Service Act).
(b) TERMS RELATING TO HEALTH PLANS.—In this
title:
(1) HEALTH PLAN.—
(A) IN GENERAL.—The term ‘‘health plan’’
means health insurance coverage and a group
health plan.
(B) EXCEPTION FOR SELF-INSURED PLANS AND
MEWAS.—Except to the extent specifically
provided by this title, the term ‘‘health plan’’
shall not include a group health plan or multiple
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employer welfare arrangement to the extent the
plan or arrangement is not subject to State
insurance regulation under section 514 of the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of
1974.
(2) HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE AND ISSUER.—
The terms ‘‘health insurance coverage’’ and ‘‘health
insurance issuer’’ have the meanings given such
terms by section 2791(b) of the Public Health
Service Act.
(3) GROUP HEALTH PLAN.—The term ‘‘group
health plan’’ has the meaning given such term by
section 2791(a) of the Public Health Service Act.
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SEC.
1302.
ESSENTIAL
HEALTH
BENEFITS
REQUIREMENTS.
(a) ESSENTIAL HEALTH BENEFITS PACKAGE.—In this
title, the term ‘‘essential health benefits package’’
means, with respect to any health plan, coverage
that—
(1) provides for the essential health benefits
defined by the Secretary under subsection (b);
(2) limits cost-sharing for such coverage in
accordance with subsection (c); and
(3) subject to subsection (e), provides either the
bronze, silver, gold, or platinum level of coverage
described in subsection (d).
(b) ESSENTIAL HEALTH BENEFITS.—
(1) IN GENERAL.—Subject to paragraph (2), the
Secretary shall define the essential health benefits,
except that such benefits shall include at least the
following general categories and the items and
services covered within the categories:
(A) Ambulatory patient services.
(B) Emergency services.
(C) Hospitalization.
(D) Maternity and newborn care.
(E) Mental health and substance use disorder
services, including behavioral health treatment.
(F) Prescription drugs.
(G) Rehabilitative and habilitative services
and devices.
(H) Laboratory services.
(I) Preventive and wellness services and
chronic disease management.
(J) Pediatric services, including oral and
vision care.
(2) LIMITATION.—
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(A) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary shall ensure
that the scope of the essential health benefits
under paragraph (1) is equal to the scope of
benefits provided under a typical employer plan,
as determined by the Secretary. To inform this
determination, the Secretary of Labor shall
conduct a survey of employer-sponsored coverage
to determine the benefits typically covered by
employers, including multiemployer plans, and
provide a report on such survey to the Secretary.
(B) CERTIFICATION.—In defining the essential
health benefits described in paragraph (1), and
in revising the benefits under paragraph (4)(H),
the Secretary shall submit a report to the
appropriate committees of Congress containing a
certification from the Chief Actuary of the
Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services that
such essential health benefits meet the
limitation described in paragraph (2).
(3) NOTICE AND HEARING.—In defining the
essential health benefits described in paragraph
(1), and in revising the benefits under paragraph
(4)(H), the Secretary shall provide notice and an
opportunity for public comment.
(4) REQUIRED ELEMENTS FOR CONSIDERATION.—In
defining the essential health benefits under
paragraph (1), the Secretary shall—
(A) ensure that such essential health benefits
reflect an appropriate balance among the
categories described in such subsection, so that
benefits are not unduly weighted toward any
category;
(B) not make coverage decisions, determine
reimbursement
rates,
establish
incentive
programs, or design benefits in ways that

55a
discriminate against individuals because of their
age, disability, or expected length of life;
(C) take into account the health care needs of
diverse segments of the population, including
women, children, persons with disabilities, and
other groups;
(D) ensure that health benefits established as
essential not be subject to denial to individuals
against their wishes on the basis of the
individuals’ age or expected length of life or of
the individuals’ present or predicted disability,
degree of medical dependency, or quality of life;
(E) provide that a qualified health plan shall
not be treated as providing coverage for the
essential health benefits described in paragraph
(1) unless the plan provides that—
(i) coverage for emergency department
services will be provided without imposing any
requirement under the plan for prior
authorization of services or any limitation on
coverage where the provider of services does
not have a contractual relationship with the
plan for the providing of services that is more
restrictive
than
the
requirements
or
limitations
that
apply
to
emergency
department services received from providers
who do have such a contractual relationship
with the plan; and
(ii) if such services are provided out-ofnetwork,
the
cost-sharing
requirement
(expressed as a copayment amount or
coinsurance rate) is the same requirement that
would apply if such services were provided innetwork;
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(F) provide that if a plan described in section
1311(b)(2)(B)(ii) (relating to stand-alone dental
benefits plans) is offered through an Exchange,
another health plan offered through such
Exchange shall not fail to be treated as a
qualified health plan solely because the plan
does not offer coverage of benefits offered
through the stand-alone plan that are otherwise
required under paragraph (1)(J); and
(G) periodically review the essential health
benefits under paragraph (1), and provide a
report to Congress and the public that
contains—
(i) an assessment of whether enrollees are
facing any difficulty accessing needed services
for reasons of coverage or cost;
(ii) an assessment of whether the essential
health benefits needs to be modified or
updated to account for changes in medical
evidence or scientific advancement;
(iii) information on how the essential health
benefits will be modified to address any such
gaps in access or changes in the evidence base;
(iv) an assessment of the potential of
additional or expanded benefits to increase
costs and the interactions between the addition
or expansion of benefits and reductions in
existing benefits to meet actuarial limitations
described in paragraph (2); and
(H) periodically update the essential health
benefits under paragraph (1) to address any gaps
in access to coverage or changes in the evidence
base the Secretary identifies in the review
conducted under subparagraph (G).
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(5) RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.—Nothing in this
title shall be construed to prohibit a health plan
from providing benefits in excess of the essential
health benefits described in this subsection.
(c) REQUIREMENTS RELATING TO COST-SHARING.—
(1) ANNUAL LIMITATION ON COST-SHARING.—
(A) 2014.—The cost-sharing incurred under a
health plan with respect to self-only coverage or
coverage other than self-only coverage for a plan
year beginning in 2014 shall not exceed the
dollar amounts in effect under section
223(c)(2)(A)(ii) of the Internal Revenue Code of
1986 for self-only and family coverage,
respectively, for taxable years beginning in 2014.
(B) 2015 AND LATER.—In the case of any plan
year beginning in a calendar year after 2014, the
limitation under this paragraph shall—
(i) in the case of self-only coverage, be equal
to the dollar amount under subparagraph (A)
for self-only coverage for plan years beginning
in 2014, increased by an amount equal to the
product of that amount and the premium
adjustment percentage under paragraph (4) for
the calendar year; and
(ii) in the case of other coverage, twice the
amount in effect under clause (i).
If the amount of any increase under clause (i) is
not a multiple of $50, such increase shall be
rounded to the next lowest multiple of $50.
(2) ANNUAL LIMITATION ON DEDUCTIBLES FOR
EMPLOYER-SPONSORED PLANS.—
(A) IN GENERAL.—In the case of a health plan
offered in the small group market, the deductible
under the plan shall not exceed—
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(i) $2,000 in the case of a plan covering a
single individual; and
(ii) $4,000 in the case of any other plan.
The amounts under clauses (i) and (ii) may be
increased by the maximum amount of reimbursement
which is reasonably available to a participant under
a flexible spending arrangement described in section
106(c)(2) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986
(determined without regard to any salary reduction
arrangement).
(B) INDEXING OF LIMITS.—In the case of any
plan year beginning in a calendar year after
2014—
(i) the dollar amount under subparagraph
(A)(i) shall be increased by an amount equal to
the product of that amount and the premium
adjustment percentage under paragraph (4) for
the calendar year; and
(ii) the dollar amount under subparagraph
(A)(ii) shall be increased to an amount equal to
twice the amount in effect under subparagraph
(A)(i) for plan years beginning in the calendar
year, determined after application of clause (i).
If the amount of any increase under clause (i) is not a
multiple of $50, such increase shall be rounded to the
next lowest multiple of $50.
(C) ACTUARIAL VALUE.—The limitation under
this paragraph shall be applied in such a
manner so as to not affect the actuarial value of
any health plan, including a plan in the bronze
level.
(D) COORDINATION WITH PREVENTIVE LIMITS.—
Nothing in this paragraph shall be construed to
allow a plan to have a deductible under the plan
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apply to benefits described in section 2713 of the
Public Health Service Act.
(3) COST-SHARING.—In this title—
(A) IN GENERAL.—The term ‘‘cost-sharing’’
includes—
(i) deductibles, coinsurance, copayments, or
similar charges; and
(ii) any other expenditure required of an
insured individual which is a qualified medical
expense (within the meaning of section
223(d)(2) of the Internal Revenue Code of
1986) with respect to essential health benefits
covered under the plan.
(B) EXCEPTIONS.—Such term does not include
premiums, balance billing amounts for nonnetwork providers, or spending for non-covered
services.
(4) PREMIUM ADJUSTMENT PERCENTAGE.—For
purposes of paragraphs (1)(B)(i) and (2)(B)(i), the
premium adjustment percentage for any calendar
year is the percentage (if any) by which the
average per capita premium for health insurance
coverage in the United States for the preceding
calendar year (as estimated by the Secretary no
later than October 1 of such preceding calendar
year) exceeds such average per capita premium for
2013 (as determined by the Secretary).
(d) LEVELS OF COVERAGE.—
(1) LEVELS OF COVERAGE DEFINED.—The levels of
coverage described in this subsection are as
follows:
(A) BRONZE LEVEL.—A plan in the bronze level
shall provide a level of coverage that is designed
to provide benefits that are actuarially
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equivalent to 60 percent of the full actuarial
value of the benefits provided under the plan.
(B) SILVER LEVEL.—A plan in the silver level
shall provide a level of coverage that is designed
to provide benefits that are actuarially
equivalent to 70 percent of the full actuarial
value of the benefits provided under the plan.
(C) GOLD LEVEL.—A plan in the gold level
shall provide a level of coverage that is designed
to provide benefits that are actuarially
equivalent to 80 percent of the full actuarial
value of the benefits provided under the plan.
(D) PLATINUM LEVEL.—A plan in the platinum
level shall provide a level of coverage that is
designed to provide benefits that are actuarially
equivalent to 90 percent of the full actuarial
value of the benefits provided under the plan.
(2) ACTUARIAL VALUE.—
(A) IN GENERAL.—Under regulations issued by
the Secretary, the level of coverage of a plan
shall be determined on the basis that the
essential health benefits described in subsection
(b) shall be provided to a standard population
(and without regard to the population the plan
may actually provide benefits to).
(B) EMPLOYER CONTRIBUTIONS.—The Secretary
shall issue regulations under which employer
contributions to a health savings account (within
the meaning of section 223 of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1986) may be taken into
account in determining the level of coverage for a
plan of the employer.
(C) APPLICATION.—In determining under this
title, the Public Health Service Act, or the
Internal Revenue Code of 1986 the percentage of
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the total allowed costs of benefits provided under
a group health plan or health insurance coverage
that are provided by such plan or coverage, the
rules contained in the regulations under this
paragraph shall apply.
(3) ALLOWABLE VARIANCE.—The Secretary shall
develop guidelines to provide for a de minimis
variation in the actuarial valuations used in
determining the level of coverage of a plan to
account for differences in actuarial estimates.
(4) PLAN REFERENCE.—In this title, any reference
to a bronze, silver, gold, or platinum plan shall be
treated as a reference to a qualified health plan
providing a bronze, silver, gold, or platinum level of
coverage, as the case may be.
(e) CATASTROPHIC PLAN.—
(1) IN GENERAL.—A health plan not providing a
bronze, silver, gold, or platinum level of coverage
shall be treated as meeting the requirements of
subsection (d) with respect to any plan year if—
(A) the only individuals who are eligible to
enroll in the plan are individuals described in
paragraph (2); and
(B) the plan provides—
(i) except as provided in clause (ii), the
essential health benefits determined under
subsection (b), except that the plan provides no
benefits for any plan year until the individual
has incurred cost-sharing expenses in an
amount equal to the annual limitation in effect
under subsection (c)(1) for the plan year
(except as provided for in section 2713); and
(ii) coverage for at least three primary care
visits.
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(2) INDIVIDUALS ELIGIBLE FOR ENROLLMENT.—An
individual is described in this paragraph for any
plan year if the individual—
(A) has not attained the age of 30 before the
beginning of the plan year; or
(B) has a certification in effect for any plan
year under this title that the individual is
exempt from the requirement under section
5000A of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 by
reason of—
(i) section 5000A(e)(1) of such Code (relating
to individuals without affordable coverage); or
(ii) section 5000A(e)(5) of such Code (relating
to individuals with hardships).
(3) RESTRICTION TO INDIVIDUAL MARKET.—If a
health insurance issuer offers a health plan
described in this subsection, the issuer may only
offer the plan in the individual market.
(f) CHILD-ONLY PLANS.—If a qualified health plan is
offered through the Exchange in any level of coverage
specified under subsection (d), the issuer shall also
offer that plan through the Exchange in that level as
a plan in which the only enrollees are individuals
who, as of the beginning of a plan year, have not
attained the age of 21, and such plan shall be treated
as a qualified health plan.
(g) PAYMENTS TO FEDERALLY-QUALIFIED HEALTH
CENTERS. .—If any item or service covered by a
qualified health plan is provided by a Federallyqualified health center (as defined in section
1905(l)(2)(B) of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C.
1396d(l)(2)(B)) to an enrollee of the plan, the offeror
of the plan shall pay to the center for the item or
service an amount that is not less than the amount of
payment that would have been paid to the center
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under section 1902(bb) of such Act (42 U.S.C.
1396a(bb)) for such item or service.
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Subtitle E—Affordable Coverage Choices for All
Americans
PART I—PREMIUM TAX CREDITS AND COSTSHARING REDUCTIONS
Subpart A—Premium Tax Credits and Cost-sharing
Reductions
SEC. 1401. REFUNDABLE TAX CREDIT PROVIDING
PREMIUM ASSISTANCE FOR COVERAGE UNDER A
QUALIFIED HEALTH PLAN.
(a) IN GENERAL.—Subpart C of part IV of subchapter
A of chapter 1 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986
(relating to refundable credits) is amended by
inserting after section 36A the following new section:
‘‘SEC. 36B. REFUNDABLE CREDIT FOR COVERAGE
UNDER A QUALIFIED HEALTH PLAN.
‘‘(a) IN GENERAL.—In the case of an applicable
taxpayer, there shall be allowed as a credit against
the tax imposed by this subtitle for any taxable year
an amount equal to the premium assistance credit
amount of the taxpayer for the taxable year.
‘‘(b) PREMIUM ASSISTANCE CREDIT AMOUNT.—For
purposes of this section—
‘‘(1) IN GENERAL.—The term ‘premium assistance
credit amount’ means, with respect to any taxable
year, the sum of the premium assistance amounts
determined under paragraph (2) with respect to all
coverage months of the taxpayer occurring during
the taxable year.
‘‘(2)
PREMIUM
ASSISTANCE
AMOUNT.—The
premium assistance amount determined under this
subsection with respect to any coverage month is
the amount equal to the lesser of—
‘‘(A) the monthly premiums for such month for
1 or more qualified health plans offered in the
individual market within a State which cover
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the taxpayer, the taxpayer’s spouse, or any
dependent (as defined in section 152) of the
taxpayer and which were enrolled in through an
Exchange established by the State under 1311 of
the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act,
or
‘‘(B) the excess (if any) of—
‘‘(i) the adjusted monthly premium for such
month for the applicable second lowest cost
silver plan with respect to the taxpayer, over
‘‘(ii) an amount equal to 1/12 of the product
of the applicable percentage and the taxpayer’s
household income for the taxable year.
‘‘(3) OTHER TERMS AND RULES RELATING TO
PREMIUM ASSISTANCE AMOUNTS.—For purposes of
paragraph (2)—
‘‘(A) APPLICABLE PERCENTAGE.—
‘‘(i) IN GENERAL.—Except as provided in
clause (ii), the applicable percentage for any
taxable year shall be the percentage such that
the applicable percentage for any taxpayer
whose household income is within an income
tier specified in the following table shall
increase, on a sliding scale in a linear manner,
from the initial premium percentage to the
final premium percentage specified in such
table for such income tier:
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‘‘In the case of The
initial
household
income premium
(expressed
as
a percentage is—
percent of poverty
line)
with
the
following income tier

The
final
premium
percentage
is—

Up to 133%
133% up to 150%
150% up to 200%
200% up to 250%
250% up to 300%
300% up to 400%

2.0%
4.0%
6.3%
8.05%
9.5%
9.5%

2.0%
3.0%
4.0%
6.3%
8.05%
9.5%

“(ii) INDEXING.—
‘‘(I) IN GENERAL.—Subject to subclause
(II), in the case of taxable years beginning in
any calendar year after 2014, the initial and
final applicable percentages under clause (i)
(as in effect for the preceding calendar year
after application of this clause) shall be
adjusted to reflect the excess of the rate of
premium growth for the preceding calendar
year over the rate of income growth for the
preceding calendar year.
“(II) ADDITIONAL ADJUSTMENT.—Except as
provided in subclause (III), in the case of any
calendar year after 2018, the percentages
described in subclause (I) shall, in addition
to the adjustment under subclause (I), be
adjusted to reflect the excess (if any) of the
rate of premium growth estimated under
subclause (I) for the preceding calendar year
over the rate of growth in the consumer
price index for the preceding calendar year.
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“(III) FAILSAFE.—Subclause (II) shall
apply for any calendar year only if the
aggregate amount of premium tax credits
under
this
section
and
costsharing
reductions under section 1402 of the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act for the
preceding calendar year exceeds an amount
equal to 0.504 percent of the gross domestic
product for the preceding calendar year.
‘‘(B) APPLICABLE SECOND LOWEST COST SILVER
PLAN.—The applicable second lowest cost silver
plan with respect to any applicable taxpayer is
the second lowest cost silver plan of the
individual market in the rating area in which
the taxpayer resides which—
‘‘(i) is offered through the same Exchange
through which the qualified health plans taken
into account under paragraph (2)(A) were
offered, and
‘‘(ii) provides—
‘‘(I) self-only coverage in the case of an
applicable taxpayer—
‘‘(aa) whose tax for the taxable year is
determined under section 1(c) (relating to
unmarried
individuals
other
than
surviving
spouses
and
heads
of
households) and who is not allowed a
deduction under section 151 for the
taxable year with respect to a dependent,
or
‘‘(bb) who is not described in item (aa)
but who purchases only self-only coverage,
and
‘‘(II) family coverage in the case of any
other applicable taxpayer.
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If a taxpayer files a joint return and no credit is
allowed under this section with respect to 1 of the
spouses by reason of subsection (e), the taxpayer
shall be treated as described in clause (ii)(I) unless a
deduction is allowed under section 151 for the taxable
year with respect to a dependent other than either
spouse and subsection (e) does not apply to the
dependent.
‘‘(C) ADJUSTED MONTHLY PREMIUM.—The
adjusted monthly premium for an applicable
second lowest cost silver plan is the monthly
premium which would have been charged (for
the rating area with respect to which the
premiums under paragraph (2)(A) were
determined) for the plan if each individual
covered under a qualified health plan taken into
account under paragraph (2)(A) were covered by
such silver plan and the premium was adjusted
only for the age of each such individual in the
manner allowed under section 2701 of the Public
Health Service Act. In the case of a State
participating
in
the
wellness
discount
demonstration project under section 2705(d) of
the Public Health Service Act, the adjusted
monthly premium shall be determined without
regard to any premium discount or rebate under
such project.
‘‘(D) ADDITIONAL BENEFITS.—If—
‘‘(i) a qualified health plan under section
1302(b)(5) of the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act offers benefits in addition
to the essential health benefits required to be
provided by the plan, or
‘‘(ii) a State requires a qualified health plan
under section 1311(d)(3)(B) of such Act to cover
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benefits in addition to the essential health
benefits required to be provided by the plan,
the portion of the premium for the plan properly
allocable (under rules prescribed by the Secretary of
Health and Human Services) to such additional
benefits shall not be taken into account in
determining either the monthly premium or the
adjusted monthly premium under paragraph (2).
‘‘(E) SPECIAL RULE FOR PEDIATRIC DENTAL
COVERAGE.—For purposes of determining the
amount of any monthly premium, if an
individual enrolls in both a qualified health plan
and
a
plan
described
in
section
1311(d)(2)(B)(ii)(I) of the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act for any plan year, the
portion of the premium for the plan described in
such section that (under regulations prescribed
by the Secretary) is properly allocable to
pediatric dental benefits which are included in
the essential health benefits required to be
provided by a qualified health plan under section
1302(b)(1)(J) of such Act shall be treated as a
premium payable for a qualified health plan.
‘‘(c) DEFINITION AND RULES RELATING TO APPLICABLE
TAXPAYERS, COVERAGE MONTHS, AND QUALIFIED
HEALTH PLAN.—For purposes of this section—
‘‘(1) APPLICABLE TAXPAYER.—
‘‘(A) IN GENERAL.—The term ‘applicable
taxpayer’ means, with respect to any taxable
year, a taxpayer whose household income for the
taxable year equals or exceeds 100 percent but
does not exceed 400 percent of an amount equal
to the poverty line for a family of the size
involved.
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‘‘(B) SPECIAL

RULE FOR CERTAIN INDIVIDUALS

LAWFULLY PRESENT IN THE UNITED STATES.—If—

‘‘(i) a taxpayer has a household income
which is not greater than 100 percent of an
amount equal to the poverty line for a family of
the size involved, and
‘‘(ii) the taxpayer is an alien lawfully present
in the United States, but is not eligible for the
Medicaid program under title XIX of the Social
Security Act by reason of such alien status, the
taxpayer shall, for purposes of the credit under
this section, be treated as an applicable
taxpayer with a household income which is
equal to 100 percent of the poverty line for a
family of the size involved.
‘‘(C) MARRIED COUPLES MUST FILE JOINT
RETURN.—If the taxpayer is married (within the
meaning of section 7703) at the close of the
taxable year, the taxpayer shall be treated as an
applicable taxpayer only if the taxpayer and the
taxpayer’s spouse file a joint return for the
taxable year.
‘‘(D) DENIAL OF CREDIT TO DEPENDENTS.—No
credit shall be allowed under this section to any
individual with respect to whom a deduction
under section 151 is allowable to another
taxpayer for a taxable year beginning in the
calendar year in which such individual’s taxable
year begins.
‘‘(2) COVERAGE MONTH.—For purposes of this
subsection—
‘‘(A) IN GENERAL.—The term ‘coverage month’
means, with respect to an applicable taxpayer,
any month if—
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‘‘(i) as of the first day of such month the
taxpayer, the taxpayer’s spouse, or any
dependent of the taxpayer is covered by a
qualified health plan described in subsection
(b)(2)(A) that was enrolled in through an
Exchange established by the State under
section 1311 of the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act, and
‘‘(ii) the premium for coverage under such
plan for such month is paid by the taxpayer (or
through advance payment of the credit under
subsection (a) under section 1412 of the
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act).
‘‘(B) EXCEPTION FOR MINIMUM ESSENTIAL
COVERAGE.—
‘‘(i) IN GENERAL.—The term ‘coverage month’
shall not include any month with respect to an
individual if for such month the individual is
eligible for minimum essential coverage other
than eligibility for coverage described in
section 5000A(f)(1)(C) (relating to coverage in
the individual market).
‘‘(ii) MINIMUM ESSENTIAL COVERAGE.—The
term ‘minimum essential coverage’ has the
meaning given such term by section 5000A(f).
‘‘(C) SPECIAL RULE FOR EMPLOYER-SPONSORED
MINIMUM ESSENTIAL COVERAGE.—For purposes of
subparagraph (B)—
‘‘(i) COVERAGE MUST BE AFFORDABLE.—Except
as provided in clause (iii), an employee shall
not be treated as eligible for minimum
essential coverage if such coverage—
‘‘(I) consists of an eligible employersponsored plan (as defined in section
5000A(f)(2)), and
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‘‘(II) the employee’s required contribution
(within
the
meaning
of
section
5000A(e)(1)(B)) with respect to the plan
exceeds 9.5 percent of the applicable
taxpayer’s household income.
This clause shall also apply to an individual who is
eligible to enroll in the plan by reason of a
relationship the individual bears to the employee.
‘‘(ii) COVERAGE MUST PROVIDE MINIMUM
VALUE.—Except as provided in clause (iii), an
employee shall not be treated as eligible for
minimum essential coverage if such coverage
consists of an eligible employer-sponsored plan
(as defined in section 5000A(f)(2)) and the
plan’s share of the total allowed costs of
benefits provided under the plan is less than
60 percent of such costs.
‘‘(iii) EMPLOYEE OR FAMILY MUST NOT BE
COVERED UNDER EMPLOYER PLAN.—Clauses (i)
and (ii) shall not apply if the employee (or any
individual described in the last sentence of
clause (i)) is covered under the eligible
employer-sponsored plan or the grandfathered
health plan.
‘‘(iv) INDEXING.—In the case of plan years
beginning in any calendar year after 2014, the
Secretary shall adjust the 9.5 percent under
clause (i)(II) in the same manner as the
percentages are adjusted under subsection
(b)(3)(A)(ii).
(D) EXCEPTIONS FOR INDIVIDUALS RECEIVING
FREE CHOICE VOUCHERS.—The term ‘coverage
month’ shall not include any month in which
such individual has a free choice voucher
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provided under section 10108 of the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act.
‘‘(3) DEFINITIONS AND OTHER RULES.—
‘‘(A) QUALIFIED HEALTH PLAN.—The term
‘qualified health plan’ has the meaning given
such term by section 1301(a) of the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act, except that
such term shall not include a qualified health
plan which is a catastrophic plan described in
section 1302(e) of such Act.
‘‘(B) GRANDFATHERED HEALTH PLAN.—The term
‘grandfathered health plan’ has the meaning
given such term by section 1251 of the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act.
‘‘(d) TERMS RELATING TO INCOME AND FAMILIES.—For
purposes of this section—
‘‘(1) FAMILY SIZE.—The family size involved with
respect to any taxpayer shall be equal to the
number of individuals for whom the taxpayer is
allowed a deduction under section 151 (relating to
allowance of deduction for personal exemptions) for
the taxable year.
‘‘(2) HOUSEHOLD INCOME.—
‘‘(A)
HOUSEHOLD
INCOME.—The
term
‘household income’ means, with respect to any
taxpayer, an amount equal to the sum of—
‘‘(i) the modified adjusted gross income of the
taxpayer, plus
‘‘(ii) the aggregate modified adjusted gross
incomes of all other individuals who—
‘‘(I) were taken into account in
determining the taxpayer’s family size under
paragraph (1), and
‘‘(II) were required to file a return of tax
imposed by section 1 for the taxable year.
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‘‘(B) MODIFIED ADJUSTED GROSS INCOME.—The
term ‘modified adjusted gross income’ means
adjusted gross income increased by—
‘‘(i) any amount excluded from gross income
under section 911, and
‘‘(ii) any amount of interest received or
accrued by the taxpayer during the taxable
year which is exempt from tax.
‘‘(3) POVERTY LINE.—
‘‘(A) IN GENERAL.—The term ‘poverty line’ has
the meaning given that term in section
2110(c)(5) of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C.
1397jj(c)(5)).
‘‘(B) POVERTY LINE USED.—In the case of any
qualified health plan offered through an
Exchange for coverage during a taxable year
beginning in a calendar year, the poverty line
used shall be the most recently published
poverty line as of the 1st day of the regular
enrollment period for coverage during such
calendar year.
‘‘(e) RULES FOR INDIVIDUALS NOT LAWFULLY
PRESENT.—
‘‘(1) IN GENERAL.—If 1 or more individuals for
whom a taxpayer is allowed a deduction under
section 151 (relating to allowance of deduction for
personal exemptions) for the taxable year
(including the taxpayer or his spouse) are
individuals who are not lawfully present—
‘‘(A) the aggregate amount of premiums
otherwise taken into account under clauses (i)
and (ii) of subsection (b)(2)(A) shall be reduced
by the portion (if any) of such premiums which is
attributable to such individuals, and
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‘‘(B) for purposes of applying this section, the
determination as to what percentage a
taxpayer’s household income bears to the
poverty level for a family of the size involved
shall be made under one of the following
methods:
‘‘(i) A method under which—
‘‘(I) the taxpayer’s family size is
determined by not taking such individuals
into account, and
‘‘(II) the taxpayer’s household income is
equal to the product of the taxpayer’s
household income (determined without
regard to this subsection) and a fraction—
‘‘(aa) the numerator of which is the
poverty line for the taxpayer’s family size
determined after application of subclause
(I), and
‘‘(bb) the denominator of which is the
poverty line for the taxpayer’s family size
determined without regard to subclause
(I).
‘‘(ii) A comparable method reaching the same
result as the method under clause (i).
‘‘(2) LAWFULLY PRESENT.—For purposes of this
section, an individual shall be treated as lawfully
present only if the individual is, and is reasonably
expected to be for the entire period of enrollment
for which the credit under this section is being
claimed, a citizen or national of the United States
or an alien lawfully present in the United States.
‘‘(3) SECRETARIAL AUTHORITY.—The Secretary of
Health and Human Services, in consultation with
the Secretary, shall prescribe rules setting forth
the methods by which calculations of family size
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and household income are made for purposes of
this subsection. Such rules shall be designed to
ensure that the least burden is placed on
individuals enrolling in qualified health plans
through an Exchange and taxpayers eligible for the
credit allowable under this section.
‘‘(f) RECONCILIATION OF CREDIT AND ADVANCE
CREDIT.—
‘‘(1) IN GENERAL.—The amount of the credit
allowed under this section for any taxable year
shall be reduced (but not below zero) by the
amount of any advance payment of such credit
under section 1412 of the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act.
‘‘(2) EXCESS ADVANCE PAYMENTS.—
‘‘(A) IN GENERAL.—If the advance payments to
a taxpayer under section 1412 of the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act for a taxable
year exceed the credit allowed by this section
(determined without regard to paragraph (1)),
the tax imposed by this chapter for the taxable
year shall be increased by the amount of such
excess.
‘‘(B) LIMITATION ON INCREASE WHERE INCOME
LESS THAN 400 PERCENT OF POVERTY LINE.—
‘‘(i) IN GENERAL.—In the case of an
applicable taxpayer whose household income is
less than 400 percent of the poverty line for the
size of the family involved for the taxable year,
the
amount
of
the
increase
under
subparagraph (A) shall in no event exceed
$400 ($250 in the case of a taxpayer whose tax
is determined under section 1(c) for the taxable
year).
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‘‘(ii) INDEXING OF AMOUNT.—In the case of
any calendar year beginning after 2014, each
of the dollar amounts under clause (i) shall be
increased by an amount equal to—
‘‘(I) such dollar amount, multiplied by
‘‘(II)
the
cost-of-living
adjustment
determined under section 1(f)(3) for the
calendar year, determined by substituting
‘calendar year 2013’ for ‘calendar year 1992’
in subparagraph (B) thereof.
(3)
INFORMATION
REQUIREMENT.—Each
Exchange (or any person carrying out 1 or more
responsibilities of an Exchange under section
1311(f)(3) or 1321(c) of the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act) shall provide the following
information to the Secretary and to the taxpayer
with respect to any health plan provided through
the Exchange:
‘‘(A) The level of coverage described in section
1302(d) of the Patient Protection and Affordable
Care Act and the period such coverage was in
effect.
‘‘(B) The total premium for the coverage
without regard to the credit under this section or
cost-sharing reductions under section 1402 of
such Act.
‘‘(C) The aggregate amount of any advance
payment of such credit or reductions under
section 1412 of such Act.
‘‘(D) The name, address, and TIN of the
primary insured and the name and TIN of each
other individual obtaining coverage under the
policy.
‘‘(E) Any information provided to the
Exchange,
including
any
change
of
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circumstances, necessary to determine eligibility
for, and the amount of, such credit.
‘‘(F) Information necessary to determine
whether a taxpayer has received excess advance
payments.
If the amount of any increase under clause (i) is not a
multiple of $50, such increase shall be rounded to the
next lowest multiple of $50.
‘‘(g) REGULATIONS.—The Secretary shall prescribe
such regulations as may be necessary to carry out the
provisions of this section, including regulations which
provide for—
‘‘(1) the coordination of the credit allowed under
this section with the program for advance payment
of the credit under section 1412 of the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act, and
‘‘(2) the application of subsection (f) where the
filing status of the taxpayer for a taxable year is
different from such status used for determining the
advance payment of the credit.’’.
(b) DISALLOWANCE OF DEDUCTION.—Section 280C of
the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 is amended by
adding at the end the following new subsection:
‘‘(g) CREDIT FOR HEALTH INSURANCE PREMIUMS.—No
deduction shall be allowed for the portion of the
premiums paid by the taxpayer for coverage of 1 or
more individuals under a qualified health plan which
is equal to the amount of the credit determined for
the taxable year under section 36B(a) with respect to
such premiums.’’.
(c) STUDY ON AFFORDABLE COVERAGE.—
(1) STUDY AND REPORT.—
(A) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 5 years after
the date of the enactment of this Act, the
Comptroller General shall conduct a study on
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the affordability of health insurance coverage,
including—
(i) the impact of the tax credit for qualified
health insurance coverage of individuals under
section 36B of the Internal Revenue Code of
1986 and the tax credit for employee health
insurance expenses of small employers under
section 45R of such Code on maintaining and
expanding the health insurance coverage of
individuals;
(ii) the availability of affordable health
benefits plans, including a study of whether
the percentage of household income used for
purposes of section 36B(c)(2)(C) of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1986 (as added by this
section) is the appropriate level for
determining
whether
employer-provided
coverage is affordable for an employee and
whether such level may be lowered without
significantly increasing the costs to the
Federal Government and reducing employerprovided coverage; and
(iii) the ability of individuals to maintain
essential health benefits coverage (as defined
in section 5000A(f) of the Internal Revenue
Code of 1986).
(B) REPORT.—The Comptroller General shall
submit to the appropriate committees of
Congress a report on the study conducted under
subparagraph (A), together with legislative
recommendations relating to the matters studied
under such subparagraph.
(2) APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS.—In
this subsection, the term ‘‘appropriate committees
of Congress’’ means the Committee on Ways and
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Means, the Committee on Education and Labor,
and the Committee on Energy and Commerce of
the House of Representatives and the Committee
on Finance and the Committee on Health,
Education, Labor and Pensions of the Senate.
(d) CONFORMING AMENDMENTS.—
(1) Paragraph (2) of section 1324(b) of title 31,
United States Code, is amended by inserting
‘‘36B,’’ after ‘‘36A,’’.
(2) The table of sections for subpart C of part IV
of subchapter A of chapter 1 of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1986 is amended by inserting
after the item relating to section 36A the following
new item:
‘‘Sec. 36B. Refundable credit for coverage under a
qualified health plan.’’.
(3) Section 6211(b)(4)(A) of the Internal Revenue
Code of 1986 is amended by inserting ‘‘36B,’’ after
‘‘36A,’’.
(e) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendments made by this
section shall apply to taxable years ending after
December 31, 2013.
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Subtitle F—Shared Responsibility for Health Care
PART I—INDIVIDUAL RESPONSIBILITY
SEC. 1501. REQUIREMENT TO MAINTAIN MINIMUM
ESSENTIAL COVERAGE.
(a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following
findings:
(1) IN GENERAL.—The individual responsibility
requirement provided for in this section (in this
subsection referred to as the ‘‘requirement’’) is
commercial and economic in nature, and
substantially affects interstate commerce, as a
result of the effects described in paragraph (2).
(2) EFFECTS ON THE NATIONAL ECONOMY AND
INTERSTATE COMMERCE.—The effects described in
this paragraph are the following:
(A) The requirement regulates activity that is
commercial and economic in nature: economic
and financial decisions about how and when
health care is paid for, and when health
insurance is purchased. In the absence of the
requirement, some individuals would make an
economic and financial decision to forego health
insurance coverage and attempt to self-insure,
which increases financial risks to households
and medical providers.
(B) Health insurance and health care services
are a significant part of the national economy.
National health spending is projected to increase
from $2,500,000,000,000, or 17.6 percent of the
economy, in 2009 to $4,700,000,000,000 in 2019.
Private health insurance spending is projected to
be $854,000,000,000 in 2009, and pays for
medical supplies, drugs, and equipment that are
shipped in interstate commerce. Since most
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health insurance is sold by national or regional
health insurance companies, health insurance is
sold in interstate commerce and claims
payments flow through interstate commerce.
(C) The requirement, together with the other
provisions of this Act, will add millions of new
consumers to the health insurance market,
increasing the supply of, and demand for, health
care services and will increase the number and
share of Americans who are insured.
(D) The requirement achieves near-universal
coverage by building upon and strengthening the
private employer-based health insurance system,
which covers 176,000,000 Americans nationwide.
In Massachusetts, a similar requirement has
strengthened private employer-based coverage:
despite the economic downturn, the number of
workers offered employer-based coverage has
actually increased.
(E) The economy loses up to $207,000,000,000
a year because of the poorer health and shorter
lifespan of the uninsured.
By significantly
reducing the number of the uninsured, the
requirement, together with the other provisions
of this Act, will significantly reduce this
economic cost.
(F) The cost of providing uncompensated care
to the uninsured was $43,000,000,000 in 2008.
To pay for this cost, health care providers pass
on the cost to private insurers, which pass on the
cost to families. This cost-shifting increases
family premiums by on average over $1,000 a
year. By significantly reducing the number of
the uninsured, the requirement, together with
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the other provisions of this Act, will lower health
insurance premiums.
(G) 62 percent of all personal bankruptcies are
caused in part by medical expenses.
By
significantly
increasing
health
insurance
coverage, the requirement, together with the
other provisions of this Act, will improve
financial security for families.
(H) Under the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974 (29 U.S.C. 1001 et seq.), the
Public Health Service Act (42 U.S.C. 201 et seq.),
and this Act, the Federal Government has a
significant role in regulating health insurance.
The requirement is an essential part of this
larger regulation of economic activity, and the
absence of the requirement would undercut
Federal regulation of the health insurance
market.
(I) Under sections 2704 and 2705 of the Public
Health Service Act (as added by section 1201 of
this Act), if there were no requirement, many
individuals would wait to purchase health
insurance until they needed care.
By
significantly
increasing
health
insurance
coverage, the requirement, together with the
other provisions of this Act, will minimize this
adverse selection and broaden the health
insurance risk pool to include healthy
individuals, which will lower health insurance
premiums. The requirement is essential to
creating effective health insurance markets in
which improved health insurance products that
are guaranteed issue and do not exclude
coverage of pre-existing conditions can be sold.
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(J) Administrative costs for private health
insurance, which were $90,000,000,000 in 2006,
are 26 to 30 percent of premiums in the current
individual and small group markets.
By
significantly
increasing
health
insurance
coverage and the size of purchasing pools, which
will
increase
economies
of
scale,
the
requirement, together with the other provisions
of
this
Act,
will
significantly
reduce
administrative costs and lower health insurance
premiums. The requirement is essential to
creating effective health insurance markets that
do not require underwriting and eliminate its
associated administrative costs.
(3) SUPREME COURT RULING.—In United States v.
South-Eastern Underwriters Association (322 U.S.
533 (1944)), the Supreme Court of the United
States ruled that insurance is interstate commerce
subject to Federal regulation.
(b) IN GENERAL.—Subtitle D of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1986 is amended by adding at the
end the following new chapter:
‘‘CHAPTER 48—MAINTENANCE OF MINIMUM
ESSENTIAL COVERAGE
‘‘Sec. 5000A. Requirement to maintain minimum
essential coverage.
‘‘SEC. 5000A. REQUIREMENT TO MAINTAIN MINIMUM
ESSENTIAL COVERAGE.
‘‘(a) REQUIREMENT TO MAINTAIN MINIMUM
ESSENTIAL COVERAGE.—An applicable individual
shall for each month beginning after 2013 ensure
that the individual, and any dependent of the
individual who is an applicable individual, is covered
under minimum essential coverage for such month.
‘‘(b) SHARED RESPONSIBILITY PAYMENT.—
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‘‘(1) IN GENERAL.—If a taxpayer who is an
applicable individual, or an applicable individual
for whom the taxpayers is liable under paragraph
(3), fails to meet the requirement of subsection (a)
for 1 or more months, then, except as provided in
subsection (e), there is hereby imposed on the
taxpayer a penalty with respect to such failures in
the amount determined under subsection (c).
‘‘(2) INCLUSION WITH RETURN.—Any penalty
imposed by this section with respect to any month
shall be included with a taxpayer’s return under
chapter 1 for the taxable year which includes such
month.
‘‘(3) PAYMENT OF PENALTY.—If an individual with
respect to whom a penalty is imposed by this
section for any month—
‘‘(A) is a dependent (as defined in section 152)
of another taxpayer for the other taxpayer’s
taxable year including such month, such other
taxpayer shall be liable for such penalty, or
‘‘(B) files a joint return for the taxable year
including such month, such individual and the
spouse of such individual shall be jointly liable
for such penalty.
‘‘(c) AMOUNT OF PENALTY.—
‘‘(1) IN GENERAL.—The amount of the penalty
imposed by this section on any taxpayer for any
taxable year with respect to failures described in
subsection (b)(1) shall be equal to the lesser of—
“(A) the sum of the monthly penalty amounts
determined under paragraph (2) for months in
the taxable year during which 1 or more such
failures occurred, or
“(B) an amount equal to the national average
premium for qualified health plans which have a
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bronze level of coverage, provide coverage for the
applicable family size involved, and are offered
through Exchanges for plan years beginning in
the calendar year with or within which the
taxable year ends.
“(2) MONTHLY PENALTY AMOUNTS.—For purposes
of paragraph (1)(A), the monthly penalty amount
with respect to any taxpayer for any month during
which any failure described in subsection (b)(1)
occurred is an amount equal to 1Ú12 of the greater
of the following amounts:
“(A) FLAT DOLLAR AMOUNT. .—AN AMOUNT
EQUAL TO THE LESSER OF—
“(i) the sum of the applicable dollar amounts
for all individuals with respect to whom such
failure occurred during such month, or
“(ii) 300 percent of the applicable dollar
amount (determined without regard to
paragraph (3)(C)) for the calendar year with or
within which the taxable year ends.
‘‘(B) PERCENTAGE OF INCOME.— An amount
equal to the following percentage of the excess of
the taxpayer’s household income for the taxable
year over the amount of gross income specified in
section 6012(a)(1) with respect to the taxpayer
for the taxable year:
“(i) 1.0 percent for taxable years beginning
in 2014.
‘‘(ii) 2.0 percent for taxable years beginning
in 2015.
‘‘(iii) 2.5 percent for taxable years beginning
after 2015.
“(3) APPLICABLE DOLLAR AMOUNT.—For purposes
of paragraph (1)—
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‘‘(A) IN GENERAL.—Except as provided in
subparagraphs (B) and (C), the applicable dollar
amount is $750.
‘‘(B) PHASE IN.—The applicable dollar amount
is $95 for 2014 and $325 for 2015.
‘‘(C) SPECIAL RULE FOR INDIVIDUALS UNDER AGE
18.—If an applicable individual has not attained
the age of 18 as of the beginning of a month, the
applicable dollar amount with respect to such
individual for the month shall be equal to onehalf of the applicable dollar amount for the
calendar year in which the month occurs.
‘‘(D) INDEXING OF AMOUNT.—In the case of any
calendar year beginning after 2016, the
applicable dollar amount shall be equal to $695,
increased by an amount equal to—
‘‘(i) $695, multiplied by
‘‘(ii) the cost-of-living adjustment determined
under section 1(f)(3) for the calendar year,
determined by substituting ‘calendar year
2015’ for ‘calendar year 1992’ in subparagraph
(B) thereof.
If the amount of any increase under clause (i) is not a
multiple of $50, such increase shall be rounded to the
next lowest multiple of $50.
‘‘(4) TERMS RELATING TO INCOME AND FAMILIES.—
For purposes of this section—
‘‘(A) FAMILY SIZE.—The family size involved
with respect to any taxpayer shall be equal to
the number of individuals for whom the taxpayer
is allowed a deduction under section 151
(relating to allowance of deduction for personal
exemptions) for the taxable year.
‘‘(B)
HOUSEHOLD
INCOME.—The
term
‘household income’ means, with respect to any
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taxpayer for any taxable year, an amount equal
to the sum of—
‘‘(i) the modified adjusted gross income of the
taxpayer, plus
‘‘(ii) the aggregate modified adjusted gross
incomes of all other individuals who—
‘‘(I) were taken into account in
determining the taxpayer’s family size under
paragraph (1),and
‘‘(II) were required to file a return of tax
imposed by section 1 for the taxable year.
‘‘(C) MODIFIED ADJUSTED GROSS INCOME.—The
term ‘modified adjusted gross income’ means
adjusted gross income increased by—
‘‘(i) any amount excluded from gross
income— under section 911, and,
‘‘(ii) any amount of interest received or
accrued by the taxpayer during the taxable
year which is exempt from tax.
‘‘(d) APPLICABLE INDIVIDUAL.—For purposes of this
section—
‘‘(1) IN GENERAL.—The term ‘applicable
individual’ means, with respect to any month, an
individual other than an individual described in
paragraph (2), (3), or (4).
‘‘(2) RELIGIOUS EXEMPTIONS.—
‘‘(A) RELIGIOUS CONSCIENCE EXEMPTION.—Such
term shall not include any individual for any
month if such individual has in effect an
exemption under section 1311(d)(4)(H) of the
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act
which certifies that such individual is
“(i) a member of a recognized religious sect
or division thereof which is described in section
1402(g)(1), and
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“(ii) an adherent of established tenets or
teachings of such sect or division as described
in such section.
‘‘(B) HEALTH CARE SHARING MINISTRY.—
‘‘(i) IN GENERAL.—Such term shall not
include any individual for any month if such
individual is a member of a health care
sharing ministry for the month.
‘‘(ii) HEALTH CARE SHARING MINISTRY.—The
term ‘health care sharing ministry’ means an
organization—
‘‘(I) which is described in section 501(c)(3)
and is exempt from taxation under section
501(a),
‘‘(II) members of which share a common
set of ethical or religious beliefs and share
medical expenses among members in
accordance with those beliefs and without
regard to the State in which a member
resides or is employed,
‘‘(III)
members
of
which
retain
membership even after they develop a
medical condition,
‘‘(IV) which (or a predecessor of which) has
been in existence at all times since
December 31, 1999, and medical expenses of
its members have been shared continuously
and without interruption since at least
December 31, 1999, and
‘‘(V) which conducts an annual audit
which is performed by an independent
certified
public
accounting
firm
in
accordance
with
generally
accepted
accounting principles and which is made
available to the public upon request.
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‘‘(3) INDIVIDUALS NOT LAWFULLY PRESENT.—Such
term shall not include an individual for any month
if for the month the individual is not a citizen or
national of the United States or an alien lawfully
present in the United States.
‘‘(4) INCARCERATED INDIVIDUALS.—Such term
shall not include an individual for any month if for
the month the individual is incarcerated, other
than incarceration pending the disposition of
charges.
‘‘(e) EXEMPTIONS.—No penalty shall be imposed
under subsection (a) with respect to—
‘‘(1)
INDIVIDUALS
WHO
CANNOT
AFFORD
COVERAGE.—
‘‘(A) IN GENERAL.—Any applicable individual for
any month if the applicable individual’s required
contribution (determined on an annual basis) for
coverage for the month exceeds 8 percent of such
individual’s household income for the taxable year
described in section 1412(b)(1)(B) of the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act. For purposes
of applying this subparagraph, the taxpayer’s
household income shall be increased by any
exclusion from gross income for any portion of the
required contribution made through a salary
reduction arrangement.
‘‘(B) REQUIRED CONTRIBUTION.—For purposes of
this paragraph, the term ‘required contribution’
means—
‘‘(i) in the case of an individual eligible to
purchase
minimum
essential
coverage
consisting of coverage through an eligibleemployer-sponsored plan, the portion of the
annual premium which would be paid by the
individual (without regard to whether paid
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through salary reduction or otherwise) for selfonly coverage, or
‘‘(ii) in the case of an individual eligible only
to purchase minimum essential coverage
described in subsection (f)(1)(C), the annual
premium for the lowest cost bronze plan
available in the individual market through the
Exchange in the State in the rating area in
which the individual resides (without regard to
whether the individual purchased a qualified
health plan through the Exchange), reduced by
the amount of the credit allowable under
section 36B for the taxable year (determined as
if the individual was covered by a qualified
health plan offered through the Exchange for
the entire taxable year).
‘‘(C) SPECIAL RULES FOR INDIVIDUALS RELATED TO
EMPLOYEES.—For purposes of subparagraph (B)(i),
if an applicable individual is eligible for minimum
essential coverage through an employer by reason
of a relationship to an employee, the determination
under subparagraph (A) shall be made by reference
to required contribution of the employee.
‘‘(D) INDEXING.—In the case of plan years
beginning in any calendar year after 2014,
subparagraph (A) shall be applied by substituting
for ‘8 percent’ the percentage the Secretary of
Health and Human Services determines reflects
the excess of the rate of premium growth between
the preceding calendar year and 2013 over the rate
of income growth for such period.
‘‘(2) TAXPAYERS WITH INCOME BELOW FILING
THRESHOLD.—Any applicable individual for any
month during a calendar year if the individual’s
household income for the taxable year described in
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section 1412(b)(1)(B) of the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act is less than the amount of
gross income specified in section 6102(a)(1) with
respect to the taxpayer.
‘‘(3) MEMBERS OF INDIAN TRIBES.—Any applicable
individual for any month during which the
individual is a member of an Indian tribe (as
defined in section 45A(c)(6)).
‘‘(4) MONTHS DURING SHORT COVERAGE GAPS.—
‘‘(A) IN GENERAL.—Any month the last day of
which occurred during a period in which the
applicable individual was not covered by
minimum essential coverage for a continuous
period of less than 3 months.
‘‘(B) SPECIAL RULES.—For purposes of applying
this paragraph—
‘‘(i) the length of a continuous period shall be
determined without regard to the calendar
years in which months in such period occur,
‘‘(ii) if a continuous period is greater than
the period allowed under subparagraph (A), no
exception shall be provided under this
paragraph for any month in the period, and
‘‘(iii) if there is more than 1 continuous
period described in subparagraph (A) covering
months in a calendar year, the exception
provided by this paragraph shall only apply to
months in the first of such periods.
The Secretary shall prescribe rules for the collection
of the penalty imposed by this section in cases where
continuous periods include months in more than 1
taxable year.
‘‘(5) HARDSHIPS.—Any applicable individual who
for any month is determined by the Secretary of
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Health and Human Services under section
1311(d)(4)(H) to have suffered a hardship.
‘‘(f) MINIMUM ESSENTIAL COVERAGE.—For purposes
of this section—
‘‘(1) IN GENERAL.—The term ‘minimum essential
coverage’ means any of the following:
‘‘(A) GOVERNMENT SPONSORED PROGRAMS.—
Coverage under—
‘‘(i) the Medicare program under part A of
title XVIII of the Social Security Act,
‘‘(ii) the Medicaid program under title XIX of
the Social Security Act,
‘‘(iii) the CHIP program under title XXI of
the Social Security Act,
‘‘(iv) the TRICARE for Life program,
‘‘(v) the veteran’s health care program under
chapter 17 of title 38, United States Code, or
‘‘(vi) a health plan under section 2504(e) of
title 22, United States Code (relating to Peace
Corps volunteers).
‘‘(B) EMPLOYER-SPONSORED PLAN.—Coverage
under an eligible employer-sponsored plan.
‘‘(C) PLANS IN THE INDIVIDUAL MARKET.—
Coverage under a health plan offered in the
individual market within a State.
‘‘(D)
GRANDFATHERED
HEALTH
PLAN.—
Coverage under a grandfathered health plan.
‘‘(E) OTHER COVERAGE.—Such other health
benefits coverage, such as a State health benefits
risk pool, as the Secretary of Health and Human
Services, in coordination with the Secretary,
recognizes for purposes of this subsection.
‘‘(2) ELIGIBLE EMPLOYER-SPONSORED PLAN.—The
term ‘eligible employer-sponsored plan’ means,
with respect to any employee, a group health plan
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or group health insurance coverage offered by an
employer to the employee which is—
‘‘(A) a GOVERNMENTAL plan (within the
meaning of section 2791(d)(8) of the Public
Health Service Act), or
‘‘(B) any other plan or coverage offered in the
small or large group market within a State.
Such term shall include a grandfathered health plan
described in paragraph (1)(D) offered in a group
market.
‘‘(3) EXCEPTED BENEFITS NOT TREATED AS
MINIMUM
ESSENTIAL
COVERAGE.—The
term
‘minimum essential coverage’ shall not include
health insurance coverage which consists of
coverage of excepted benefits—
‘‘(A) described in paragraph (1) of subsection
(c) of section 2791 of the Public Health Service
Act; or
‘‘(B) described in paragraph (2), (3), or (4) of
such subsection if the benefits are provided
under a separate policy, certificate, or contract of
insurance.
‘‘(4) INDIVIDUALS RESIDING OUTSIDE UNITED
STATES OR RESIDENTS OF TERRITORIES.—Any
applicable individual shall be treated as having
minimum essential coverage for any month—
‘‘(A) if such month occurs during any period
described in subparagraph (A) or (B) of section
911(d)(1) which is applicable to the individual, or
‘‘(B) if such individual is a bona fide resident
of any possession of the United States (as
determined under section 937(a)) for such
month.
‘‘(5) INSURANCE-RELATED TERMS.—Any term used
in this section which is also used in title I of the
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Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act shall
have the same meaning as when used in such title.
‘‘(g) ADMINISTRATION AND PROCEDURE.—
‘‘(1) IN GENERAL.—The penalty provided by this
section shall be paid upon notice and demand by
the Secretary, and except as provided in paragraph
(2), shall be assessed and collected in the same
manner as an assessable penalty under subchapter
B of chapter 68.
‘‘(2) SPECIAL RULES.—Notwithstanding any other
provision of law—
‘‘(A) WAIVER OF CRIMINAL PENALTIES.—In the
case of any failure by a taxpayer to timely pay
any penalty imposed by this section, such
taxpayer shall not be subject to any criminal
prosecution or penalty with respect to such
failure.
‘‘(B) LIMITATIONS ON LIENS AND LEVIES.—The
Secretary shall not—
‘‘(i) file notice of lien with respect to any
property of a taxpayer by reason of any failure
to pay the penalty imposed by this section, or
‘‘(ii) levy on any such property with respect
to such failure.’’.
(c) CLERICAL AMENDMENT.—The table of chapters
for subtitle D of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 is
amended by inserting after the item relating to
chapter 47 the following new item:
‘‘CHAPTER 48—MAINTENANCE OF MINIMUM ESSENTIAL
COVERAGE.”.
(d) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendments made by
this section shall apply to taxable years ending after
December 31, 2013.
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SEC. 1513. SHARED RESPONSIBILITY FOR EMPLOYERS.
(a) IN GENERAL.—Chapter 43 of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1986 is amended by adding at the
end the following:
‘‘SEC. 4980H. SHARED RESPONSIBILITY FOR EMPLOYERS
REGARDING HEALTH COVERAGE.
‘‘(a) LARGE EMPLOYERS NOT OFFERING HEALTH
COVERAGE.—If—
‘‘(1) any applicable large employer fails to offer
to its full-time employees (and their dependents)
the opportunity to enroll in minimum essential
coverage under an eligible employer-sponsored
plan (as defined in section 5000A(f)(2)) for any
month, and
‘‘(2) at least one full-time employee of the
applicable large employer has been certified to the
employer under section 1411 of the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act as having
enrolled for such month in a qualified health plan
with respect to which an applicable premium tax
credit or cost-sharing reduction is allowed or paid
with respect to the employee,
then there is hereby imposed on the employer an
assessable payment equal to the product of the
applicable payment amount and the number of
individuals employed by the employer as full-time
employees during such month.
‘‘(b) LARGE EMPLOYERS OFFERING COVERAGE WITH
EMPLOYEES WHO QUALIFY FOR PREMIUM TAX CREDITS
OR COST-SHARING REDUCTIONS.—
‘‘(1) IN GENERAL.—If—
‘‘(A) an applicable large employer offers to its
full-time employees (and their dependents) the
opportunity to enroll in minimum essential
coverage under an eligible employer-sponsored
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plan (as defined in section 5000A(f)(2)) for any
month, and
‘‘(B) 1 or more full-time employees of the
applicable large employer has been certified to
the employer under section 1411 of the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act as having
enrolled for such month in a qualified health
plan with respect to which an applicable
premium tax credit or cost-sharing reduction is
allowed or paid with respect to the employee,
then there is hereby imposed on the employer an
assessable payment equal to the product of the
number of full-time employees of the applicable large
employer described in subparagraph (B) for such
month and an amount equal to 1/12 of $3,000.
‘‘(2) OVERALL LIMITATION.—The aggregate
amount of tax determined under paragraph (1)
with respect to all employees of an applicable large
employer for any month shall not exceed the
product of the applicable payment amount and the
number of individuals employed by the employer
as full-time employees during such month.
“(3) SPECIAL RULES FOR EMPLOYERS PROVIDING
FREE CHOICE VOUCHERS. .— No assessable payment
shall be imposed under paragraph (1) for any
month with respect to any employee to whom the
employer provides a free choice voucher under
section 10108 of the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act for such month.
‘‘(c) DEFINITIONS AND SPECIAL RULES.—For
purposes of this section—
‘‘(1) APPLICABLE PAYMENT AMOUNT.—The term
‘applicable payment amount’ means, with respect
to any month, 1Ú12 of $2000.
‘‘(2) APPLICABLE LARGE EMPLOYER.—
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‘‘(A) IN GENERAL.—The term ‘applicable large
employer’ means, with respect to a calendar
year, an employer who employed an average of
at least 50 full-time employees on business days
during the preceding calendar year.
‘‘(B) EXEMPTION FOR CERTAIN EMPLOYERS.—
‘‘(i) IN GENERAL.—An employer shall not be
considered to employ more than 50 full-time
employees if—
‘‘(I) the employer’s workforce exceeds 50
fulltime employees for 120 days or fewer
during the calendar year, and
‘‘(II) the employees in excess of 50
employed during such 120-day period were
seasonal workers.
‘‘(ii) DEFINITION OF SEASONAL WORKERS.—
The term ‘seasonal worker’ means a worker
who performs labor or services on a seasonal
basis as defined by the Secretary of Labor,
including
workers
covered
by
section
500.20(s)(1) of title 29, Code of Federal
Regulations and retail workers employed
exclusively during holiday seasons.
‘‘(C) RULES FOR DETERMINING EMPLOYER SIZE.—
For purposes of this paragraph—
‘‘(i) APPLICATION OF AGGREGATION RULE FOR
EMPLOYERS.—All persons treated as a single
employer under subsection (b), (c), (m), or (o) of
section 414 of the Internal Revenue Code of
1986 shall be treated as 1 employer.
‘‘(ii) EMPLOYERS NOT IN EXISTENCE IN
PRECEDING YEAR.—In the case of an employer
which was not in existence throughout the
preceding calendar year, the determination of
whether such employer is an applicable large
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employer shall be based on the average
number of employees that it is reasonably
expected such employer will employ on
business days in the current calendar year.
‘‘(iii) PREDECESSORS.—Any reference in this
subsection to an employer shall include a
reference to any predecessor of such employer.
“(D) APPLICATION OF EMPLOYER SIZE TO
ASSESSABLE PENALTIES.—
“(i) IN GENERAL. .—The number of
individuals employed by an APPLICABLE large
employer as full-time employees during any
month shall be reduced by 30 solely for
purposes of calculating—
‘‘(I) the assessable payment under
subsection (a), or
‘‘(II) the overall limitation under
subsection (b)(2).
‘‘(ii) AGGREGATION.—In the case of
persons treated as 1 employer under
subparagraph (C)(i), only 1 reduction under
subclause (I) or (II) shall be allowed with
respect to such persons and such reduction
shall be allocated among such persons ratably
on the basis of the number of full-time
employees employed by each such person.
“(E) FULL-TIME EQUIVALENTS TREATED AS FULLTIME EMPLOYEES.— Solely for purposes of
determining whether an employer is an
applicable large employer under this paragraph,
an employer shall, in addition to the number of
full-time employees for any month otherwise
determined, include for such month a number of
full-time employees determined by dividing the
aggregate number of hours of service of
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employees who are not full-time employees for
the month by 120.
‘‘(3) APPLICABLE PREMIUM TAX CREDIT AND COSTSHARING
REDUCTION.—The
term
‘applicable
premium tax credit and cost-sharing reduction’
means—
‘‘(A) any premium tax credit allowed under
section 36B,
‘‘(B) any cost-sharing reduction under section
1402 of the Patient Protection and Affordable
Care Act, and
‘‘(C) any advance payment of such credit or
reduction under section 1412 of such Act.
‘‘(4) FULL-TIME EMPLOYEE.—
‘‘(A) IN GENERAL.—The term ‘full-time
employee’ means, with respect to any month, an
employee who is employed on average at least 30
hours of service per week.
‘‘(B) HOURS OF SERVICE.—The Secretary, in
consultation with the Secretary of Labor, shall
prescribe such regulations, rules, and guidance
as may be necessary to determine the hours of
service of an employee, including rules for the
application of this paragraph to employees who
are not compensated on an hourly basis.
‘‘(5) INFLATION ADJUSTMENT.—
‘‘(A) IN GENERAL.—In the case of any calendar
year after 2014, each of the dollar amounts in
subsection (b) and paragraph (1) shall be
increased by an amount equal to the product
of—
‘‘(i) such dollar amount, and
‘‘(ii) the premium adjustment percentage (as
defined in section 1302(c)(4) of the Patient
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Protection and Affordable Care Act) for the
calendar year.
‘‘(B) ROUNDING.—If the amount of any
increase under subparagraph (A) is not a
multiple of $10, such increase shall be rounded
to the next lowest multiple of $10.
‘‘(6) OTHER DEFINITIONS.—Any term used in this
section which is also used in the Patient Protection
and Affordable Care Act shall have the same
meaning as when used in such Act.
‘‘(7) TAX NONDEDUCTIBLE.—For denial of
deduction for the tax imposed by this section, see
section 275(a)(6).
‘‘(e) ADMINISTRATION AND PROCEDURE.—
‘‘(1) IN GENERAL.—Any assessable payment
provided by this section shall be paid upon notice
and demand by the Secretary, and shall be
assessed and collected in the same manner as an
assessable penalty under subchapter B of chapter
68.
‘‘(2) TIME FOR PAYMENT.—The Secretary may
provide for the payment of any assessable payment
provided by this section on an annual, monthly, or
other periodic basis as the Secretary may
prescribe.
‘‘(3) COORDINATION WITH CREDITS, ETC..—The
Secretary shall prescribe rules, regulations, or
guidance for the repayment of any assessable
payment (including interest) if such payment is
based on the allowance or payment of an applicable
premium tax credit or cost-sharing reduction with
respect to an employee, such allowance or payment
is subsequently disallowed, and the assessable
payment would not have been required to be made
but for such allowance or payment.’’.
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(b) CLERICAL AMENDMENT.—The table of sections
for chapter 43 of such Code is amended by adding at
the end the following new item:
‘‘Sec. 4980H. Shared responsibility for employers
regarding health coverage.’’.
(c) STUDY AND REPORT OF EFFECT OF TAX ON
WORKERS’ WAGES.—
(1) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of Labor shall
conduct a study to determine whether employees’
wages are reduced by reason of the application of
the assessable payments under section 4980H of
the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 (as added by
the amendments made by this section).
The
Secretary shall make such determination on the
basis of the National Compensation Survey
published by the Bureau of Labor Statistics.
(2) REPORT.—The Secretary shall report the
results of the study under paragraph (1) to the
Committee on Ways and Means of the House of
Representatives and to the Committee on Finance
of the Senate.
(d) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendments made by
this section shall apply to months beginning after
December 31, 2013.
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TITLE IX—REVENUE PROVISIONS
Subtitle A—Revenue Offset Provisions
SEC. 9001- EXCISE TAX ON HIGH COST EMPLOYERSPONSORED HEALTH COVERAGE.
(a) IN GENERAL.—Chapter 43 of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1986, as amended by section 1513,
is amended by adding at the end the following:
‘‘SEC. 4980I. EXCISE TAX ON HIGH COST EMPLOYERSPONSORED HEALTH COVERAGE.
‘‘(a) IMPOSITION OF TAX.—If—
‘‘(1) an employee is covered under any applicable
employer-sponsored coverage of an employer at any
time during a taxable period, and
‘‘(2) there is any excess benefit with respect to
the coverage, there is hereby imposed a tax equal
to 40 percent of the excess benefit.
‘‘(b) EXCESS BENEFIT.—For purposes of this
section—
‘‘(1) IN GENERAL.—The term ‘excess benefit’
means, with respect to any applicable employersponsored coverage made available by an employer
to an employee during any taxable period, the sum
of the excess amounts determined under paragraph
(2) for months during the taxable period.
‘‘(2) MONTHLY EXCESS AMOUNT.—The excess
amount determined under this paragraph for any
month is the excess (if any) of—
‘‘(A) the aggregate cost of the applicable
employer-sponsored coverage of the employee for
the month, over
‘‘(B) an amount equal to 1Ú12 of the annual
limitation under paragraph (3) for the calendar
year in which the month occurs.
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‘‘(3) ANNUAL LIMITATION.—For purposes of this
subsection—
‘‘(A) IN GENERAL.—The annual limitation
under this paragraph for any calendar year is
the dollar limit determined under subparagraph
(C) for the calendar year.
‘‘(B) APPLICABLE ANNUAL LIMITATION.—
“(i) IN GENERAL.—Except as provided in
clause (ii) the annual limitation which applies
for any month shall be determined on the basis
of the type of coverage (as determined under
subsection (f)(1)) provided to the employee by
the employer as of the beginning of the month.
“(ii) MULTIMEMPLOYER PLAN COVERAGE.—
Any coverage provided under a multiemployer
plan (as defined in section 414(f)) shall be
treated as coverage other than self-only
coverage.
‘‘(C) APPLICABLE DOLLAR LIMIT—Except as
provided in subparagraph (D)—
‘‘(i) 2018.—In the case of 2018, the dollar
limit under this subparagraph is—
‘‘(I) in the case of an employee with selfonly coverage, $10,200 multiplied by the
health
cost
adjustment
percentage
(determined by only taking into account selfonly coverage), and
‘‘(II) in the case of an employee with
coverage other than self-only coverage,
$27,500 multiplied by the health cost
adjustment percentage (determined by only
taking into account coverage other than selfonly coverage).
‘‘(ii)
HEALTH
COST
ADJUSTMENT
PERCENTAGE.—For purposes of clause (i), the
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health cost adjustment percentage is equal to
100 percent plus the excess (if any) of—
“(I) the percentage by which the per
employee cost for providing coverage under
the Blue Cross/Blue Shield standard benefit
option under the Federal Employees Health
Benefits Plan for plan year 2018
(determined by using the benefit package for
such coverage in 2010) exceeds such cost for
plan year 2010, over
‘‘(II) 55 percent.
“(iii) AGE AND GENDER ADJUSTMENT. —
“(I)
IN
GENERAL.—
The
amount
determined under subclause (I) or (II) of
clause (i), whichever is applicable, for any
taxable period shall be increased by the
amount determined under subclause (II).
“(II) AMOUNT DETERMINED.—The amount
determined under this subclause is an
amount equal to the excess (if any) of—
‘‘(aa) the premium cost of the Blue
Cross/Blue Shield standard benefit option
under the Federal Employees Health
Benefits Plan for the type of coverage
provided such individual in such taxable
period if priced for the age and gender
characteristics of all employees of the
individual’s employer, over
‘‘(bb) that premium cost for the
provision of such coverage under such
option in such taxable period if priced for
the age and gender characteristics of the
national workforce.
“(iv) EXCEPTION FOR CERTAIN INDIVIDUALS.—
In the case of an individual who is a qualified
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retiree or who participates in a plan sponsored
by an employer the majority of whose
employees covered by the plan are engaged in
a high-risk profession or employed to repair or
install electrical or telecommunications lines—
‘‘(I) the dollar amount in clause (i)(I) shall
be increased by $1,650, and
‘‘(II) the dollar amount in clause (i)(II)
shall be increased by $3,450.
‘‘(iii) SUBSEQUENT YEARS.—In the case of any
calendar year after 2018, each of the dollar
amounts under clauses (i) (after the
application of clause (ii)) and (iv) shall be
increased to the amount equal to such amount
as in effect for the calendar year preceding
such year, increased by an amount equal to the
product of—
‘‘(I) such amount as so in effect, multiplied
by
‘‘(II)
the
cost-of-living
adjustment
determined under section 1(f)(3) for such
year (determined by substituting the
calendar year that is 2 years before such
year for ‘1992’ in subparagraph (B) thereof),
increased by 1 percentage point in the case
of determinations for calendar years
beginning before 2020.
If any amount determined under this clause is not a
multiple of $50, such amount shall be rounded to the
nearest multiple of $50.
“(c) LIABILITY TO PAY TAX.—
‘‘(1) IN GENERAL.—Each coverage provider shall
pay the tax imposed by subsection (a) on its
applicable share of the excess benefit with respect
to an employee for any taxable period.
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‘‘(2) COVERAGE PROVIDER.—For purposes of this
subsection, the term ‘coverage provider’ means
each of the following:
‘‘(A) HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE.—If the
applicable employer-sponsored coverage consists
of coverage under a group health plan which
provides health insurance coverage, the health
insurance issuer.
‘‘(B) HSA AND MSA CONTRIBUTIONS.—If the
applicable employer-sponsored coverage consists
of coverage under an arrangement under which
the employer makes contributions described in
subsection (b) or (d) of section 106, the employer.
‘‘(C) OTHER COVERAGE.—In the case of any
other applicable employer-sponsored coverage,
the person that administers the plan benefits.
‘‘(3) APPLICABLE SHARE.—For purposes of this
subsection, a coverage provider’s applicable share
of an excess benefit for any taxable period is the
amount which bears the same ratio to the amount
of such excess benefit as—
‘‘(A) the cost of the applicable employersponsored coverage provided by the provider to
the employee during such period, bears to
‘‘(B) the aggregate cost of all applicable
employer-sponsored coverage provided to the
employee by all coverage providers during such
period.
‘‘(4) RESPONSIBILITY TO CALCULATE TAX AND
APPLICABLE SHARES.—
‘‘(A) IN GENERAL.—Each employer shall—
‘‘(i) calculate for each taxable period the
amount of the excess benefit subject to the tax
imposed by subsection (a) and the applicable
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share of such excess benefit for each coverage
provider, and
‘‘(ii) notify, at such time and in such manner
as the Secretary may prescribe, the Secretary
and each coverage provider of the amount so
determined for the provider.
‘‘(B) SPECIAL RULE FOR MULTIEMPLOYER
PLANS.—In the case of applicable employersponsored coverage made available to employees
through a multiemployer plan (as defined in
section 414(f)), the plan sponsor shall make the
calculations, and provide the notice, required
under subparagraph (A).
‘‘(d) APPLICABLE EMPLOYER-SPONSORED COVERAGE;
COST.—For purposes of this section—
‘‘(1)
APPLICABLE
EMPLOYER-SPONSORED
COVERAGE.—
‘‘(A) IN GENERAL.—The term ‘applicable
employer-sponsored coverage’ means, with
respect to any employee, coverage under any
group health plan made available to the
employee by an employer which is excludable
from the employee’s gross income under section
106, or would be so excludable if it were
employer-provided coverage (within the meaning
of such section 106).
‘‘(B) EXCEPTIONS.—The term ‘applicable
employer-sponsored coverage’ shall not include—
‘‘(i) any coverage (whether through
insurance or otherwise) described in section
9832(c)(1) (other than subparagraph (G)
thereof) or for long-term care, or
“(ii) any policy under a separate policy,
certificate, or contract of insurance which
provides benefits substantially all of which are
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for treatment of the mouth (including any
organ or structure within the mouth) or for
treatment of the eye, or
‘‘(iii) any coverage described in section
9832(c)(3) the payment for which is not
excludable from gross income and for which a
deduction under section 162(l) is not allowable.
‘‘(C) COVERAGE INCLUDES EMPLOYEE PAID
PORTION.—Coverage
shall be treated as
applicable employer-sponsored coverage without
regard to whether the employer or employee
pays for the coverage.
‘‘(D) SELF-EMPLOYED INDIVIDUAL.—In the case
of an individual who is an employee within the
meaning of section 401(c)(1), coverage under any
group health plan providing health insurance
coverage shall be treated as applicable employersponsored coverage if a deduction is allowable
under section 162(l) with respect to all or any
portion of the cost of the coverage.
‘‘(E) GOVERNMENTAL PLANS INCLUDED.—
Applicable employer-sponsored coverage shall
include coverage under any group health plan
established and maintained primarily for its
civilian employees by the Government of the
United States, by the government of any State or
political subdivision thereof, or by any agency or
instrumentality of any such government.
‘‘(2) DETERMINATION OF COST.—
‘‘(A) IN GENERAL.—The cost of applicable
employer-sponsored
coverage
shall
be
determined under rules similar to the rules of
section 4980B(f)(4), except that in determining
such cost, any portion of the cost of such
coverage which is attributable to the tax
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imposed under this section shall not be taken
into account and the amount of such cost shall be
calculated separately for self-only coverage and
other coverage.
In the case of applicable
employer-sponsored coverage which provides
coverage to retired employees, the plan may
elect to treat a retired employee who has not
attained the age of 65 and a retired employee
who has attained the age of 65 as similarly
situated beneficiaries.
‘‘(B) HEALTH FSAS.—In the case of applicable
employer-sponsored coverage consisting of
coverage under a flexible spending arrangement
(as defined in section 106(c)(2)), the cost of the
coverage shall be equal to the sum of—
‘‘(i) the amount of employer contributions
under any salary reduction election under the
arrangement, plus
‘‘(ii)
the
amount
determined
under
subparagraph (A) with respect to any
reimbursement under the arrangement in
excess of the contributions described in clause
(i).
‘‘(C) ARCHER MSAS AND HSAS.—In the case of
applicable
employer-sponsored
coverage
consisting of coverage under an arrangement
under which the employer makes contributions
described in subsection (b) or (d) of section 106,
the cost of the coverage shall be equal to the
amount of employer contributions under the
arrangement.
‘‘(D) ALLOCATION ON A MONTHLY BASIS.—If cost
is determined on other than a monthly basis, the
cost shall be allocated to months in a taxable
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period on such basis as the Secretary may
prescribe.
“3) EMPLOYEE.—The term ‘employee’ includes
any former employee, surviving spouse, or other
primary insured individual.
‘‘(e) PENALTY FOR FAILURE TO PROPERLY CALCULATE
EXCESS BENEFIT.—
‘‘(1) IN GENERAL.—If, for any taxable period, the
tax imposed by subsection (a) exceeds the tax
determined under such subsection with respect to
the total excess benefit calculated by the employer
or plan sponsor under subsection (c)(4)—
‘‘(A) each coverage provider shall pay the tax
on its applicable share (determined in the same
manner as under subsection (c)(4)) of the excess,
but no penalty shall be imposed on the provider
with respect to such amount, and
‘‘(B) the employer or plan sponsor shall, in
addition to any tax imposed by subsection (a),
pay a penalty in an amount equal to such excess,
plus interest at the underpayment rate
determined under section 6621 for the period
beginning on the due date for the payment of tax
imposed by subsection (a) to which the excess
relates and ending on the date of payment of the
penalty.
‘‘(2) LIMITATIONS ON PENALTY.—
‘‘(A) PENALTY NOT TO APPLY WHERE FAULURE
NOT

DISCOVERED

DILIGENCE.—No

EXERCISING

REASONABLE

penalty shall be imposed by
paragraph (1)(B) on any failure to properly
calculate the excess benefit during any period for
which it is established to the satisfaction of the
Secretary that the employer or plan sponsor
neither knew, nor exercising reasonable
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diligence would have known, that such failure
existed.
‘‘(B) PENALTY NOT TO APPLY TO FAILURES
CORRECTED WITHIN 30 DAYS.—No penalty shall be
imposed by paragraph (1)(B) on any such failure
if—
‘‘(i) such failure was due to reasonable cause
and not to willful neglect, and
‘‘(ii) such failure is corrected during the 30day period beginning on the 1st date that the
employer knew, or exercising reasonable
diligence would have known, that such failure
existed.
‘‘(C) WAIVER BY SECRETARY.—In the case of any
such failure which is due to reasonable cause
and not to willful neglect, the Secretary may
waive part or all of the penalty imposed by
paragraph (1), to the extent that the payment of
such penalty would be excessive or otherwise
inequitable relative to the failure involved.
‘‘(f) OTHER DEFINITIONS AND SPECIAL RULES.—For
purposes of this section—
‘‘(1) COVERAGE DETERMINATIONS.—
‘‘(A) IN GENERAL.—Except as provided in
subparagraph (B), an employee shall be treated
as having self-only coverage with respect to any
applicable employer-sponsored coverage of an
employer.
‘‘(B) MINIMUM ESSENTIAL COVERAGE.—An
employee shall be treated as having coverage
other than self-only coverage only if the
employee is enrolled in coverage other than selfonly coverage in a group health plan which
provides minimum essential coverage (as defined
in section 5000A(f)) to the employee and at least
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one other beneficiary, and the benefits provided
under such minimum essential coverage do not
vary based on whether any individual covered
under such coverage is the employee or another
beneficiary.
‘‘(2) QUALIFIED RETIREE.—The term ‘qualified
retiree’ means any individual who—
‘‘(A) is receiving coverage by reason of being a
retiree,
‘‘(B) has attained age 55, and
‘‘(C) is not entitled to benefits or eligible for
enrollment under the Medicare program under
title XVIII of the Social Security Act.
‘‘(3)
EMPLOYEES ENGAGED IN HIGH-RISK
PROFESSION.—The term ‘employees engaged in a
high-risk profession’ means law enforcement
officers (as such term is defined in section 1204 of
the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of
1968), employees in fire protection activities (as
such term is defined in section 3(y) of the Fair
Labor Standards Act of 1938), individuals who
provide out-of-hospital emergency medical care
(including
emergency
medical
technicians,
paramedics, and first-responders), individuals
whose primary work is longshore work (as defined
in section 258(b) of the Immigration and
Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1288(b)), determined
without regard to paragraph (2) thereof), and
individuals engaged in the construction, mining,
agriculture (not including food processing),
forestry, and fishing industries.
Such term
includes an employee who is retired from a highrisk profession described in the preceding sentence,
if such employee satisfied the requirements of such
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sentence for a period of not less than 20 years
during the employee’s employment.
‘‘(4) GROUP HEALTH PLAN.—The term ‘group
health plan’ has the meaning given such term by
section 5000(b)(1).
‘‘(5) HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE; HEALTH
INSURANCE ISSUER.—
‘‘(A) HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE.—The term
‘health insurance coverage’ has the meaning
given such term by section 9832(b)(1) (applied
without regard to subparagraph (B) thereof,
except as provided by the Secretary in
regulations).
‘‘(B) HEALTH INSURANCE ISSUER.—The term
‘health insurance issuer’ has the meaning given
such term by section 9832(b)(2).
‘‘(6) PERSON THAT ADMINISTERS THE PLAN
BENEFITS.—The term ‘person that administers the
plan benefits’ shall include the plan sponsor if the
plan sponsor administers benefits under the plan.
‘‘(7) PLAN SPONSOR.—The term ‘plan sponsor’ has
the meaning given such term in section 3(16)(B) of
the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of
1974.
‘‘(8) TAXABLE PERIOD.—The term ‘taxable period’
means the calendar year or such shorter period as
the Secretary may prescribe. The Secretary may
have different taxable periods for employers of
varying sizes.
‘‘(9) AGGREGATION RULES.—All employers treated
as a single employer under subsection (b), (c), (m),
or (o) of section 414 shall be treated as a single
employer.
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‘‘(10) DENIAL OF DEDUCTION.—For denial of a
deduction for the tax imposed by this section, see
section 275(a)(6).
‘‘(g) REGULATIONS.—The Secretary shall prescribe
such regulations as may be necessary to carry out
this section.’’.
(b) CLERICAL AMENDMENT.—The table of sections
for chapter 43 of such Code, as amended by section
1513, is amended by adding at the end the following
new item:
‘‘Sec. 4980I. Excise tax on high cost employersponsored health coverage.’’.
(c) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendments made by
this section shall apply to taxable years beginning
after December 31, 2017.
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SEC. 9002. INCLUSION OF COST OF EMPLOYERSPONSORED HEALTH COVERAGE ON W-2.
(a) IN GENERAL.—Section 6051(a) of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1986 (relating to receipts for
employees) is amended by striking ‘‘and’’ at the end of
paragraph (12), by striking the period at the end of
paragraph (13) and inserting ‘‘, and’’, and by adding
after paragraph (13) the following new paragraph:
‘‘(14) the aggregate cost (determined under rules
similar to the rules of section 4980B(f)(4)) of
applicable employer-sponsored coverage (as defined
in section 4980I(d)(1)), except that this paragraph
shall not apply to—
‘‘(A) coverage to which paragraphs (11) and
(12) apply, or
‘‘(B) the amount of any salary reduction
contributions
to
a
flexible
spending
arrangement (within the meaning of section
125).’’.
(b) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendments made by
this section shall apply to taxable years beginning
after December 31, 2010.
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SEC. 9003. DISTRIBUTIONS FOR MEDICINE QUALIFIED
ONLY IF FOR PRESCRIBED DRUG OR INSULIN.
(a) HSAS.—Subparagraph (A) of section 223(d)(2)
of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 is amended by
adding at the end the following: ‘‘Such term shall
include an amount paid for medicine or a drug only if
such medicine or drug is a prescribed drug
(determined without regard to whether such drug is
available without a prescription) or is insulin.’’.
(b) ARCHER MSAS.—Subparagraph (A) of section
220(d)(2) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 is
amended by adding at the end the following: ‘‘Such
term shall include an amount paid for medicine or a
drug only if such medicine or drug is a prescribed
drug (determined without regard to whether such
drug is available without a prescription) or is
insulin.’’.
(c) HEALTH FLEXIBLE SPENDING ARRANGEMENTS
AND HEALTH REIMBURSEMENT ARRANGEMENTS.—
Section 106 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 is
amended by adding at the end the following new
subsection:
‘‘(f) REIMBURSEMENTS FOR MEDICINE RESTRICTED TO
PRESCRIBED DRUGS AND INSULIN.—For purposes of
this section and section 105, reimbursement for
expenses incurred for a medicine or a drug shall be
treated as a reimbursement for medical expenses
only if such medicine or drug is a prescribed drug
(determined without regard to whether such drug is
available without a prescription) or is insulin.’’.
(d) EFFECTIVE DATES.—
(1) DISTRIBUTIONS FROM SAVINGS ACCOUNTS.—
The amendments made by subsections (a) and (b)
shall apply to amounts paid with respect to taxable
years beginning after December 31, 2010.
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(2) REIMBURSEMENTS.—The amendment made by
subsection (c) shall apply to expenses incurred with
respect to taxable years beginning after December
31, 2010.
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SEC. 9004. INCREASE IN ADDITIONAL TAX ON
DISTRIBUTIONS FROM HSAS AND ARCHER MSAS NOT
USED FOR QUALIFIED MEDICAL EXPENSES.
(a) HSAS.—Section 223(f)(4)(A) of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1986 is amended by striking ‘‘10
percent’’ and inserting ‘’20 percent’’.
(b) ARCHER MSAS.—Section 220(f)(4)(A) of the
Internal Revenue Code of 1986 is amended by
striking ‘‘15 percent’’ and inserting ‘‘20 percent’’.
(c) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendments made by
this section shall apply to distributions made after
December 31, 2010.
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SEC. 9005. LIMITATIONS ON HEALTH FLEXIBLE
SPENDING ARRANGEMENTS UNDER CAFETERIA PLANS.
(a) IN GENERAL.—Section 125 of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1986 is amended—
(1) by redesignating subsections (i) and (j) as
subsections (j) and (k), respectively, and
(2) by inserting after subsection (h) the following
new subsection:
‘‘(i) LIMITATION ON HEALTH FLEXIBLE SPENDING
ARRANGEMENTS.—
“(1) IN GENERAL.—For purposes of this section, if
a benefit is provided under a cafeteria plan
through employer contributions to a health flexible
spending arrangement, such benefit shall not be
treated as a qualified benefit unless the cafeteria
plan provides that an employee may not elect for
any taxable year to have salary reduction
contributions in excess of $2,500 made to such
arrangement.
“(2) ADJUSTMENT FOR INFLATION.— In the case of
any taxable year beginning after December 31,
2013, the dollar amount in paragraph (1) shall be
increased by an amount equal to—
‘‘(A) such amount, multiplied by
‘‘(B) the cost-of-living adjustment determined
under section 1(f)(3) for the calendar year in
which such taxable year begins by substituting
‘calendar year 2012’ for ‘calendar year 1992’ in
subparagraph (B) thereof.
If any increase determined under this paragraph is
not a multiple of $50, such increase shall be
rounded to the next lowest multiple of $50.’’.
(b) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendments made by
this section shall apply to taxable years beginning
after December 31, 2010.
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SEC. 9006. EXPANSION OF INFORMATION REPORTING
REQUIREMENTS.
(a) IN GENERAL.—Section 6041 of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1986 is amended by adding at the
end the following new subsections:
‘‘(h)
APPLICATION
TO
CORPORATIONS.—
Notwithstanding any regulation prescribed by the
Secretary before the date of the enactment of this
subsection, for purposes of this section the term
‘person’ includes any corporation that is not an
organization exempt from tax under section 501(a).
‘‘(i) REGULATIONS.—The Secretary may prescribe
such regulations and other guidance as may be
appropriate or necessary to carry out the purposes of
this section, including rules to prevent duplicative
reporting of transactions.’’.
(b) PAYMENTS FOR PROPERTY AND OTHER GROSS
PROCEEDS.—Subsection (a) of section 6041 of the
Internal Revenue Code of 1986 is amended—
(1) by inserting ‘‘amounts in consideration for
property,’’ after ‘‘wages,’’,
(2) by inserting ‘‘gross proceeds,’’ after
‘‘emoluments, or other’’, and
(3) by inserting ‘‘gross proceeds,’’ after ‘‘setting
forth the amount of such’’.
(c) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendments made by
this section shall apply to payments made after
December 31, 2011.
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SEC.
9007.
ADDITIONAL
REQUIREMENTS
FOR
CHARITABLE HOSPITALS.
(a) REQUIREMENTS TO QUALIFY AS SECTION
501(C)(3) CHARITABLE HOSPITAL ORGANIZATION.—
Section 501 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986
(relating to exemption from tax on corporations,
certain trusts, etc.) is amended by redesignating
subsection (r) as subsection (s) and by inserting after
subsection (q) the following new subsection:
‘‘(r) ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS FOR CERTAIN
HOSPITALS.—
‘‘(1) IN GENERAL.—A hospital organization to
which this subsection applies shall not be treated
as described in subsection (c)(3) unless the
organization—
‘‘(A) meets the community health needs
assessment
requirements
described
in
paragraph (3),
‘‘(B) meets the financial assistance policy
requirements described in paragraph (4),
‘‘(C) meets the requirements on charges
described in paragraph (5), and
‘‘(D) meets the billing and collection
requirement described in paragraph (6).
‘‘(2) HOSPITAL ORGANIZATIONS TO WHICH
SUBSECTION APPLIES.—
‘‘(A) IN GENERAL.—This subsection shall apply
to—
‘‘(i) an organization which operates a facility
which is required by a State to be licensed,
registered, or similarly recognized as a
hospital, and
‘‘(ii) any other organization which the
Secretary determines has the provision of
hospital care as its principal function or
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purpose constituting the basis for its
exemption under subsection (c)(3) (determined
without regard to this subsection).
‘‘(B) ORGANIZATIONS WITH MORE THAN 1
HOSPITAL FACILITY.—If a hospital organization
operates more than 1 hospital facility—
‘‘(i) the organization shall meet the
requirements of this subsection separately
with respect to each such facility, and
‘‘(ii) the organization shall not be treated as
described in subsection (c)(3) with respect to
any such facility for which such requirements
are not separately met.
‘‘(3) COMMUNITY HEALTH NEEDS ASSESSMENTS.—
‘‘(A) IN GENERAL.—An organization meets the
requirements of this paragraph with respect to
any taxable year only if the organization—
‘‘(i) has conducted a community health needs
assessment which meets the requirements of
subparagraph (B) in such taxable year or in
either of the 2 taxable years immediately
preceding such taxable year, and
‘‘(ii) has adopted an implementation strategy
to meet the community health needs identified
through such assessment.
‘‘(B) COMMUNITY HEALTH NEEDS ASSESSMENT.—
A community health needs assessment meets
the requirements of this paragraph if such
community health needs assessment—
‘‘(i) takes into account input from persons
who represent the broad interests of the
community served by the hospital facility,
including those with special knowledge of or
expertise in public health, and
‘‘(ii) is made widely available to the public.
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‘‘(4)
FINANCIAL
ASSISTANCE
POLICY.—An
organization meets the requirements of this
paragraph if the organization establishes the
following policies:
‘‘(A) FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE POLICY.—A written
financial assistance policy which includes—
‘‘(i)
eligibility
criteria
for
financial
assistance, and whether such assistance
includes free or discounted care,
‘‘(ii) the basis for calculating amounts
charged to patients,
‘‘(iii) the method for applying for financial
assistance,
‘‘(iv) in the case of an organization which
does not have a separate billing and collections
policy, the actions the organization may take
in the event of nonpayment, including
collections action and reporting to credit
agencies, and
‘‘(v) measures to widely publicize the policy
within the community to be served by the
organization.
‘‘(B) POLICY RELATING TO EMERGENCY MEDICAL
CARE.—A
written
policy
requiring
the
organization to provide, without discrimination,
care for emergency medical conditions (within
the meaning of section 1867 of the Social
Security Act (42 U.S.C. 1395dd)) to individuals
regardless of their eligibility under the financial
assistance policy described in subparagraph (A).
‘‘(5) LIMITATION ON CHARGES.—An organization
meets the requirements of this paragraph if the
organization—
‘‘(A) limits amounts charged for emergency or
other medically necessary care provided to
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individuals eligible for assistance under the
financial assistance policy described in
paragraph (4)(A) to not more than the amounts
generally billed to individuals who have
insurance covering such care, and
‘‘(B) prohibits the use of gross charges.
‘‘(6) BILLING AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS.—
An organization meets the requirement of this
paragraph only if the organization does not engage
in extraordinary collection actions before the
organization has made reasonable efforts to
determine whether the individual is eligible for
assistance under the financial assistance policy
described in paragraph (4)(A).
‘‘(7) REGULATORY AUTHORITY.—The Secretary
shall issue such regulations and guidance as may
be necessary to carry out the provisions of this
subsection, including guidance relating to what
constitutes reasonable efforts to determine the
eligibility of a patient under a financial assistance
policy for purposes of paragraph (6).’’.
(b) EXCISE TAX FOR FAILURES TO MEET HOSPITAL
EXEMPTION REQUIREMENTS.—
(1) IN GENERAL.—Subchapter D of chapter 42 of
the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 (relating to
failure by certain charitable organizations to meet
certain qualification requirements) is amended by
adding at the end the following new section:
‘‘SEC. 4959. TAXES ON FAILURES BY HOSPITAL
ORGANIZATIONS.
‘‘If a hospital organization to which section 501(r)
applies fails to meet the requirement of section
501(r)(3) for any taxable year, there is imposed on the
organization a tax equal to $50,000.’’.
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(2) CONFORMING AMENDMENT.—The table of
sections for subchapter D of chapter 42 of such
Code is amended by adding at the end the
following new item:
‘‘Sec. 4959. Taxes on failures by hospital
organizations.’’.
(c) MANDATORY REVIEW OF TAX EXEMPTION FOR
HOSPITALS.—The Secretary of the Treasury or the
Secretary’s delegate shall review at least once every 3
years the community benefit activities of each
hospital organization to which section 501(r) of the
Internal Revenue Code of 1986 (as added by this
section) applies.
(d) ADDITIONAL REPORTING REQUIREMENTS.—
(1) COMMUNITY HEALTH NEEDS ASSESSMENTS AND
AUDITED FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.—Section 6033(b)
of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 (relating to
certain organizations described in section 501(c)(3))
is amended by striking ‘‘and’’ at the end of
paragraph (14), by redesignating paragraph (15) as
paragraph (16), and by inserting after paragraph
(14) the following new paragraph:
‘‘(15) in the case of an organization to which the
requirements of section 501(r) apply for the taxable
year—
‘‘(A) a description of how the organization is
addressing the needs identified in each
community health needs assessment conducted
under section 501(r)(3) and a description of any
such needs that are not being addressed together
with the reasons why such needs are not being
addressed, and
‘‘(B) the audited financial statements of such
organization (or, in the case of an organization
the financial statements of which are included in
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a consolidated financial statement with other
organizations, such consolidated financial
statement).’’.
(2) TAXES.—Section 6033(b)(10) of such Code is
amended by striking ‘‘and’’ at the end of
subparagraph (B), by inserting ‘‘and’’ at the end of
subparagraph (C), and by adding at the end the
following new subparagraph:
‘‘(D) section 4959 (relating to taxes on failures
by hospital organizations),’’.
(e) REPORTS.—
(1) REPORT ON LEVELS OF CHARITY CARE.—The
Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the
Secretary of Health and Human Services, shall
submit to the Committees on Ways and Means,
Education and Labor, and Energy and Commerce
of the House of Representatives and to the
Committees on Finance and Health, Education,
Labor, and Pensions of the Senate an annual
report on the following:
(A) Information with respect to private taxexempt,
taxable,
and
government-owned
hospitals regarding—
(i) levels of charity care provided,
(ii) bad debt expenses,
(iii) unreimbursed costs for services provided
with respect to means-tested government
programs, and
(iv) unreimbursed costs for services provided
with respect to non-means tested government
programs.
(B) Information with respect to private taxexempt hospitals regarding costs incurred for
community benefit activities.
(2) REPORT ON TRENDS.—
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(A) STUDY.—The Secretary of the Treasury, in
consultation with the Secretary of Health and
Human Services, shall conduct a study on trends
in the information required to be reported under
paragraph (1).
(B) REPORT.—Not later than 5 years after the
date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary
of the Treasury, in consultation with the
Secretary of Health and Human Services, shall
submit a report on the study conducted under
subparagraph (A) to the Committees on Ways
and Means, Education and Labor, and Energy
and Commerce of the House of Representatives
and to the Committees on Finance and Health,
Education, Labor, and Pensions of the Senate.
(f) EFFECTIVE DATES.—
(1) IN GENERAL.—Except as provided in
paragraphs (2) and (3), the amendments made by
this section shall apply to taxable years beginning
after the date of the enactment of this Act.
(2) COMMUNITY HEALTH NEEDS ASSESSMENT.—
The requirements of section 501(r)(3) of the
Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as added by
subsection (a), shall apply to taxable years
beginning after the date which is 2 years after the
date of the enactment of this Act.
(3) EXCISE TAX.—The amendments made by
subsection (b) shall apply to failures occurring
after the date of the enactment of this Act.
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SEC. 9008. IMPOSITION OF ANNUAL FEE ON BRANDED
PRESCRIPTION PHARMACEUTICAL MANUFACTURERS AND
IMPORTERS.
(a) IMPOSITION OF FEE.—
(1) IN GENERAL.—Each covered entity engaged in
the business of manufacturing or importing
branded prescription drugs shall pay to the
Secretary of the Treasury not later than the
annual payment date of each calendar year
beginning after 2009 a fee in an amount
determined under subsection (b).
(2) ANNUAL PAYMENT DATE.—For purposes of this
section, the term ‘‘annual payment date’’ means
with respect to any calendar year the date
determined by the Secretary, but in no event later
than September 30 of such calendar year.
(b) DETERMINATION OF FEE AMOUNT.—
(1) IN GENERAL.—With respect to each covered
entity, the fee under this section for any calendar
year shall be equal to an amount that bears the
same ratio to the applicable amount as—
(A) the covered entity’s branded prescription
drug sales taken into account during the
preceding calendar year, bear to
(B) the aggregate branded prescription drug
sales of all covered entities taken into account
during such preceding calendar year.
(2) SALES TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT.—For purposes of
paragraph (1), the branded prescription drug sales
taken into account during any calendar year with
respect to any covered entity shall be determined
in accordance with the following table:
With respect to a covered The percentage of such
entity’s
aggregate sales taken into account
branded
prescription is:
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drug sales during the
calendar year that are:
Not
more
than
$5,000,000 ......................
More than $5,000,000 but
not
more
than
$125,000,000.
More than $125,000,000
but not more than
$225,000,000.
More than $225,000,000
but not more than
$400,000,000.
More
than
$400,000,000.....................

0 percent

10 percent

40 percent

75 percent
100 percent.

DETERMINATION.—The
(3)
SECRETARIAL
Secretary of the Treasury shall calculate the
amount of each covered entity’s fee for any
calendar year under paragraph (1). In calculating
such amount, the Secretary of the Treasury shall
determine
such
covered
entity’s
branded
prescription drug sales on the basis of reports
submitted under subsection (g) and through the
use of any other source of information available to
the Secretary of the Treasury.
(4) APPLICABLE AMOUNT.—For purposes of
paragraph (1), the applicable amount shall be
determined in accordance with the following table:
Calendar year
Applicable amount
2011......................................... $2,500,000,000
2012......................................... $2,800,000,000
2013......................................... $2,800,000,000
2014......................................... $3,000,000,000
2015......................................... $3,000,000,000

131a
2016.........................................
2017.........................................
2018.........................................
2019 and thereafter................

$3,000,000,000
$4,000,000,000
$4,100,000,000
$2,800,000,000

(c) TRANSFER OF FEES TO MEDICARE PART B TRUST
FUND.—There is hereby appropriated to the Federal
Supplementary Medical Insurance Trust Fund
established under section 1841 of the Social Security
Act an amount equal to the fees received by the
Secretary of the Treasury under subsection (a).
(d) COVERED ENTITY.—
(1) IN GENERAL.—For purposes of this section,
the term ‘‘covered entity’’ means any manufacturer
or importer with gross receipts from branded
prescription drug sales.
(2) CONTROLLED GROUPS.—
(A) IN GENERAL.—For purposes of this
subsection, all persons treated as a single
employer under subsection (a) or (b) of section 52
of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 or
subsection (m) or (o) of section 414 of such Code
shall be treated as a single covered entity.
(B) INCLUSION OF FOREIGN CORPORATIONS.—
For purposes of subparagraph (A), in applying
subsections (a) and (b) of section 52 of such Code
to this section, section 1563 of such Code shall be
applied without regard to subsection (b)(2)(C)
thereof.
(3) JOINT AND SEVERAL LIABILITY.—If more than
one person is liable for payment of the fee under
subsection (a) with respect to a single covered
entity by reason of the application of paragraph (2),
all such persons shall be jointly and severally
liable for payment of such fee.
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(e) BRANDED PRESCRIPTION DRUG SALES.—For
purposes of this section—
(1)
IN
GENERAL.—The
term
‘‘branded
prescription drug sales’’ means sales of branded
prescription drugs to any specified government
program or pursuant to coverage under any such
program.
(2) BRANDED PRESCRIPTION DRUGS.—
(A) IN GENERAL.—The term ‘‘branded
prescription drug’’ means—
(i) any prescription drug the application for
which was submitted under section 505(b) of
the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (21
U.S.C. 355(b)), or
(ii) any biological product the license for
which was submitted under section 351(a) of
the Public Health Service Act (42 U.S.C.
262(a)).
(B) PRESCRIPTION DRUG.—For purposes of
subparagraph (A)(i), the term ‘‘prescription
drug’’ means any drug which is subject to section
503(b) of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic
Act (21 U.S.C. 353(b)).
(3) EXCLUSION OF ORPHAN DRUG SALES.—The
term ‘‘branded prescription drug sales’’ shall not
include sales of any drug or biological product with
respect to which a credit was allowed for any
taxable year under section 45C of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1986. The preceding sentence
shall not apply with respect to any such drug or
biological product after the date on which such
drug or biological product is approved by the Food
and Drug Administration for marketing for any
indication other than the treatment of the rare
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disease or condition with respect to which such
credit was allowed.
(4) SPECIFIED GOVERNMENT PROGRAM.—The term
‘‘specified government program’’ means—
(A) the Medicare Part D program under part D
of title XVIII of the Social Security Act,
(B) the Medicare Part B program under part B
of title XVIII of the Social Security Act,
(C) the Medicaid program under title XIX of
the Social Security Act,
(D) any program under which branded
prescription drugs are procured by the
Department of Veterans Affairs,
(E) any program under which branded
prescription drugs are procured by the
Department of Defense, or
(F) the TRICARE retail pharmacy program
under section 1074g of title 10, United States
Code.
(f) TAX TREATMENTS OF FEES.—The fees imposed by
this section—
(1) for purposes of subtitle F of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1986, shall be treated as excise
taxes with respect to which only civil actions for
refund under procedures of such subtitle shall
apply, and
(2) for purposes of section 275 of such Code, shall
be considered to be a tax described in section
275(a)(6).
(g) REPORTING REQUIREMENT.—Not later than the
date determined by the Secretary of the Treasury
following the end of any calendar year, the Secretary
of Health and Human Services, the Secretary of
Veterans Affairs, and the Secretary of Defense shall
report to the Secretary of the Treasury, in such
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manner as the Secretary of the Treasury prescribes,
the total branded prescription drug sales for each
covered entity with respect to each specified
government program under such Secretary’s
jurisdiction using the following methodology:
(1) MEDICARE PART D PROGRAM.—The Secretary
of Health and Human Services shall report, for
each covered entity and for each branded
prescription drug of the covered entity covered by
the Medicare Part D program, the product of—
(A) the per-unit ingredient cost, as reported to
the Secretary of Health and Human Services by
prescription drug plans and Medicare Advantage
prescription drug plans, minus any per-unit
rebate, discount, or other price concession
provided by the covered entity, as reported to the
Secretary of Health and Human Services by the
prescription drug plans and Medicare Advantage
prescription drug plans, and
(B) the number of units of the branded
prescription drug paid for under the Medicare
Part D program.
(2) MEDICARE PART B PROGRAM.—The Secretary
of Health and Human Services shall report, for
each covered entity and for each branded
prescription drug of the covered entity covered by
the Medicare Part B program under section
1862(a) of the Social Security Act, the product of—
(A) the per-unit average sales price (as defined
in section 1847A(c) of the Social Security Act) or
the per-unit Part B payment rate for a
separately paid branded prescription drug
without a reported average sales price, and

135a
(B) the number of units of the branded
prescription drug paid for under the Medicare
Part B program.
The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services
shall establish a process for determining the units
and the allocated price for purposes of this section for
those branded prescription drugs that are not
separately payable or for which National Drug Codes
are not reported.
(3) MEDICAID PROGRAM.—The Secretary of
Health and Human Services shall report, for each
covered entity and for each branded prescription
drug of the covered entity covered under the
Medicaid program, the product of—
(A) the per-unit ingredient cost paid to
pharmacies by States for the branded
prescription drug dispensed to Medicaid
beneficiaries, minus any per-unit rebate paid by
the covered entity under section 1927 of the
Social Security Act and any State supplemental
rebate, and
(B) the number of units of the branded
prescription drug paid for under the Medicaid
program.
OF
VETERANS
AFFAIRS
(4)
DEPARTMENT
PROGRAMS.—The Secretary of Veterans Affairs
shall report, for each covered entity and for each
branded prescription drug of the covered entity the
total amount paid for each such branded
prescription drug procured by the Department of
Veterans Affairs for its beneficiaries.
(5) DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE PROGRAMS AND
TRICARE.—The Secretary of Defense shall report,
for each covered entity and for each branded
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prescription drug of the covered entity, the sum
of—
(A) the total amount paid for each such
branded prescription drug procured by the
Department of Defense for its beneficiaries, and
(B) for each such branded prescription drug
dispensed under the TRICARE retail pharmacy
program, the product of—
(i) the per-unit ingredient cost, minus any
per-unit rebate paid by the covered entity, and
(ii) the number of units of the branded
prescription drug dispensed under such
program.
(h) SECRETARY.—For purposes of this section, the
term ‘‘Secretary’’ includes the Secretary’s delegate.
(i) GUIDANCE.—The Secretary of the Treasury shall
publish guidance necessary to carry out the purposes
of this section.
(j) EFFECTIVE DATE.—This section shall apply to
calendar years beginning after December 31, 2010.
(k) CONFORMING AMENDMENT.—Section 1841(a) of
the Social Security Act is amended by inserting ‘‘or
section 9008(c) of the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act of 2009’’ after ‘‘this part’’.
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SEC. 9009. IMPOSITION OF ANNUAL FEE ON MEDICAL
DEVICE MANUFACTURERS AND IMPORTERS.

Subchapter E—Medical Devices
‘‘Sec. 4191. Medical devices.

‘‘SEC. 4191. MEDICAL DEVICES.
‘‘(a) IN GENERAL.—There is hereby imposed on the
sale of any taxable medical device by the
manufacturer, producer, or importer a tax equal to
2.3 percent of the price for which so sold.
‘‘(b) TAXABLE MEDICAL DEVICE.—For purposes of
this section—
‘‘(1) IN GENERAL.—The term ‘taxable medical
device’ means any device (as defined in section
201(h) of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic
Act) intended for humans.
‘‘(2) EXEMPTIONS.—Such term shall not include— ‘
‘(A) eyeglasses,
‘‘(B) contact lenses,
‘‘(C) hearing aids, and
‘‘(D) any other medical device determined by
the Secretary to be of a type which is generally
purchased by the general public at retail for
individual use.’’, and
(2) by INSERTING after the item relating to
subchapter D in the table of subchapters for such
chapter the following new item:
‘‘SUBCHAPTER E. MEDICAL DEVICES’’.
(b) Certain Exemptions Not to Apply.—
(1) Section 4221(a) of the Internal Revenue Code
of 1986 is amended by adding at the end the
following new sentence: ‘‘In the case of the tax
imposed by section 4191, paragraphs (3), (4), (5),
and (6) shall not apply.’’.
(2) Section 6416(b)(2) of such Code is amended by
adding at the end the following: ‘‘In the case of the
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tax imposed by section 4191, subparagraphs (B),
(C), (D), and (E) shall not apply.’’.
(c) Effective Date.—The amendments made by this
section shall apply to sales after December 31, 2012.
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SEC. 9010. IMPOSITION OF ANNUAL FEE ON HEALTH
INSURANCE PROVIDERS
(a) IMPOSITION OF FEE.—
(1) IN GENERAL.—Each covered entity engaged in
the business of providing health insurance shall
pay to the Secretary not later than the annual
payment date of each calendar year beginning after
2013 a fee in an amount determined under
subsection (b).
(2) ANNUAL PAYMENT DATE.—For purposes of this
section, the term ‘‘annual payment date’’ means
with respect to any calendar year the date
determined by the Secretary, but in no event later
than September 30 of such calendar year.
(b) DETERMINATION OF FEE AMOUNT.—
(1) IN GENERAL.—With respect to each covered
entity under this section for any calendar year
shall be equal to an amount that bears the same
ratio to the applicable amount as—
(A) the covered entity’s net premiums written
with respect to health insurance for any United
States health risk that are taken into account
during the preceding calendar year, bears to
(B) the aggregate net premiums written with
respect to such health insurance of all covered
entities that are taken into account during such
preceding calendar year.
(2) AMOUNTS TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT.—For
purposes of paragraph (1),
(A) IN GENERAL. .—The net premiums written
with respect to health insurance for any United
States health risk that are taken into account
during any calendar year with respect to any
covered entity shall be determined in accordance
with the following table:
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With respect to a covered The percentage of net
entity’s net premiums premiums written that
written
during
the are taken into account
calendar year are:
is:
Not
more
than
$25,000,000 ...................... 0 percent
More than $25,000,000
but not more than
$50,000,000.
50 percent
More
than
$50,000,000....................... 100 percent.
(B) PARTIAL EXCLUSION FOR CERTAIN EXEMPT
ACTIVITIES.—After
the
application
of
subparagraph (A), only 50 percent of the
remaining net premiums written with respect to
health insurance for any United States health
risk that are attributable to the activities (other
than activities of an unrelated trade or business
as defined in section 513 of the Internal Revenue
Code of 1986) of any covered entity qualifying
under paragraph (3), (4), (26), or (29) of section
501(c) of such Code and exempt from tax under
section 501(a) of such Code shall be taken into
account.
DETERMINATION.—The
(3)
SECRETARIAL
Secretary shall calculate the amount of each
covered entity’s fee for any calendar year under
paragraph (1). In calculating such amount, the
Secretary shall determine such covered entity’s net
premiums written with respect to any United
States health risk on the basis of reports submitted
by the covered entity under subsection (g) and
through the use of any other source of information
available to the Secretary.
(c) COVERED ENTITY.—

141a
(1) IN GENERAL.—For purposes of this section,
the term ‘‘covered entity’’ means any entity which
provides health insurance for any United States
health risk during the calendar year in which the
fee under this section is due.
(2) EXCLUSION.—Such term does not include—
(A) any employer to the extent that such
employer self-insures its employees’ health risks,
(B) any governmental entity (except to the
extent such an entity provides health insurance
coverage through the community health
insurance option under section 1323).
(C) any entity—
(i) which is incorporated as a nonprofit
corporation under a State law,
(ii) no part of the net earnings of which
inures to the benefit of any private shareholder
or individual, no substantial part of the
activities of which is carrying on propaganda,
or otherwise attempting, to influence
legislation (except to the extentas otherwise
provided in section 501(h) of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1986), and which does not
participate in, or intervene in (including the
publishing or distributing of statements), any
political campaign on behalf of (or in
opposition to) any candidate for public office,
and (iii) more than 80 percent of the gross
revenues of which is received from government
programs that target low-income, elderly, or
disabled populations under titles XVIII, XIX,
and XXI of the Social Security Act, and
(D) any entity which is described in section
501(c)(9) of such Code and which is established
by an entity provides(other than by an employer
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or employers) for purposes of providing health
insurance coverage through the community
health insurance option under section 1323).care
benefits.
(3) CONTROLLED GROUPS.—
(A) IN GENERAL.—For purposes of this
subsection, all persons treated as a single
employer under subsection (a) or (b) of section 52
of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 or
subsection (m) or (o) of section 414 of such Code
shall be treated as a single covered entity (or
employer for purposes of paragraph (2)).
(B) INCLUSION OF FOREIGN CORPORATIONS.—
For purposes of subparagraph (A), in applying
subsections (a) and (b) of section 52 of such Code
to this section, section 1563 of such Code shall be
applied without regard to subsection (b)(2)(C)
thereof.
If any entity described in subparagraph (C) or
(D) of paragraph (2) is treated as a covered
entity by reason of the application of the
preceding sentence, the net premiums written
with respect to health insurance for any United
States health risk of such entity shall not be
taken into account for purposes of this section.
(4) JOINT AND SEVERAL LIABILITY.— If more than
one person is liable for payment of the fee under
subsection (a) with respect to a single covered
entity by reason of the application of paragraph (3),
all such persons shall be jointly and severally
liable for payment of such fee.
(d) UNITED STATES HEALTH RISK.—For purposes of
this section, the term ‘‘United States health risk’’
means the health risk of any individual who is—
(1) a United States citizen,
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(2) a resident of the United States (within the
meaning of section 7701(b)(1)(A) of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1986), or
(3) located in the United States, with respect to
the period such individual is so located.
(e) APPLICABLE AMOUNT.—For purposes of
subsection (b)(1)—
(1) YEARS BEFORE 2019.—In the case of calendar
years beginning before 2019, the applicable
amount shall be determined in accordance with the
following table:
Calendar year
Applicable amount
2014......................................... $8,000,000,000
2015......................................... $11,300,000,000
2016......................................... $11,300,000,000
2017......................................... $13,900,000,000
2018......................................... $14,300,000,000
(2) Years after 2018.—In the case of any
calendar year beginning after 2018, the applicable
amount shall be the applicable amount for the
preceding calendar year increased by the rate of
premium growth (within the meaning of section
36B(b)(3)(A)(ii) of the Internal Revenue Code of
1986) for such preceding calendar year.
(f) TAX TREATMENT OF FEES.—The fees imposed by
this section—
(1) for purposes of subtitle F of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1986, shall be treated as excise
taxes with respect to which only civil actions for
refund under procedures of such subtitle shall
apply, and
(2) for purposes of section 275 of such Code shall
be considered to be a tax described in section
275(a)(6).
(g) REPORTING REQUIREMENT.—
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(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than the date
determined by the Secretary following the end of
any calendar year, each covered entity shall report
to the Secretary, in such manner as the Secretary
prescribes, the covered entity’s net premiums
written with respect to health insurance for any
United States health risk for such calendar year.
(2) PENALTY FOR FAILURE TO REPORT.—
(A) IN GENERAL.—In the case of any failure to
make a report containing the information
required by paragraph (1) on the date prescribed
therefor (determined with regard to any
extension of time for filing), unless it is shown
that such failure is due to reasonable cause,
there shall be paid by the covered entity failing
to file such report, an amount equal to—
(i) $10,000, plus
(ii) the lesser of—
(I) an amount equal to $1,000, multiplied
by the number of days during which such
failure continues, or
(II) the amount of the fee imposed by this
section for which such report was required.
(B) TREATMENT OF PENALTY.—The penalty
imposed under subparagraph (A)—
(i) shall be treated as a penalty for purposes
of subtitle F of the Internal Revenue Code of
1986,
(ii) shall be paid on notice and demand by
the Secretary and in the same manner as tax
under such Code, and
(iii) with respect to which only civil actions
for refund under procedures of such subtitle F
shall apply.
(3) ACCURACY-RELATED PENALTY.—
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(A) IN GENERAL.— In the case of any
understatement of a covered entity’s net premiums
written with respect to health insurance for any
United States health risk for any calendar year,
there shall be paid by the covered entity making
such understatement, an amount equal to the
excess of—
(i) the amount of the covered entity’s fee under
this section for the calendar year the Secretary
determines should have been paid in the absence
of any such understatement, over
(ii) the amount of such fee the Secretary
determined based on such understatement.
(B) UNDERSTATEMENT.—For purposes of this
paragraph, an understatement of a covered entity’s
net premiums written with respect to health
insurance for any United States health risk for any
calendar year is the difference between the amount
of such net premiums written as reported on the
return filed by the covered entity under paragraph
(1) and the amount of such net premiums written
that should have been reported on such return.
(C) TREATMENT OF PENALTY.—The penalty
imposed under subparagraph (A) shall be subject
to the provisions of subtitle F of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1986 that apply to assessable
penalties imposed under chapter 68 of such Code.
(4) TREATMENT OF INFORMATION.— Section 6103
of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 shall not
apply to any information reported under this
subsection.
(h) ADDITIONAL DEFINITIONS.—For purposes of this
section—
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(1) SECRETARY.—The term ‘‘Secretary’’ means
the Secretary of the Treasury or the Secretary’s
delegate.
(2) UNITED STATES.—The term ‘‘United States’’
means the several States, the District of Columbia,
the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and the
possessions of the United States.
(3) HEALTH INSURANCE.—The term ‘‘health
insurance’’ shall not include—
(A) any insurance coverage described in
paragraph (1)(A) or (3) of section 9832(c) of the
Internal Revenue Code of 1986,
(B) any insurance for long-term care, or
(C) any medicare supplemental health
insurance (as defined in section 1882(g)(1) of the
Social Security Act).
(i) GUIDANCE.—The Secretary shall publish
guidance necessary to carry out the purposes of this
section and shall prescribe such regulations as are
necessary or appropriate to prevent avoidance of the
purposes of this section, including inappropriate
actions taken to qualify as an exempt entity under
subsection (c)(2).
(j) EFFECTIVE DATE.—This section shall apply to
calendar year beginning after December 31, 2013.
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SEC. 9012. ELIMINATION OF DEDUCTION FOR EXPENSES
ALLOCABLE TO MEDICARE PART D SUBSIDY.
(a) IN GENERAL.—Section 139A of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1986 is amended by striking the
second sentence.
(b) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendment made by
this section shall apply to taxable years beginning
after December 31, 2012.
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SEC. 9013. MODIFICATION OF ITEMIZED DEDUCTION FOR
MEDICAL EXPENSES.
(a) IN GENERAL.—Subsection (a) of section 213 of
the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 is amended by
striking ‘‘7.5 percent’’ and inserting ‘‘10 percent’’.
(b) TEMPORARY WAIVER OF INCREASE FOR CERTAIN
SENIORS.—Section 213 of the Internal Revenue Code
of 1986 is amended by adding at the end the
following new subsection:
‘‘(f) SPECIAL RULE FOR 2013, 2014, 2015, AND
2016.—In the case of any taxable year beginning
after December 31, 2012, and ending before January
1, 2017, subsection (a) shall be applied with respect
to a taxpayer by substituting ‘7.5 percent’ for ‘10
percent’ if such taxpayer or such taxpayer’s spouse
has attained age 65 before the close of such taxable
year.’’.
(c) CONFORMING AMENDMENT.—Section 56(b)(1)(B)
of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 is amended by
striking ‘‘by substituting ‘10 percent’ for ‘7.5 percent’
’’ and inserting ‘‘without regard to subsection (f) of
such section’’.
(d) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendments made by
this section shall apply to taxable years beginning
after December 31, 2012.
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SEC. 9014. LIMITATION ON EXCESSIVE REMUNERATION
PAID BY CERTAIN HEALTH INSURANCE PROVIDERS.
(a) IN GENERAL.—Section 162(m) of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1986 is amended by adding at the
end the following new subparagraph:
‘‘(6) SPECIAL RULE FOR APPLICATION TO CERTAIN
HEALTH INSURANCE PROVIDERS.—
‘‘(A) IN GENERAL.—No deduction shall be
allowed under this chapter—
‘‘(i) in the case of applicable individual
remuneration which is for any disqualified
taxable year beginning after December 31,
2012, and which is attributable to services
performed by an applicable individual during
such taxable year, to the extent that the
amount of such remuneration exceeds
$500,000, or
‘‘(ii) in the case of deferred deduction
remuneration for any taxable year beginning
after December 31, 2012, which is attributable
to services performed by an applicable
individual during any disqualified taxable year
beginning after December 31, 2009, to the
extent that the amount of such remuneration
exceeds $500,000 reduced (but not below zero)
by the sum of—
‘‘(I)
the
applicable
individual
remuneration for such disqualified taxable
year, plus
‘‘(II) the portion of the deferred deduction
remuneration for such services which was
taken into account under this clause in a
preceding taxable year (or which would have
been taken into account under this clause in
a preceding taxable year if this clause were

150a
applied by substituting ‘December 31, 2009’
for ‘December 31, 2012’ in the matter
preceding subclause (I)).
‘‘(B)
DISQUALIFIED TAXABLE YEAR.—For
purposes of this paragraph, the term
‘disqualified taxable year’ means, with respect to
any employer, any taxable year for which such
employer is a covered health insurance provider.
‘‘(C) COVERED HEALTH INSURANCE PROVIDER.—
For purposes of this paragraph—
‘‘(i) IN GENERAL.—The term ‘covered health
insurance provider’ means—
‘‘(I) with respect to taxable years
beginning after December 31, 2009, and
before January 1, 2013, any employer which
is a health insurance issuer (as defined in
section 9832(b)(2)) and which receives
premiums from providing health insurance
coverage (as defined in section 9832(b)(1)),
and
‘‘(II) with respect to taxable years
beginning after December 31, 2012, any
employer which is a health insurance issuer
(as defined in section 9832(b)(2)) and with
respect to which not less than 25 percent of
the gross premiums received from providing
health insurance coverage (as defined in
section 9832(b)(1)) is from minimum
essential coverage (as defined in section
5000A(f)).
‘‘(ii) AGGREGATION RULES.—Two or more
persons who are treated as a single employer
under subsection (b), (c), (m), or (o) of section
414 shall be treated as a single employer,
except that in applying section 1563(a) for
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purposes of any such subsection, paragraphs
(2) and (3) thereof shall be disregarded.
‘‘(D) APPLICABLE INDIVIDUAL REMUNERATION.—
For purposes of this paragraph, the term
‘applicable individual remuneration’ means, with
respect to any applicable individual for any
disqualified taxable year, the aggregate amount
allowable as a deduction under this chapter for
such taxable year (determined without regard to
this subsection) for remuneration (as defined in
paragraph (4) without regard to subparagraphs
(B), (C), and (D) thereof) for services performed
by such individual (whether or not during the
taxable year). Such term shall not include any
deferred deduction remuneration with respect to
services performed during the disqualified
taxable year.
‘‘(E) DEFERRED DEDUCTION REMUNERATION.—
For purposes of this paragraph, the term
‘deferred
deduction
remuneration’
means
remuneration which would be applicable
individual remuneration for services performed
in a disqualified taxable year but for the fact
that the deduction under this chapter
(determined without regard to this paragraph)
for such remuneration is allowable in a
subsequent taxable year.
‘‘(F) APPLICABLE INDIVIDUAL.—For purposes of
this paragraph, the term ‘applicable individual’
means, with respect to any covered health
insurance provider for any disqualified taxable
year, any individual—
‘‘(i) who is an officer, director, or employee in
such taxable year, or
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‘‘(ii) who provides services for or on behalf of
such covered health insurance provider during
such taxable year.
‘‘(G) COORDINATION.—Rules similar to the
rules of subparagraphs (F) and (G) of paragraph
(4) shall apply for purposes of this paragraph.
‘‘(H) REGULATORY AUTHORITY.—The Secretary
may prescribe such guidance, rules, or
regulations as are necessary to carry out the
purposes of this paragraph.’’.
(b) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendment made by
this section shall apply to taxable years beginning
after December 31, 2009, with respect to services
performed after such date.
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SEC. 9015. ADDITIONAL HOSPITAL INSURANCE TAX ON
HIGH-INCOME TAXPAYERS.
(a) FICA.—
(1) IN GENERAL.—Section 3101(b) of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1986 is amended—
(A) by striking ‘‘In addition’’ and inserting the
following:
‘‘(1) IN GENERAL.—In addition’’,
(B) by striking ‘‘the following percentages of
the’’ and inserting ‘‘1.45 percent of the’’,
(C) by striking ‘‘(as defined in section
3121(b))—’’ and all that follows and inserting
‘‘(as defined in section 3121(b)).’’, and
(D) by adding at the end the following new
paragraph:
‘‘(2) ADDITIONAL TAX.—In addition to the tax
imposed by paragraph (1) and the preceding
subsection, there is hereby imposed on every
taxpayer (other than a corporation, estate, or trust)
a tax equal to 0.9 percent of wages which are
received with respect to employment (as defined in
section 3121(b)) during any taxable year beginning
after December 31, 2012, and which are in excess
of—
‘‘(A) in the case of a joint return, $250,000,
‘‘(B) in the case of a married taxpayer (as
defined in section 7703) filing a separate return,
1Ú2 of the dollar amount determined under
subparagraph (A), and
“(C) in any other case, $200,000.’’.
(2) COLLECTION OF TAX.—Section 3102 of the
Internal Revenue Code of 1986 is amended by
adding at the end the following new subsection:
‘‘(f) SPECIAL RULES FOR ADDITIONAL TAX.—
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‘‘(1) IN GENERAL.—In the case of any tax imposed
by section 3101(b)(2), subsection (a) shall only
apply to the extent to which the taxpayer receives
wages from the employer in excess of $200,000,
and the employer may disregard the amount of
wages received by such taxpayer’s spouse.
‘‘(2) COLLECTION OF AMOUNTS NOT WITHHELD.—To
the extent that the amount of any tax imposed by
section 3101(b)(2) is not collected by the employer,
such tax shall be paid by the employee.
‘‘(3) TAX PAID BY RECIPIENT.—If an employer, in
violation of this chapter, fails to deduct and
withhold the tax imposed by section 3101(b)(2) and
thereafter the tax is paid by the employee, the tax
so required to be deducted and withheld shall not
be collected from the employer, but this paragraph
shall in no case relieve the employer from liability
for any penalties or additions to tax otherwise
applicable in respect of such failure to deduct and
withhold.’’.
(b) SECA.—
(1) IN GENERAL.—Section 1401(b) of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1986 is amended—
(A) by striking ‘‘In addition’’ and inserting
the following:
‘‘(1) IN GENERAL.—In addition’’, and
(B) by adding at the end the following
new paragraph:
‘‘(2) ADDITIONAL TAX.—
‘‘(A) IN GENERAL.—In addition to the tax
imposed by paragraph (1) and the
preceding subsection, there is hereby
imposed on every taxpayer (other than a
corporation, estate, or trust) for each
taxable year beginning after December 31,
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2012, a tax equal to 0.9 percent of the selfemployment income for such taxable year
which is in excess of—
‘‘(i) in the case of a joint return,
$250,000,
“(ii) in the case of a married taxpayer
(as defined in section 7703) filing a
separate return, 1Ú2 of the dollar amount
determined under clause (i), and
‘‘(iii) in any other case, $200,000.
‘‘(B) COORDINATION WITH FICA.—The
amounts under clauses (i), (ii), or (iii)
(whichever is applicable) of subparagraph
(A) shall be reduced (but not below zero)
by the amount of wages taken into
account in determining the tax imposed
under section 3121(b)(2) with respect to
the taxpayer.’’.
(2) NO DEDUCTION FOR ADDITIONAL TAX.—
(A) IN GENERAL.—Section 164(f) of such
Code is amended by inserting ‘‘(other than
the taxes imposed by section 1401(b)(2))’’
after ‘‘section 1401)’’.
(B) DEDUCTION FOR NET EARNINGS FROM
SELF-EMPLOYMENT.—Subparagraph (B) of
section 1402(a)(12) is amended by
inserting ‘‘(determined without regard to
the rate imposed under paragraph (2) of
section 1401(b))’’ after ‘‘for such year’’.
(c) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendments made by
this section shall apply with respect to remuneration
received, and taxable years beginning, after
December 31, 2012.
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SEC. 9016. MODIFICATION OF SECTION 833 TREATMENT
OF CERTAIN HEALTH ORGANIZATIONS.

(a) IN GENERAL.—Subsection (c) of section 833 of
the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 is amended by
adding at the end the following new paragraph:
‘‘(5) NONAPPLICATION OF SECTION IN CASE OF LOW
the
MEDICAL
LOSS
RATIO.—Notwithstanding
preceding paragraphs, this section shall not apply
to any organization unless such organization’s
percentage of total premium revenue expended on
reimbursement for clinical services provided to
enrollees under its policies during such taxable
year (as reported under section 2718 of the Public
Health Service Act) is not less than 85 percent.’’.
(b) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendment made by
this section shall apply to taxable years beginning
after December 31, 2009.

